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7Government and civil society organizations are faced with the considerable task of promoting broad-based economic growth 
among the rural poor without compromising the 
natural resource base, while at the same time increas-
ing the sustainability of their actions. In this context, 
rural community enterprises (RCEs) are increasingly 
being advocated because of their perceived ability to 
combine, with varying degrees of success, economic 
objectives with environmental and social objectives, 
such as sustainable resource management, improved 
local safety nets, increased influence over political 
processes, and member education. Recent changes in 
the political, legal, and market environment in devel-
oping regions offer possibilities for RCE development 
that simply did not exist before. Reduced barriers 
to trade, including tariffs, quantitative restrictions, 
and other barriers, provide conditions for enhanced 
export performance for both traditional and nontra-
ditional products. Structural adjustment programs 
substantially reduced or eliminated state-backed 
marketing boards and production cooperatives, thus 
opening new spaces for RCEs in the commercializa-
tion of agriculture and forest products. In addition, 
emerging segments and niches in agricultural and for-
est product markets, such as organic, certified timber, 
and specialty fruits, provide incentives for new com-
munity-based business endeavors as well as attract 
external investments for upgrading RCE operations. 
Against this backdrop, the Ford Foundation commis-
sioned the Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher 
Education Center (CATIE) to work in collaboration 
with the University of London1 and various local part-
ners to carry out a comprehensive review of RCEs and 
their potential for promoting rural development. This 
review aims at better understanding of the nature of 
RCEs, their asset-building potential, the factors that 
contribute to their success, or lack thereof, and their 
ability to evolve into viable businesses capable of deliv-
ering economic, environmental and social impacts. We 
carried out 26 RCE case studies in the United States 
and 11 selected developing countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, Asia, and Africa. These case stud-
ies cover a range of productive activities, including the 
extraction and processing of timber and nontimber for-
est products (NTFPs), the production of agricultural 
commodities such as coffee, cacao, tea, and banana, 
as well as services (ecotourism). RCEs were identified 
and analyzed in collaboration with local partners using 
common methodological guidelines, combining pri-
mary and secondary data collection. 
Our review of existing research and discussions 
revealed a relatively large gap regarding the capaci-
ties of RCEs to engage in globalizing markets and 
effectively deliver benefits to their members. There 
is consensus that cooperatives and other forms of 
smallholder business organizations are more likely 
to develop into viable businesses when they emerge 
from local development processes, thus promoting 
a sense of ownership and asset building. However, 
there is a poor understanding of the duration and 
potential pitfalls of such processes and the long-term 
commitments required for securing RCE viability. 
Recent discussions highlight that effective gov-
ernance is vital to the overall success of RCEs, 
especially in more demanding market environ-
ments. At the same time it is acknowledged that 
effective governance is difficult to achieve due to 
the multiple interests of stakeholders (e.g., new 
members versus old members, management versus 
members), limited business experience by board of 
directors and members, and the high costs of coor-
dination and communication between them. There 
is consensus that political–legal frameworks are not 
conducive to RCE development. On the other hand, 
there is little discussion or evidence of the capacity 
of governments and service providers to meet effec-
tively the needs of RCEs, their members, or their 
business partners along the value chain. Discussions 
have yet to address fully several important aspects 
related to the design of more effective RCE devel-
opment strategies, nor has systematic analysis of 
the minimum asset endowments (natural, physical, 
Executive summary
1 In the initial stage of this research, collaboration was with Imperial College London (2006), which, at the time, was a constituent college of the 
University of London. In 2007, following Imperial College London’s separation from the University of London, collaboration was transferred to the 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) (2007-2008).
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social, human, financial) required for RCE devel-
opment been carried out. Of particular importance 
is the need to gain more insight into opportunities 
for improving technical, business development, and 
financial services for RCEs and, equally important, 
of better articulating them.
Findings from the case studies
Land tenure is important but not a sine qua non for 
the initial stages of RCE development. While most 
RCEs depend directly on natural capital for their 
business operations, endowment levels vary widely, 
both at enterprise and farm household level. In many 
cases, natural capital at the aggregate (enterprise) 
level is relatively high, while at the farm level it is 
limited. Formal land titling is uncommon. Though 
land tenure is a prerequisite for using land as col-
lateral for credit, its absence—especially for sampled 
cases—does not imply an imminent threat to the 
flow of natural resources from producers (collectors) 
to the RCEs. Both our sample and the literature 
provide ample evidence that investments by small 
producers, for example in perennial crops, also take 
place in the absence of legal access to the resource 
base. 
Significant physical capital accumulation by RCEs 
is possible, but limited processing capacity and rural 
infrastructure remain key constraints. Several RCEs 
have made significant investments in physical capital 
worth hundreds of thousands of dollars, if not several 
million dollars. Despite these considerable invest-
ments, which, in many cases, were realized through 
donor funding and/or credits, most RCEs are not 
equipped with state-of-the-art technology or facili-
ties. In terms of processing capacity, only a few RCEs 
produce finished products for consumption by final 
consumers (e.g., honey and poultry). Most sampled 
RCEs have processing capacity for semifinished prod-
ucts, such as dimensioned sawn wood, cocoa butter 
and powder, and coconut oil. RCEs without basic 
processing capacity tend to be among the least con-
solidated RCEs in the sample. In terms of external 
physical capital, few RCEs have year round road 
access, 24/7 electricity, and secure telephone and 
Internet connection. 
Most sampled RCEs are highly undercapitalized, irre-
spective of size and scale of operations. This situation 
results, in large part, from the inherent constraints 
of the legal form of the RCEs (e.g., cooperative and 
associations), weak management, and limited will-
ingness of members to invest in the RCE. Chronic 
undercapitalization implies constrained working capi-
tal available for RCE business operations (including 
short-term credit services for members), forcing RCEs 
to borrow from formal and informal financial service 
providers; this in turn reduces the net benefits received 
by members. Access to credit is highly variable: RCEs 
with greater access are those with long-term business 
relationships with buyers, relatively stable produc-
tion volumes, and niche market orientation (usually 
certified). 
RCEs can accumulate high endowments of social capi-
tal among members and with buyers and development 
agencies. In several cases, social cohesion is high among 
members, reflected in membership growth, strong cor-
porate identity and commitment to RCE development. 
In other cases, social capital is limited, with members’ 
conception of the RCE as just another intermediary. 
Internal cohesion was more common among RCEs 
oriented toward international niche markets. Several 
RCEs have been successful in establishing long-term 
trust relationships with a few buyers. There was little 
evidence in our sample of significant impact by RCEs 
on local or national political decision-making processes. 
Several RCEs have forged long-term relations with 
donor and development agencies and nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs). In most cases, donor and 
government support (in this order) have been critical 
for RCE establishment and development. 
Relatively little attention has been paid to building 
human capital for RCE administration. Among board 
of directors (BoD) and management there is an over-
all shortage of trained personnel from within the RCE. 
BoD members and managers often acquire their skills 
through a learning-by-doing process. Mandatory rota-
tion of BoD members, and at times, managers, create 
irregular learning curves, hampering RCE perfor-
mance and strategic orientation. In several cases, rules 
and regulations for critical areas of RCE operations 
do not exist. Even in cases where they do exist, they 
are not always monitored or enforced. Despite these 
limitations, there is evidence that, over the course of 
time, BoD members and managers become progres-
sively capable of administering RCE operations and 
less dependent on outside support in terms of funding 
and business administration. 
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There is no single legal form that adequately addresses 
the realities and needs of RCEs. The choice of the 
legal form of RCEs often implies trade-offs in terms 
of taxes versus no taxes, capital accumulation versus 
capital disbursement, internal versus external decision 
control, member versus nonmember participation, 
among others. However, in many cases, not even the 
“second best option” is chosen, due to lack of business 
vision, legal inexperience, and inappropriate advice 
by NGO and development agencies (e.g., priority for 
conservation rather than business development). As a 
result, the legal form of RCEs may impede long-term 
development. 
Weak RCE management capacities remain a major 
impediment for RCE growth and development. In 
some cases, RCEs management is carried out mainly 
by the board of directors or general assembly. On 
the upside, participatory decision making legitimizes 
major RCE decisions. On the downside, develop-
ment of clear strategic perspectives can be hampered 
which such democratic processes are combined with 
weak skills and capacities of local RCE administra-
tors. Though several RCEs have received external 
support for business administration—usually in the 
form of externally funded managers or direct admin-
istration through NGO staff—this form of business 
administration is prone to be unsustainable. In most 
cases, a clear exit strategy exists that allows for pro-
gressive development of local skills and capacities does 
not exist. 
A service environment conducive to RCE develop-
ment rarely exists. Services are often incomplete, 
insufficiently focused, rarely coordinated among differ-
ent service providers, and usually without clear entry 
and exit strategies. In addition, many RCEs face dif-
ficulties in clearly expressing their needs for technical, 
business development, and financial services, as they 
can only demand what they know. Many RCEs have 
yet to receive effective services, at reasonable cost, and 
according to their specific needs. Technical services, for 
example, tend to focus on production and processing of 
low-value products for local markets or international 
markets. Financial services, on the other hand, are 
often provided in isolation from business development 
considerations. Moreover, while technical and financial 
services for RCE development are readily available, 
there are hardly any specialized business development 
service (BDS) providers for the rural sector. 
Long-term accompaniment is critical to RCE 
development. Without long-term assistance from 
NGOs, several sampled RCEs would not be where 
they are. Related services are critical for linking with 
buyers, improving quality, obtaining certification, 
and developing effective administration and export 
procedures. In addition, accompaniment by buyers 
and processors (embedded services) can play a critical 
role in RCE development. Such services are critical 
for acquiring specialized production capacities, devel-
opment of business vision, product placement, and 
resolving various issues related to export and import. 
Buyer-provided technical, business development, or 
financial services are usually offered in the context 
of long-term business relationships. However, these 
tend to be limited to a few RCEs participating in niche 
markets (organic, certified timber, fair trade). 
Many RCEs exhibit low levels of productivity and pro-
cessing capacity. Low farm productivity is due largely 
to lack of improved genetic material, low use of fer-
tilizers, inappropriate pest and disease management, 
and overall limited knowledge of good agricultural 
practices. Among the forest-based RCEs, technical 
skills for timber and NTFP management are relatively 
well-developed, due largely to intensive support from 
development agencies and NGOs (often with a focus 
on biodiversity conservation). An overarching chal-
lenge for RCEs is quality control from the farm/forest 
to the collective enterprise. None of the sampled 
RCEs provides incentives to its members for quality 
production. 
With few exceptions, participation of women in 
RCE management and decision making is very lim-
ited. In some agricultural and NTFP-based RCEs, 
women play a critical role in harvest and processing 
(on farm or in factory) but are largely excluded from 
the boards of directors. In the case of timber-based 
RCEs, women also tend to be excluded from pro-
duction related processes. In many cases, cultural 
factors and women’s domestic tasks largely prevent 
them from playing a more prominent role in RCE 
related decision making. Even women beyond the 
age of child-rearing responsibilities do not readily 
find their way into RCE decision-making boards, 
suggesting that strong barriers to entry exist. There 
is an urgent need to identify women who are inter-
ested in RCE administration and to strengthen their 
entrepreneurial and leadership skills.
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Despite limitations, several RCEs have demonstrated 
capacity to generate income for their members. 
Employment generated by RCEs ranges from any-
thing between a handful of employees to several 
hundred staff. In most cases, RCEs employ between 
10 and 20 staff. Only in cases where processing plays 
a mayor role is significant employment generated. 
Income generated by RCE members figures promi-
nently among overall income sources. However, in 
none of the cases sampled do RCE members live 
exclusively on RCE-derived income. Certified RCEs 
tend to pay prices exceeding those paid by local inter-
mediaries. Some forest-based RCEs pay significant 
annual dividends per member. In situations where 
local marketing conditions are relatively poor, RCEs 
have managed to pay significant price premiums 
(up to 50%) by linking directly with international 
buyers. 
RCEs enhance community development beyond their 
own membership, though the overall scale of impact 
varies widely. By their very nature, forest-based RCEs 
tend to provide benefits to a larger portion of com-
munity members, thereby increasing overall impact 
on the community. Agricultural RCEs, on the other 
hand, typically represent only a subgroup of a given 
community, though certain forms of certification (fair 
trade) and enterprise philosophy make them invest 
part of their proceeds in community development 
(e.g., schools, road construction, wells for drink-
ing water). One of the areas in which RCEs clearly 
stand out is their capacity for sound natural resource 
management. This is not only reflected in the high 
degree of certified enterprises but also in the gener-
ally low-input agriculture or forestry they practice. 
External support provided by environmental NGOs 
has strongly focused on improving the environmental 
performance of RCEs.
The long duration for RCEs to reach maturity (about 
30 to 40 years) compromises the viability and impact 
of related processes. This will be even more criti-
cal in the future, given rapidly globalizing markets 
for agricultural and forest products and related ser-
vices (e.g., ecotourism) and the concomitant rise in 
competition among enterprises. This highlights the 
need for shortcuts to RCE development processes. 
Comprehensive support policies and strategies are 
needed. These in turn require enhanced technical, 
business development, and financial services, better 
articulation between them, and close collaboration 
between the different service providers and donor/
government agencies, along with forging alliances 
with the private sector buyers. 
RCE development is not inherently compatible with 
“triple bottom line” performance. To become eco-
nomically viable businesses, a focus on “enterprise” 
is paramount. Compatibility of the economic goals 
of RCE development with environmental and social 
objectives is most feasible when sustainable pro-
duction modes are in place or strived for. Examples 
include sustainable forest management, organic agri-
culture, and fair-trade-certified operations. It needs to 
be borne in mind that these examples refer to niche 
markets and hence, do not provide broad-based solu-
tions for rural development. Outside of these niches, 
social and environmental objectives are also feasible 
but are second-order objectives in RCE development. 
In situations where environmental management and 
broader community development are paramount, and 
where niche market orientation is not a viable option, 
approaches other than RCE development may be 
required. 
We conclude with recommendations for improving the 
overall service environment for RCE development. 
These are provided for the following three stages 
of RCE development: pre-emergent, emergent, and 
mature. In addition, recommendations distinguish 
between three types of organizations that provide 
services: generalist providers, specialist providers, 
and research and training centers. Recommendations 
incorporate such cross-cutting themes as gender 
promotion, sustainability in service delivery, trust 
development, and multi-stakeholder learning. 
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Changes in the development context 
Throughout sub-Saharan Africa and remote sections 
of Latin America and southern Asia, the livelihoods 
of the poor depend heavily on small-scale agriculture 
and community forest management as a source of 
cash income, household maintenance, and employ-
ment. Despite increasing urbanization in many parts 
of the South, poverty remains mainly a rural issue. 
Projections suggest that over 60% of the poor remain 
rural as late as 2025 (IFAD 2001). An emphasis on 
small-scale agriculture and forest management is 
attractive from a poverty reduction and conserva-
tion standpoint, given the reliance on unskilled labor, 
dispersion in rural areas with high poverty incidence, 
and potential for providing incentives for sustainable 
resource management. However, achieving poverty 
reduction and conservation through such measures 
will depend heavily on the capacities of the rural poor 
to organize effectively into viable businesses capable 
of engaging with markets. 
Over recent decades, smallholders have faced dra-
matic changes in the political, legal, and market 
context in which they operate. Globalization com-
bined with structural adjustment programs, and the 
general tendency toward greater democracy and 
decentralization, have opened up new opportunities 
while demanding far greater capacities in production, 
organization, and marketing. The progressive liberal-
ization of world trade through, for example, successive 
rounds of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) negotiations and the establishment of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), have created 
opportunities for Southern producers and traders to 
access more easily Northern markets. In particular, 
efforts to reduce barriers to trade in agricultural and 
food products, including tariffs, quantitative restric-
tions, and other trade barriers through the Uruguay 
Round, provide necessary conditions for enhanced 
export performance for both traditional and nontra-
ditional products. The volume of food trade increased 
2.1 times from 1980 to 2003—or 3.4% annually, faster 
than the growth of GDP/capita in the world (2.6%) 
(Reardon & Flores 2006). Trade liberalization coin-
cided with rapid growth in demand for nontraditional 
products, especially fruits and vegetables, seafood, 
and meat products, as well as dramatic improve-
ments in transportation, storage, and communication 
technologies.  
In addition to increased trade flows, globalization is 
apparent in the increased interconnectedness of the 
agricultural and forest producers, traders, and proces-
sors. This results largely from the increased emphasis 
on food quality and safety and traceability by major 
processors and retailers, governments, and consum-
ers. Niche markets (e.g., organic agriculture, fair trade, 
certified timber) and otherwise higher-value markets 
(e.g., tropical fresh fruits, off-season vegetables, and 
specialty items, such as berries) are among the fast-
est growing food sectors and can offer opportunities 
for increased value added by smallholders, given 
their relatively high labor supervision requirements. 
According to the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the market for 
certified organic foods in Europe and North America 
was estimated at US$25 billion in 2004. It is estimated 
that smallholders produce up to 70% of organic prod-
ucts imported into the North. According to Fairtrade 
Labeling Organizations (FLO) International, con-
sumers worldwide spent US$2.5 billion on fair trade 
products in 2006, involving some 1.4 million smallhold-
ers and laborers worldwide. Growth in these markets 
is part of a larger trend in the consumer demand driven 
by growing interest in health and well-being, hitherto 
rising discretionary income, and increased interest 
in environmental and social responsibility. Related 
impacts on smallholder–buyer relations include: 
• consumer markets widely diversified beyond basic 
commodities, and final consumption goods having 
a high level of value added beyond the raw mate-
rial value
• demanding product quality specifications required 
by processors and distributors, often translating 
into stricter supply relations with suppliers in the 
South, and opportunities for higher prices 
• increased complexity in developing country mar-
kets in response to the emergence of domestic 
supermarkets and increased incomes and sophis-
tication among urban consumers 
1 Introduction 
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• increasing divergence between the products con-
sumed in developing countries and the products 
produced for developed-country consumers, thus 
requiring technical capacities usually outside the 
experience of smallholders and communities
Defining rural community enterprises 
For government and civil society organizations look-
ing to increase their impact on rural poverty and the 
sustainability of their actions, rural community enter-
prises (RCEs) represent a promising option. These 
enterprises are believed to foster economic growth 
and equity and provide incentives for sustainable 
natural resource management. It is advocated that 
RCEs have this potential because of some unique 
institutional and economic features that distinguish 
them from traditional companies (see Table 1.1). 
In the context of this study, we offer the following 
working definition of RCEs: businesses based on 
the production of agricultural or forest products and 
services, which are owned by small- and medium-
scale producers and pursue multiple objectives, with 
profit maximization as only one among many goals. 
Typically, other important goals include community 
development, improved local safety nets, increased 
influence over political processes, and member edu-
cation. RCEs are found across industries and market 
segments, including specialized food and agricul-
tural products (certified wood, organic agricultural 
products), and large-volume, low-value segments 
where competition tends to be fiercer (e.g., conven-
tional sugar cane, coffee, and rice). They include raw 
material suppliers, vertically integrated processors 
of products, and participants in markets for environ-
mental services, including ecotourism.
Recently there has been considerable enthusiasm 
shown for RCEs in response to falling commodity 
prices, diversification of consumer markets into higher 
value segments, and structural changes in markets 
(World Bank 2000, 2001, Antinori & Bray 2005; Molnar 
et al. 2006; USAID 2006, Donovan 2007; Penrose-
Buckley 2007). However, such interest is not new: 
the link between rural development and cooperatives 
was a common element in development approaches 
during the 1960s and 1970s, usually involving strong 
participation by development agencies for reasons 
other than smallholder income generation (e.g., 
cheaper food supplies and increased export earnings). 
Interest in cooperatives declined sharply during the 
1980s, due largely to structural adjustment policies 
that reduced government involvement in the rural 
sector, combined with the generally weak economic 
performance of rural cooperatives.2 Reasons for the 
renewed interest in smallholder and community-led 
business organization include: 
• New market opportunities: Reduction of tariff and 
nontariff trade barriers, combined with the rapid 
Table 1.1  Institutional features of conventional firms versus RCEs
Conventional firm RCEs 
Owners Investors, stockholders Affiliated members or registered community 
members
Legal form Sole proprietorship, partnership, 
incorporated company 
Cooperative, association, or incorporated 
company (stock owned by RCE members)
Objectives Profit, return on investments (stock price, 
dividends)
Employment, capitalization, dividends, 
public goods/services, sustainable resource 
management
Management 
structure
Owner(s) or managers Board of directors, managers, and/or 
general assembly
Decision control Executive officers, shareholders, auditors, 
board of directors 
Board of directors and general assembly
Capitalization 
restrictions 
No restrictions, externally generated Stipulated by RCE statutes; community 
legal framework
Distribution of 
residual claims
Proportional return on investment Proportional by usage among members or 
equal distribution among members
Sources: Mendoza & Ton (2002), Antinori & Bray (2005), Boyd (2005)
2   Recent writings on the failures of state-driven cooperative development during the 1960s and 1970s include Brass (2007) in Peru, Canterbury 
(2007) in Guyana, Mumbengegwi (1998) in Zimbabwe, and Mporogomyi (1998) in Tanzania. 
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growth in demand for labor-intensive and/or envi-
ronmentally and socially responsible agricultural 
and forest products (e.g., certified organic and fair 
trade markets, certified timber, fresh fruits). 
• Decentralization and privatization: Structural 
adjustment programs substantially scaled down the 
state’s role in smallholder agriculture and commu-
nity forestry, effectively reducing or eliminating 
state-backed marketing boards and production 
cooperatives. This has opened new spaces for 
small-scale activities in the production and com-
mercialization of agriculture and forest products 
and services.
• Changes in the development agenda: Civil society 
organizations have become responsible for deliv-
ering many services once delivered by the state 
(Wennink & Heemskerk 2006), and have adapted 
their objectives and activities to maximize their 
effects and impact in terms of reduction of poverty 
and social exclusion. 
However, relatively little is known about the capaci-
ties of RCEs to engage effectively in increasingly 
complex market environments while at the same time 
deliver sufficient benefits to their members. While glo-
balizing markets offer the potential for higher prices 
and incentives for environmental stewardship, they 
also require smallholders to comply regularly with on-
time delivery of quality products in sufficient volumes 
and at competitive prices. The long-term viability of 
RCEs rests upon the ability to secure the advantages 
for smallholders and communities related to:  
• Lower costs:3 RCEs can increase scale economies in 
production, processing, and handling. By combin-
ing resources among members, RCEs provide an 
institutional framework for increasing scale, pool-
ing risk, developing trust-based relationships with 
buyers by reducing information asymmetry and 
opportunism among smallholders, and promoting 
the sharing of information and the facilitation of 
contract enforcement.
• Increased bargaining power: RCEs can provide 
increased bargaining power vis-à-vis downstream 
buyers and processors. For buyers and proces-
sors, instead of investing time in negotiating with 
individual producers over small volumes, they 
can negotiate with a RCE for a large quantity. 
This generates space for negotiating higher prices 
for products and inputs. 
• Enhanced social welfare: This may include cultural 
and political empowerment and enhanced ability 
to shape the political–legal process, regarding 
such issues as access to government services, tax 
concessions, infrastructure investments, subsidies, 
or resource access (tenure). Local communities 
may benefit from RCE-generated employment 
and investments in services normally the respon-
sibility of government, such as infrastructure and 
welfare programs.  
• Increased access to services: RCEs provide ser-
vices related to input supply (purchase in bulk 
for resale to members), technical services, credit, 
and access to higher-value markets. In some 
cases, services are provided by external organi-
zations, rather than RCEs themselves. NGOs 
and banks often target RCEs to lower their 
transaction costs and exploit economies of scale 
in servicing groups rather than to individual pro-
ducers. 
• Realization of environmental benefits: The abil-
ity to reconcile poverty reduction and resource 
conservation goals depends in part on the insti-
tutional arrangements that shape the incentives 
faced by RCEs and their members. RCEs pro-
vide an institutional framework for promoting 
conservation by lowering costs for processing 
and marketing and facilitating services for the 
implementation of sustainable management 
practices. They can also reduce certification costs 
on average by coordinating inspection, monitor-
ing production, and transmitting information.
Securing these advantages creates costs, which can 
be high, especially if RCEs are not managed effi-
ciently and access to essential resources is scarce. A 
typical RCE may be charged with purchasing inputs 
for members (including certification), bulking pro-
duce from members, paying them, processing into 
semi-elaborated products, arranging certification, 
and coordinating with buyers and external service 
providers. In addition, RCEs are often charged with 
providing capacity-building services for their 
membership. Rural poverty will be affected by RCEs 
to the extent that they provide their members with 
3   Dorward et al. (2005) identify four types of costs incurred by smallholders as a result of market liberalization: 1) costs of production (inputs, labor, ser-
vices); 2) costs of meeting demands for rents (taxes, duties and bribes); 3) costs of coordination (searching, screening, and investing in relationships 
and potential investors); and 4) costs of limiting opportunism (establishing mechanisms for protection against opportunistic behavior). Relative to 
larger-scale producers, smallholders tend to be disfavored in meeting most costs, except for those associated to accessing and supervising labor.
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needed services and that these services benefit their 
members, either directly (asset accumulation) or indi-
rectly (community development). 
Organization of this review 
This review aims to understand better the nature 
of RCEs, the dimension and distribution of returns 
from RCEs, the related development challenges, 
and the factors that facilitate their success or lack 
thereof. In addition to a comprehensive review of 
the existing debates and discussions related to RCE 
development, this report presents results from 26 
case studies of RCE development from the United 
States and 11 selected countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific, and Africa. 
The discussions that follow are divided into four 
chapters. Chapter 2 reviews themes, issues, and 
debates in the literature related to RCE develop-
ment that have emerged over the past decades. 
Chapter 3 outlines our methodological approach, 
particularly regarding the selection of countries and 
RCE cases, and the steps taken to collect and ana-
lyze primary and secondary information. In Chapter 
4, we present the main findings from our case study 
analysis. Chapter 5 draws upon the findings from the 
literature review and the case study analysis to iden-
tify recommendations for the Ford Foundation and 
other donors in their support of RCE development. 
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Overview
Rural community enterprises typically fall into the 
category of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 
given their number of employees, production vol-
umes, and annual turnover. Official definitions of 
SMEs tend to focus on the number of employees 
and the annual turnover, but these criteria vary 
widely across regions and from country to country. 
According to Beck et al. (2003), in the European 
Union, small- and medium-size enterprises have 
between 11 and 50 and 51 and 250 employees, 
respectively, while in the United States, definitions 
vary between 11 to 100 and 101 and 500 employees 
for small- and medium-size enterprises respectively. 
In developing regions, the economic and social con-
texts suggest lower ceilings for SMEs, for example 
a maximum of 100 employees and an annual turn-
over of less than US$ 3 million, according to the 
Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) of the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB). 
Relatively little research has focused on the devel-
opment of collective enterprises for advancing the 
goals related to sustainable rural development, 
namely poverty reduction, resources conservation, 
and social inclusion. Rather, discussion has tended 
to highlight the institutional arrangements for orga-
nizing smallholders into collective enterprises for 
increased market access and the related challenges 
for responding effectively to members’ demand for 
effective services. 
These discussions utilize various terms for small-
holder and community-based enterprises, including 
“cooperatives,” “producer associations,” “rural 
producer organizations,” “community forest enter-
prises,” “micro and small enterprises,” and “farmer 
organizations.” The definitions vary in terms of the 
enterprise objectives (implicit or explicit), institu-
tional arrangements for administration and resource 
management, and relation to the local political–legal 
context. Thus, for purposes of simplicity, here we 
use the term “rural community enterprises” (RCEs) 
in the broad sense to refer to enterprises collectively 
owned by smallholders.
Organizational forms and structures 
This section examines several of the key issues related 
to the organizational setup of (RCEs). These issues 
include objectives for RCE growth and develop-
ment; legal forms for RCEs, namely cooperatives and 
producer associations, and the opportunities and limi-
tations of multitiered organizational structures.  
Objectives for RCE growth and development 
A number of different stakeholders, both internal 
and external to RCEs, influence the goals and objec-
tives set by RCEs for their growth and development. 
Among these are: 
• RCE members: improved livelihood opportuni-
ties and security, through access to commercial 
services (credit, output markets, and technical 
services), lower transaction costs (trust, grading, 
etc.), and improved information flow
• RCE management: maximize profits (greatest 
possible surplus for retention or disbursement to 
members), better positioning in higher-value and 
growing markets, through increased scale (lower 
costs) and increased capitalization
• NGOs and government agencies: reduce rural pov-
erty, environmental conservation, social inclusion, 
gender equity, increased competitiveness (increased 
export performance), and empowerment
Such interests may or may not be in harmony. According 
to LeVay (1983), it is not uncommon in RCEs, as in other 
entrepreneurial ventures, for tension to arise between 
the objectives of keeping the organization small and 
intimate and allowing it to grow. From a management 
point of view, enlarging the scale of the RCE may help 
to increase business performance. Nevertheless, active 
RCE members may judge matters in a different light. 
They have every incentive to demand the greatest pos-
sible returns to the raw product that they supply. The 
RCE may be viewed primarily as a means of achieving 
such- returns, not as a profit-seeking entity in its own 
right. As for the pursuit of growth, if this results in lower 
per-unit returns or in an extension of the membership, 
there may be considerable dissatisfaction amongst 
the active membership. An increase in the number of 
members dilutes control. 
2 Issues and debates in 
RCE development 
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RCE priorities may also be influenced by NGOs and 
government agencies, whose objectives may or may 
not be in line with those of the RCE membership. 
For example, NGO objectives to extend RCE cover-
age to include poorer and more vulnerable groups 
may conflict with members’ desire to restrict access 
to accumulated capital and control. A consensus 
may result in the adoption of a particular set of 
goals, acceptable to all parties, but it may also mask 
dissatisfaction on the part of some stakeholders. 
Which objectives prevail depends upon the relative 
strengths of the various parties.
Recent research focused on forest-based RCEs in 
Mexico and Guatemala (Bray & Merino Pérez 2002, 
Antinori & Bray 2005, Stoian et al. 2007) illustrates the 
potentially complex nature of the trade-offs related to 
RCE development: 
• Empowerment: General assemblies often make 
key decisions on personnel, resource management, 
and marketing without a clear understanding of 
the technical, financial and management issues 
involved in RCE operations. Moreover, they may 
not recognize the right of their elected manager to 
manage. 
• Human capital promotion: Leadership positions 
often change every few years, increasing costs as 
experienced people leave and inexperienced and 
sometimes incompetent people enter. As these 
posts rotate every few years, organizational learn-
ing becomes irregular, resulting in economic losses 
caused by improper management decisions. 
• Community development: General assemblies may 
view the RCE more as a source of jobs and profit 
sharing than as an enterprise based on sound busi-
ness principles. Communities may set relatively 
high wages and favor the use of profits for divi-
dends or investment in community works rather 
than RCE capitalization. 
• Conservation: Emerging groups in communities 
may see conservation as a primary objective and 
object to large-scale resource extraction, resulting 
in conflicts between management for multiple uses 
(e.g., NTFP harvesting and processing, tourism) 
and management for timber. 
Despite these challenges, evidence suggests that RCEs 
have been able to combine democratic participation, 
environmental stewardship, and economic efficiency, 
with varying degrees of success. In Mexico, Antinori 
& Bray (2005) argue that RCEs have distinct advan-
tages and resilience in achieving a balanced social 
and environmental performance based on an overall 
enabling political–legal framework, high endow-
ments of natural capital, and previous experience 
in community organization for common property 
management. In Guatemala, an active RCE sector 
has emerged with a strong emphasis on the sustain-
able management of timber and nontimber products 
for international markets (see Box 2.1). In general, 
improvements in environmental performance tend 
to raise costs only modestly, or they have proven 
cost-effective or even profitable (Vogel 2005). 
In the agricultural sector, an increasing number 
of companies market under fair trade standards, 
whereby prices received by RCEs are negotiated 
by a third party, often well above the conventional 
price (Raynolds et al. 2007). Nevertheless, future 
increased investments in environmental and social 
performance is limited by uneven commitments 
within sectors, limited demand for “green” and 
fair trade products, and in some cases, higher costs 
(Vogel 2005). 
Externally versus internally driven 
organization 
RCE organization can emerge largely based on local 
efforts, such as social movements or other forms of 
collective action for political and economic objec-
tives. These internally driven RCE developments 
are often in reaction to external shocks (natural 
resource degradation, severe price fluctuation) and 
based to varying degrees on local or traditional com-
munity institutions (Bosc et al. 2002). RCEs have 
also emerged from externally driven approaches 
pursued by external actors, mainly NGOs and gov-
ernment agencies, for the promotion of poverty 
reduction and sustainable resource management, 
among other objectives.  
Externally driven approaches have been viewed as a 
major source of the failure of RCEs, often for using 
the wrong conceptual approach, being ignorant of the 
local social structures and other local conditions, and 
demonstrating a tendency to create dependency. In the 
context of state-driven agricultural organization pro-
grams in California’s horticultural sector during the 
1920s, Tobriner (1924) found that cooperatives that 
were the result of local effort provided a more solid 
organizational base for long-term collective business 
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development. Where externally driven approaches 
had been applied in California without accompany-
ing investments in building a sense of ownership by 
members, the results were disappointing: “There is no 
question that outsiders can organize cooperative asso-
ciations even when the farmers themselves feel little 
desire to cooperate. Once a boom for cooperation 
is started…a cooperative association can be erected 
upon no firmer foundation than enthusiasm.” In 2008, 
results from online debate among development prac-
titioners sponsored by FAO, IFAD and others on 
“The Failures of Farmers’ Organizations” highlights 
the misgivings about externally driven approaches:4
•	 “Imposing the formation of producers’ associations 
from the top and political interference are some of 
the reasons for failure” (N. Parthasarathy)
•	 “Reasons for failure of farmers organizations are 
NGOs’ involvement in the association formation: 
farmers are organized by NGOs and are directed 
by these agencies without involving them.” (F. 
Ahmad)
•	 “Our experience has shown that producer cooper-
atives have failed in several fields, mainly because 
of the institutional factors. A cooperative needs 
to be registered and gets to be governed by the 
cooperative law, making it mandatory for it to be 
headed by a government official.” (S. Mysore)
On the other hand, internally driven approaches often 
require investments in building capacities, where learn-
ing is often based on trial and error and can take several 
years to several decades to achieve, depending on the 
local capacities and political and marketing contexts. 
These costs may be reduced in marketing environ-
ments where transaction costs are relatively low and 
quality and volume requirements are minimal, such 
as conventional products for international markets or 
low value products for local markets. However, in the 
context of more demanding markets, externally driven 
approaches need to succeed given the importance of 
outside actors (e.g., NGOs, private sector) in organiz-
ing RCEs and building their capacities, especially in the 
initial stages of RCE development. There is evidence 
that over time RCEs may become less dependent on 
external actors for their survival. For example, during 
its early stages of development, the cacao coopera-
tive El Ceibo in Bolivia depended extensively on the 
German Development Service (DED) for managing 
contacts with international buyers in Europe as well as 
providing technical support. As noted by Bebbington 
(1996: 204): “Before becoming the strong organization 
that it is, El Ceibo has benefited from the support of 
NGOs and specialist institutes. Clearly, the relation-
ship evolves—professionals and NGOs initially helped 
strengthen El Ceibo, which as it becomes stronger, has 
begun to question their role.” Based on lessons learned 
in the organization of NASFAM, an externally driven 
farmer organization serving almost 100,000 Malawian 
smallholders, Chirwa et al. (2005: 5) recommend: 
“[external support] should not rush [RCE] expansion 
but should patiently allow [RCEs] to learn to be effec-
tive and efficient before they begin to expand, which 
may involve errors and a slow road to [RCE] financial 
independence.”
4  For details see: http://www.mediavince.com/gaif08/blog/?lg=en&topicId=17
Box 2.1 Cooperation between government, civil society and rural communities for 
multi-objective RCE development in Petén, Guatemala
The Petén region of Guatemala had long been subject to illegal logging, widespread forest fires and disputes 
over the access to its timber and nontimber resources. The emergence of a community-based social movement 
and increased environmental awareness led to the establishment of the Maya Biosphere Reserve in 1990. 
The multiple use zone of the reserve was opened up by the government for a concession system under which 
both industrial and community concessions became certified under the scheme of the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC). To date, two industrial and 14 community concessions have been certified. The majority of the 
latter operate community-based sawmills for processing of precious woods such as mahogany and tropical 
cedar. RCE development, promoted strongly by donor agencies and local NGOs, has led to an increased 
sense of forest ownership, a drastic reduction of forest fires, and the generation of local employment and 
income (Carrera et al. 2006). In some cases, up to 30% of RCE utilities are reinvested in social projects, while 
dividends have been paid at the end of each year amount to roughly US$ 140–$210/community member 
(Stoian et al. 2007). 
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In summary, both externally and internally driven 
approaches can work. In both cases, membership 
commitment can be maintained by effective mobiliza-
tion and governance based on principles of democracy 
and accountability and clear expectations about entry 
conditions and potential benefits. In either case, exist-
ing organizational structures in target communities 
can be good building blocks for RCE development 
(Kachule et al. 2005).
Organizational forms: rural cooperatives 
RCEs can take several different legal forms, includ-
ing cooperatives, associations, corporations, and 
communal land grants (ejidos), each with specific 
implications in terms of decision making, benefit 
sharing, growth and expansion. The optional orga-
nizational form depends on the characteristics and 
needs of the RCEs in a given market environment. 
Here, we examine the dominant RCE legal form, the 
cooperative. The organizational principles that dif-
ferentiate cooperatives from other legal forms were 
adopted in the mid-1800s in response to negative 
changes in worker−management relations wrought 
by the industrial revolution in England. As they 
emerged in Northern countries, cooperatives devel-
oped a more or less shared set of principles related to 
how they should be owned and governed, including 
voluntary and open membership, democratic member 
control, member economic participation, autonomy 
and independence, and education of members (Shaw 
2006). Cooperatives aim to provide services to their 
members at cost, including transport, bulking, credit, 
processing and marketing, among others. Unlike cor-
porate dividends that reward investors with a share 
of profits, dividends paid out by cooperatives are 
designed to adjust for underpayments for products 
delivered (selling price—price paid upon delivery 
of product) as well as for overcharges for services 
rendered (price paid for services—costs of service 
delivery), usually calculated on an annual basis. 
Successful organization and development of rural 
cooperatives is a formidable task even under the 
best of circumstances. This is largely due to the com-
plex institutional framework of cooperatives that 
combines different interests and aims within a single 
enterprise form (Vitaliano 1983, Nilsson 2001, Cook 
& Plunkett 2006):
• Separation of the ownership and control: 
Cooperatives do not provide management with 
stock ownership or stock options based on a 
cooperative’s performance. This creates a control 
problem, as managers may take decisions that lower 
the value of the RCE’s residual claims (e.g., increase 
pay, reduction of services, increased dues), and RCE 
members do not have full and immediate rights to 
their invested capital, thus limiting their ability to 
respond to ineffective management performance. 
To ensure that members remain the primary benefi-
ciary of collective action, most boards of directors of 
cooperatives are made up of RCE members. 
• The "free rider" problem: When a new member 
joins a cooperative, he/she gains access to all assets 
that earlier generations of members have accumu-
lated. Further, new members generally pay only a 
small entrance fee to join the cooperative, which 
dilutes the equity of existing members. It is diffi-
cult to justify to members that they should invest 
in the cooperative development when they have 
to share this investment with others, the free 
riders. Likewise, when a member leaves a coop-
erative, he does not have access to the assets to 
which he has contributed.  
• Conflicting goals: The board of directors has a 
responsibility in the short run to act in the best 
interest of the cooperative even if its actions 
have a negative long-term impact. Management 
may be unable to pursue goals in the long-term 
interest of its members via a more efficient and 
financially sound business. In addition, there are 
times when growth and diversification are the 
appropriate strategies, but management does 
not have the experience to implement effectively 
these strategies.
• Divergent planning (investment) horizon: Because 
members have different planning horizons, it is 
difficult to make optimal investment decisions. As 
the accumulated assets (residual rights) cannot be 
transferred when members withdraw, the plan-
ning horizon of members is thus reduced. Members 
who will not still be members at the time when an 
investment pays off will oppose it, so that a number 
of potentially profitable investments, particularly 
long-term investments, will not be realized. Capital 
growth is thus hindered and the overall value of the 
enterprise is reduced. 
Evidence suggests that the institutional limita-
tions of cooperatives can be overcome with careful 
institutional design and effective leadership. For 
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example, Lerman and Parliament (1993) argue that 
cooperatives can overcome the institutional limi-
tations for generating investment by members. In 
their analysis of investment levels by 60 U.S. coop-
eratives between 1973 and 1987, they found that, 
on average, cooperatives financed almost half of 
their total investment with member equity—nearly 
the same proportion of total investment financed 
with equity by investor-owned firms. They suggest 
that this was due to special mechanisms of per-
unit returns and allocated patronage refunds that 
cooperatives implemented to broaden their equity 
retention opportunities and thus sustain their growth 
in competitive markets. An emerging literature on 
hybrid cooperative forms highlights the potential for 
increased incentives for investment from members 
and nonmembers alike (see Box 2.2). 
Throughout large sections of developing regions, 
however, cooperatives have only recently emerged 
as self-governed business organizations. Whereas 
cooperatives in the North began as producer-initiated 
and -financed self-help actions, where government 
played little or no direct role (Chloupkova 2002), 
the development of cooperatives in the South has 
been characterized by extensive government involve-
ment in all aspects of the development process. 
During the colonial period, cooperatives were con-
sidered “instruments of acculturation and education 
that could progressively uplift the rural population 
toward a more modern level” (Pollet & Develtere 
2007). Cooperatives were created by colonial admin-
istrators, with vast administrative and technical 
apparatus set up for control and technical assistance. 
Membership in cooperatives was often compulsory. 
Box 2.2  Innovation in the institutional design of rural cooperatives
In the context of increased competition and expanding trade opportunities, as well as structural changes in 
food systems, cooperatives have to increase their access to internal sources of financial capital to implement 
growth strategies and remain competitive. This will require them to innovate in organizational form (Chaddad 
& Cook 2004). Cook & Plunkett (2006) identify three hybrid cooperative structures that relax some of the 
restrictions on traditional cooperative:
• Proportional investment cooperative: ownership rights are nontransferable, nonappreciable and 
redeemable, but members are expected to invest in the cooperative in proportion to their use. Proportional 
use is calculated by measuring each member’s average usage of the cooperative over a given period 
and calculating the member’s minimum equity capital requirement based on relative patronage. Such 
production rights give both a right and an obligation to supply.
• Member–investor cooperative: ownership rights are appreciable and redeemable, with net earnings 
distributed to members in proportion to shareholding in addition or instead of patronage. Cooperative may 
distribute cash dividends in proportion to member shares or set policies that allow for appreciability of 
residual claims. When residual claims are appreciable, members have more incentives to invest and retain 
equity in the cooperative as they are explicitly compensated for their investment.
• New generation cooperative: ownership rights are in the form of tradable and appreciable delivery rights 
restricted to current members. This model introduces ownership rights in the form of delivery rights that 
are tradable among members. Members are required to make upfront investment in delivery rights in 
proportion to their usage so that usage and capital investment are aligned. Success of this model depends 
on the demand for delivery rights and implementation of rules for the proper functions of a market for 
delivery rights.
For existing cooperatives, conversion from traditional to hybrid can resolve some the inherent weaknesses of 
the traditional model. However, such adoption will be challenging in developing countries, where poverty and 
risk aversion may limit smallholders ability to invest in cooperative development.
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Following independence, a populist nationalist 
approach to cooperatives was adopted by many coun-
tries. During this time cooperatives were seen as 
instruments in realizing natural unity and in promot-
ing economic strategies related to import substitution 
and reduced food costs for urban areas. According 
to the International Labor Organization (ILO 2001, 
11), they were “unsuccessful and costly experiments 
carried out on the basis of joint agricultural produc-
tion, collective and state farms as a way of increasing 
smallholder production and productivity.” State-led 
cooperatives frequently became sole suppliers to state 
marketing boards for commodity crops and were sub-
ject to price controls. Cooperative ministers had the 
power to, and frequently did, intervene in board mat-
ters by appointing directors and managers, controlling 
all business operations and making membership of a 
cooperative compulsory (Shaw 2006).
In response to structural adjustment programs of 
the 1980s, state-led cooperatives were privatized and 
came under the control of their members. Those that 
were able to compete as businesses survived. In most 
countries the new restricted role of government was 
codified in new cooperatives laws recognizing coop-
eration as private, autonomous businesses. Civil 
society became the new patrons of the cooperative 
sector, as part of their efforts to address rural poverty 
reduction through increased market access. Evidence 
suggests that in some cases government involvement 
in cooperative development is slowly reducing, but 
remains inconsistent and erratic. In Africa, it ranges 
from nearly no interference for cooperatives in 
Cape Verde and Uganda to high levels of direction 
and interference in Nigeria and Egypt (Shaw 2006). 
Legislative liberalization is recent or current in South 
Africa, Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda. In Kenya and 
Uganda, cooperatives proved themselves ill-prepared 
for the withdrawal of government regulatory powers 
in 1997, which resulted in wide-spread corruption and 
mismanagement. In India, the cooperative model in 
the majority of the states remains characterized by 
high levels of government control and intervention. 
Ramesha (2003) reports that dormant membership, 
lack of participation of members in management, 
lack of professionalism, and undue political and 
bureaucratic intervention have worked together to 
undermine the majority of Indian cooperatives. There 
has been much criticism of levels of state intervention 
at district and regional levels and there is an extensive 
literature discussing the negative economic and social 
impacts of the current environment for cooperative 
development. 
Organizational forms: producer associations 
Producer associations are another frequently chosen 
organizational form, which are often more flexible 
and less complex than the cooperative form. While 
their basic structure is similar to that of a coopera-
tive—with a board of directors, including president, 
vice president, secretary, and oversight commit-
tees—in an association, members may have more 
flexibility to shape how the RCE interacts with exter-
nal actors and may be subject to less interference 
from government agencies. For example, in Malawi, 
the National Smallholders Association of Malawi 
(NASFAM) chose to register as an association rather 
than as a cooperative because, according to the law in 
Malawi, a government official has to sit on the board 
of every cooperative (Penrose-Buckley 2007). In the 
Dominican Republic, associations emerged as a com-
promise to rigid cooperatives structures based on 
collective production and marketing that emerged in 
the agrarian reform period (Meyer 1989). Associations 
afforded Dominican smallholders individual responsi-
bility for their own parcels and the right to receive the 
net benefits from those parcels while maintaining the 
benefits of collection action for some activities (e.g., 
provision of credit and purchase of inputs). In gen-
eral, there is reason to view associations with caution, 
as in some cases they are not designed per se for busi-
ness activities: they do not permit the distribution of 
profits to their members and members can be person-
ally liable for an association’s debts. They also run the 
risk of being perceived as a noncommercial venture 
by members, government agencies and other service 
providers, and downstream buyers and processors.
Multitiered organizational structures 
Multitiered organizational structures represent an 
option for reducing the high fixed costs often associ-
ated with marketing, certification, and investments in 
processing for higher value markets (Figure 2.1). At 
the first tier, activities are usually related to production 
(extraction), including first-stage processing, and 
the bulking of products among individual members. 
First-tier organizations can be independent orga-
nizations (formally registered RCEs) or informal 
groups organized by the second-tier organization. 
The latter can facilitate organizational processes 
Global review of rural community enterprises 
21
and labor division and thus be more amiable to 
externally driven development processes. The num-
ber of first-tier organizations under the umbrella of 
a given second-tier organization depends on supply 
factors (geographical dispersion of members, costs 
associated with transport and communication) and 
well as demand factors (benefits on increased vol-
ume and investment from additional members). 
Second-tier organizations are often charged with 
bulking among first-tier organizations and a range 
of management and administrative functions: the 
facilitation of certification (e.g., organic, fair trade, 
forest) and financial services (mainly credit and/or 
advance payments) services. Second-tier RCEs play 
a critical role in providing technical, managerial and 
organizational support to first-tier RCEs and facili-
tating overall capacity development (Chirwa et al. 
2005). This may include establishing membership 
and leadership structures and rules, external audit-
ing, and establishing new RCEs and dividing RCEs 
which have grown large and unwieldy. 
The success of second-tier organizational structures 
depends on adopting clear and transparent rules, 
procedures, and structures that allow for effective 
response to changing opportunities and constraints. 
Rules and regulations should effectively establish 
norms of behavior within the second tier and between 
second and first tiers, with systems for monitoring 
and applying sanctions for noncompliance (Chirwa 
et al. 2005). A balance is needed between democratic 
participation by members and hierarchical control by 
managers at the second tier. In addition, attention 
must be paid to the potential for internal conflicts 
over economic and social objectives that can arise 
between first- and second-tier RCEs. Conflicts may 
emerge between increased investments and employ-
ment generation among first-tier RCEs and increased 
productivity and efficiency through centralized 
processing by second-tier RCEs. If not adequately 
addressed, these internal conflicts (e.g., profits ver-
sus employment or social investments) can result in 
increased production and administration costs and 
lost opportunities for value adding. 
Issues of governance 
Governance relates to the establishment, enforce-
ment, and monitoring of the set of rules and 
procedures for decision making, benefit sharing, 
investments, and strategy formulation. Effective RCE 
governance based on transparency, democratic deci-
sion making, internal accountability and control, can 
promote trust and reduce opportunities for opportun-
ism and has been identified as a key factor for success 
in RCE development. In general, however, effective 
governance is particularly challenging in the context 
of RCEs given 1) multiple interests of management 
and members, 2) limited business experience and 
resources of members, and 3) high costs for commu-
nication and coordination in rural areas. For example, 
Figure 2.1 Inter RCE organization for processing and commercialization of agricultural and forest
products
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Figure 2.1 Inter-RCE organization for processing and commercialization of agricultural and forest 
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evidence from sub-Saharan Africa highlights the limi-
tations of RCEs in developing effective and durable 
governance structures. Sampled RCEs suffered from 
low membership, weak organizational structures and 
lacked capacity to address the needs of their mem-
bers (SCC 2005). In addition, many RCEs inherited 
structures based on existing community governance 
systems frameworks or utilized by-laws provided by 
the government. In neither case were rules or regu-
lations adapted for the specific needs of their RCE 
development. Financial controls and record keep-
ing were often weak. Additionally, many RCEs had 
problems in meeting the financial costs of member 
participation. This was particularly apparent at the 
regional and national levels where effective coordina-
tion with members demands considerable resources. 
Meeting the costs of transport, interpretation and 
meeting expenses were cited as particular problems. 
Newer RCEs have been reluctant to learn from the 
experience of long-established ones, especially as 
related to governance matters (e.g., tenure of office, 
conflict of interest, affiliations, and codes of conduct). 
A common perception among members was that man-
agement committees/boards took advantage of their 
situation in convening meetings, for example, primar-
ily to claim for an attendance allowance.
Establishment of rules and regulations 
In the context of RCE governance, well-designed 
rules and regulations are critical for ensuring open 
and understandable election procedures; division of 
legal responsibilities between the board of directors, 
managers, and members; internal control mechanisms; 
and distribution of benefits; among other issues. In his 
review of some 400 RCEs in Chile, Berdegué (2000) 
finds that all of the economically viable RCEs have 
implemented a formal system of rules and regula-
tions for structuring the relations between members 
and administration, as well as between administra-
tion and outside actors (NGOs, buyers, processors). 
Critical among these are rules that govern the bound-
aries of the RCE; that is, who has rights to receive 
RCE benefits and who pays the costs of RCE opera-
tion. Among the poorest performing RCEs, economic 
benefits are not exclusive to members, where prices 
paid to members were the same as prices paid to non-
members. However, only registered RCE members 
were obliged to attend meetings (incurring opportu-
nity costs) and make financial contributions (through 
reduced payments for products delivered to RCE). 
Another institutional feature that characterized more- 
successful RCE development was the ability to match 
the benefits of membership (e.g., increased prices) 
and the costs of RCE membership. However, when 
the RCEs are unable to deliver higher prices or other 
benefits than those offered through conventional 
marketing channels, the rules tended not to adjust to 
the reality. This resulted in members revaluing their 
commitment and reducing deliveries to the RCE and 
increasing deliveries to middlemen (side selling). 
In addition, Berdegué identifies two other factors 
that contribute to RCE success: 1) strong member 
participation in RCE decision making, facilitating 
a relatively strong sense of ownership among mem-
bers, and 2) relatively high levels of pre-existing social 
capital, which allowed for effective conflict resolution 
among members and with outside agents. 
In their study of RCE development in Senegal and 
Burkina Faso, Bernard et al. (2007) find that 38% of 
RCEs in Senegal and 84% in Burkina Faso had formal-
ized rules and regulations, but with varying degrees of 
success. Most of the RCEs in these two countries had 
installed a ‘control commission’ to overlook the activi-
ties on the board of directors and had implemented 
formal accounting systems. Indeed, a general impres-
sion derived from their case studies is the considerable 
importance given to formalization in defining and 
implementing administrative procedures. However, 
such structures did not always translate into signifi-
cant impacts on the quality of the services provided to 
members—especially when RCEs were under pressure 
to deliver public goods (e.g., training, access to land, 
inputs). Results indicate that greater management 
capacity is related to increased performance for RCEs 
in Senegal. However, when greater management 
controls are motivated more by a concern for egalitari-
anism, as in the case of Burkina Faso, than for market 
integration, they are a negative factor for RCE perfor-
mance. Similarly, delivery of public goods by an RCE 
is associated with lower performance, acting as a tax on 
members. They suggest that the negative relationship 
between performance and the level of controls exists in 
cases where equity and solidarity are prioritized over 
efficiency: for example, allocation of credit based on 
lottery or the frequent rotation of senior management 
posts among members. In the context of severe lack of 
resources, formalized administrative procedures thus 
seem to be motivated more by equity in benefit sharing 
than by efficiency in the formation of benefits. 
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Drawing on evidence from Mexico, Antinori & Bray 
(2005) discuss how traditional community governance 
can be grafted on to RCE governance structures. 
Community governance derives from a mix of indig-
enous customs and agrarian law. Many communities 
practice a system of rotating civic and religious respon-
sibilities among members based on merit accumulated 
by service in a rising hierarchy of civic positions, or 
cargos. Votes on major decisions affecting the com-
munity are taken in the general assembly in which 
each registered member has a vote. Common prop-
erty management responsibilities fall to authorities 
named in the agrarian law, including the Comisario 
Ejidal (Ejido Supervisor). These offices are typically 
unsalaried and unspecialized toward forestry or any 
other management skill. Such organization has been 
adapted to the organization of a RCEs, for example 
1) the Comisario is the enterprise manager and all 
administrative posts are treated as community service 
assignments, integrated into the cargo system, 2) man-
agers are appointed from the community to auxiliary 
positions not part of traditional structures but respon-
sible to them, 3) professional managers are hired from 
outside the community, 4) paid administrative posi-
tions exist on a semipermanent basis and are not part 
of the rotational cargo system, and/or 5) experienced 
or respected members of the community form a sort of 
board of directors with general assembly meetings as 
shareholder’s meetings. The board of directors func-
tion can be filled by respected elders who have passed 
through the traditional governance systems. Conflicts 
over decision management and control are common, 
however. Manifestations of which can include: 
• Hierarchical relationships versus democratic 
governance: Community general assemblies may 
not understand the technical, financial and man-
agement issues involved in the RCE, yet they make 
key decisions. Community members who are also 
employees may not appreciate the demands of the 
job.
• Interplay between traditional and enterprise 
structures: Governance posts must legally and most 
commonly change every three years, although 
some communities change RCE managers even 
more frequently. While short terms are regarded 
as an important measure against corruption, it also 
has costs as experienced people leave and inexpe-
rienced, sometime incompetent, people enter.  
• Accountability and corruption: A lack of effective 
and legitimately based controls on management 
makes it relatively easy for political elites to 
manipulate and dominate the general assembly 
(e.g., Klooster 2000). Moreover, poor financial 
management and weak communication skills can 
create confusion and suspicion even where cor-
ruption has not occurred. 
Professional versus volunteer management
Given the increasing complexity of agricultural and 
forest-product markets, an important issue in RCE 
development is how to balance the principle of demo-
cratic control and retain the imperative of effective 
management. In many cases, this calls for professional 
management. However, RCEs have been reluctant to 
offer sufficient compensation to attract the best or 
most appropriate management, instead relying on 
NGO support and/or board members (Bebbington 
et al. 1996, Antinori & Bray 2005, Donovan 2007), 
which often results in limited business capacities. 
Anderson and Henehan (2003) and Lele (1981) argue 
that internally-sourced RCE managers seldom have 
much experience in business, financial management, 
or marketing and senior management posts are often 
occupied by members of the board of directors. RCE 
board members often fail to fully understand their 
roles and responsibilities, as they are almost always 
staffed from within member ranks, often with limited 
experience in business management or marketing. 
As a result, board members tend to provide too little 
or too much oversight. For RCE members to carry 
out their democratic responsibilities properly (e.g., 
strategic decision making, formulation of rules and 
regulations, performance monitoring) they must be 
well informed about the organization’s affairs and 
performance through frequent and accurate com-
munication between members and the organization, 
whether from directors, management, or employees. 
However, in many cases, RCEs are lax in providing 
sufficient, timely information about the organization 
and operations. For example, many RCEs provide 
very little information about their financial perfor-
mance until long after the end of the fiscal year. 
To be sure, effective management of RCEs by mem-
bers is possible. The case of El Ceibo in Bolivia 
provides a convincing example (Bebbington et al. 
1996), whereby long-term partnerships with donors 
and NGOs played a key role in capacity building in 
RCE administration among the membership base. 
However, such examples are rare in the literature. 
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The reluctance by RCEs to hire professional manage-
ment may result from: 1) potential trade-offs between 
long-term RCE development and members’ short-
term demand for higher prices; 2) local empowerment 
over all resource management and RCE operations, 
especially in the content of limited oversight abilities 
of RCE management by the board of directors and 
general assembly; 3) limited supply of affordable, yet 
competent, professionals in report rural areas, and 4) 
lack of long-term business strategies by RCEs, espe-
cially when RCE performance has been acceptable 
for several years under the leadership of members 
and NGOs. 
Issues of inclusion 
Another important issue related to RCE governance 
is that of inclusiveness. Inclusiveness has two dimen-
sions: an internal one, addressing the extent to which 
RCE members participate in the RCE operations, 
and an external one, addressing the extent to which 
community members can belong to a RCE. Regarding 
the former, in their analysis of RCE development 
across eight Southern countries, Couture et al. (2002) 
argue: “a pre-requisite for members’ involvement is 
an operational democratic governance structure. A 
cooperative must belong to its members, not simply 
in theory, but in practice as well. Members’ involve-
ment is essential at all levels of the cooperative’s 
functions—entrepreneurial, financial, managerial 
and social.” However, in practice, RCE members 
may be reluctant to participate in RCE governance 
for reasons which include the following: 1) eco-
nomic benefits from RCE services are low, 2) overall 
income derived from RCE activities makes a minor 
contribution to total income, taking into account that 
smallholders typically pursue a variety of economic 
and productive activities most of which fall outside 
the reach of their RCE), and 3) there is limited oppor-
tunity for influencing the outcome of RCE operations 
or strategies. Bernard et al. (2006) argue that no clear 
consensus has emerged in the literature regarding 
whether more or less participatory governance is 
more conducive to RCE development. The case for 
less participatory governance rests on the notion that 
leaders provide technical expertise, drive and conti-
nuity, while too much participation by inexperienced 
members may impair an RCE’s capacity to identify 
and pursue higher-income generating strategies. On 
the other hand, more participatory governance may 
allow for enhanced sustainability and effectiveness of 
the organization as it helps to adjust decision making 
to local conditions and customs. 
Several studies conclude that the poorest are rarely 
members of more successful RCEs (i.e., those able to 
provide economic benefits), often due to their lack of 
complementary assets to participate and effectively 
benefit from RCEs. In their study of RCEs in Malawi, 
Chirwa et al. (2005) conclude that limited household 
assets may lead to their being (a) less able to gain 
from [RCE] services and membership; (b) less able 
to afford the time and cash costs of membership; and 
(c) less welcome to existing [RCE] members who may 
see them as posing difficulties in [RCE] management. 
In Senegal and Burkina Faso, Bernard et al. (2006) 
find that within communities, poorest households 
were not systematically excluded from RCEs; how-
ever, benefits for households from RCE activities 
remained highly limited, due mainly to severe lack 
of funding for RCE growth and development. They 
suggest that these RCEs performed well in the provi-
sion of soft services, such as information and technical 
advice, but lacked resources to provide their members 
with necessary access to processing infrastructure and 
transportation means. Overall, income generated 
through RCE participation tended to be marginal, 
and although socially inclusive, their impact on 
poverty was limited. The correlation between exclu-
siveness and level of benefits is highlighted the case of 
El Ceibo in Bolivia, which has diversified into organic 
and processed markets for cocoa beans and chocolate, 
among other products. As described in Bebbington 
et al. (1996), for smallholders to join El Ceibo, they 
must first join a first-tier cooperative, which requires 
at least 1 ha of cocoa production and make an entry 
payment proportional to the estimated value of the 
cooperative. For first-tier cooperatives to join El 
Ceibo, they must purchase a share, which in 1996 cost 
roughly US$ 15,000 (30% paid up front, and 70% paid 
over five years). For El Ceibo members, the benefits 
of affiliation include higher prices, input provision, 
access to technical support, and organic certification. 
Role of women in RCE governance 
Women have traditionally been excluded from 
membership or governance of RCEs, despite mak-
ing a contribution to the enterprise. In countries like 
India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, 
women comprise just less than 10% of total member-
ship (Prakash 1999). In their study of cooperatives in 
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Africa, Hussi et al. (1993) argue that in most African 
countries, participation by women in RCE governance 
remains extremely low. In Uganda, the following gen-
der issues were identified: overall low participation 
of women in RCES due to the dominance of male 
lead in cash crop production; minimal representation 
of women in leadership and management of RCEs, 
low intensity of women’s participation—among the 
few women who are members or hold leadership 
positions, there is reluctance to express their views 
openly (Mugisha et al. 2005). A significant underrep-
resentation of women in decision-making structures 
was reported with half of all management committees 
having no women members. Case studies in Ghana 
provide some evidence of more women’s engagement 
(Shaw 2006), whereby higher participation of women 
has been achieved as the result of the promotion and 
implementation of gender equity policies. This is 
reinforced by support for gender equity from exter-
nal stakeholders in the cooperative—notably the Fair 
Trade organizations (Shaw 2006). There are still some 
prevailing laws that place barriers for women’s par-
ticipation in agricultural cooperatives and/or farmers’ 
associations, such as land ownership and household 
headship. 
At the same time, a limited number of women-only 
RCEs have emerged; however, most business devel-
opment projects oriented specifically toward women 
have been centered on microenterprise development, 
which often occurs in informal sectors or sectors with 
otherwise low growth opportunities. For example, 
in India, there are an estimated 8,171 women-only 
cooperatives, most of which are related to coopera-
tive banks, consumer stores, and fruits and vegetable 
vendors (Prakash 2003). Do these provide a model 
to promote women’s engagement in the cooperative 
sector? Or should mechanisms to promote women’s 
participation be a part of a governance model? Other 
strategies to improve gender issues in RCEs also need 
to be addressed. Overall, the issue of gender in RCE 
membership and governance has yet to be seriously 
addressed.
Issues of elite benefit capturing 
The issue of benefit capturing by powerful members 
within RCEs has been discussed as a hindrance to 
long-term RCE development. In his analysis of forest-
based RCEs in Mexico, Klooster (2000) finds evidence 
of a “forestry elite” that circumvents the democratic 
potential of RCEs and common property management: 
“communal institutions ought to provide a system of 
checks and balances to maintain the accountability 
of communal authorities and forestry administrators, 
but the forestry elite finds ways to circumvent such 
checks on its power. The forestry elite dominate com-
munal institutions through intimidation, manipulating 
elections, dodging oversight, and discouraging partici-
pation in community assemblies. Threats, violence, 
bribes, and the manipulation of reciprocal obligations 
are common tools of internal politics.”  Chirwa et al. 
(2005), suggest that elite benefit capture is more likely 
to occur during the initial stages of RCE develop-
ment when RCEs are more likely to gain from strong, 
centralized leadership unconstrained by bureaucracy 
and when RCE members lack basic literacy, business 
skills, and experience. Under these conditions, local 
elites can more easily “capture” the organization and 
allow leaders to misuse RCE resources. Leadership 
succession may also prose problems in these cir-
cumstances, and accountability to members may be 
problematic where external support organizations are 
more important sources of capital and resources then 
RCE members.
On the other hand, Bernard et al. (2007, 22) fail to 
detect any obvious signs of elite capture of benefits 
among RCEs in Africa: “Weak performance of (RCEs) 
in creating benefits for their members must thus come 
from another factor than elite capture. Indeed, we 
have seen that high concern with equity in setting up 
bureaucratic procedures, which is effective in fending 
off elite capture, may occur at the cost of efficiency.” 
Bebbington et al. (1996: 201) found little evidence of 
elite benefit capture in the case of El Ceibo (Bolivia): 
“over time there has been a progressive decentraliza-
tion of administration in the organization. There are 
now various loci of decision making,..., such that power 
is somewhat dispersed among several teams and its 
Administrative and Overview Councils.” The appar-
ent lack of elite capture in El Ceibo can be attributed 
to relatively high levels of pre-existing social capital 
acquired in the social movements in Bolivia. 
Political−legal environment 
From a political−legal perspective, the major chal-
lenge for promoting viable RCEs is to ensure that 
regulations effectively address their underlying devel-
opment problems, including limited access to suitable 
land, lack of infrastructure, high transaction costs, 
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low levels of technology, restricted access to services, 
and limited capacities. Here we examine several key 
elements of the political level framework, including 
government intervention in RCEs and other overall 
general environment, infrastructure investments, and 
property rights regimes. 
Regulations for RCE organization and 
development 
Critical analysis of the nature and impacts of political–
legal frameworks related to RCE organization 
and development has not been a priority, and what 
evidence exists is patchy and superficial. In Latin 
America, since the implementation of structural 
adjustment programs, governments have generally 
left the development RCEs to smallholders them-
selves, the private sector, and civil society. While this 
has opened the door for RCE development, it also 
left RCEs highly dependent on NGOs for inputs and 
know-how—the implications of which are discussed 
in the following section. In instances where smallhold-
ers and the private sector are especially weak, the lack 
of government support for overcoming constraints 
related to deficient infrastructure, lack of information, 
and limited capacities has led to outcomes similar, if 
not worse, than those of previous development peri-
ods where the state played a much more active role 
(see Box 2.3). 
In Africa and Asia, evidence suggests that government 
involvement in RCE organization and development 
has been reduced over the past decade, but remains 
inconsistent and erratic. In Africa, involvement ranges 
from no interference or support at all for RCEs in 
Cape Verde and Uganda to high levels of direction 
and interference in Nigeria and Egypt  (Shaw 2006). 
Legislative liberalization is recent or current in South 
Africa, Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda. Kenya pro-
vides an example of a liberalization process partially 
rescinded.  With the withdrawal of government regula-
tory powers in 1997, cooperatives proved ill-prepared 
and the results were largely negative, including ram-
pant corruption and mismanagement, failure to hold 
elections, illicit payments, and theft. In response, the 
government intervened in 2004 with a new act that 
reintroduced state regulation through the office of 
Box 2.3  State-led versus market-led rural development approaches in Guyana
In Guyana, agricultural policy over the past several decades has aimed to promote the expansion of 
nontraditional agricultural exports (NTAEs) and increased domestic food supply. However, the related 
approaches to cooperative development and smallholder organization have varied dramatically. During the 
1970s–1980s, under the state-led approach, in addition to restricting the importation of a wide range of foods, 
policies focused on: 1) nationalization of sugar industry, 2) formation of cooperatives and marketing boards 
for increased efficient in input and output markets, 3) provision of credit through development banks, and 4) 
research on food processing and preservation. Overall, the programs were not effective, resulting in severe 
shortages of food. Sugar production levels were halved, due to lack of management experience, labor unrest, 
and insufficient investment. No radical land reform was carried out, despite claims of its necessity. 
In 1988, the government launched a structural adjustment program (SAP) in which emphasis was placed on 
improved price incentives and expansion of exports. In the case of rice, the SAP proposed that irrigation and 
drainage charges be adjusted to levels that cover operating and maintenance costs. However, by shifting the 
cost burden to smallholders, the SAP had little hope of increasing incentives for increased output. Similar 
policies were suggested for the promotion of NTAEs, but here too, the lack of infrastructure and external 
support emerged as an obstacle to increased output. In addition, issues of land tenure have yet to be fully 
addressed. Overall, the export sector has performed poorly in recent years: in 2005 export earnings were 
below levels for 1997, having declined from US$593 million to US$490 million. In this context, a case can be 
made that the market-led approach has performed even worse than the state-driven approach in addressing 
the underlying development problems of limited access to suitable land, poor drainage and irrigation, low 
prices, low levels of technology, ineffective services, and limited capacities. 
Source: Canterbury (2007)
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the Commissioner for Co-operative Development 
(Wanyama 2006, in Shaw 2006). In Uganda, the with-
drawal of state support and regulation in 1991 also had 
negative consequences for cooperatives which were 
similarly unprepared, also resulting in large-scale mis-
management. As a result in Uganda, a large number of 
cooperatives collapsed, but unlike Kenya, the govern-
ment did not re-engage with the sector (Mrema 2006, 
in Shaw 2006). In India, the RCE sector remains char-
acterized by high levels of government control and 
intervention (Ramesha 2003, in Shaw 2006). There has 
been much criticism of levels of state intervention at 
district and regional levels and there is an extensive 
literature discussing the negative economic and social 
impacts of the current regime. 
Regulation of the general business environment 
Southern countries tend to regulate business activ-
ity more than Northern countries across areas such 
as business entry, employment regulation, contract 
enforcement, creditor rights, credit information sharing 
systems, and bankruptcy (World Bank 2004). However, 
heavier regulation is often associated with inefficiency 
in public institutions (longer delays and higher cost), 
increased corruption, lower productivity, and reduced 
investment. The situation is further complicated by 
weak enforcement capacity and monitoring systems. 
Heavy regulation also encourages expansion of the 
informal economy. In Bolivia, an estimated 82% of 
business activity takes place in the informal sector, and 
in timber-rich countries such as Peru, Brazil, Indonesia, 
and Cameroon, informal activities are estimated at 
about 50 to 90% of the volume of timber extracted, 
transported, and traded (Contreras-Hermosilla 2003). 
In many cases, regulatory frameworks grant consid-
erable power to government agencies to intervene in 
business organization and development, resulting in 
fewer start-up enterprises, reduced performance, and 
lower member participation. For example, forest-based 
RCEs in Guatemala must hire professional foresters 
to elaborate management plans and seek approval 
regarding their statutes and internal regulations, 
regardless of local capacities (Carrera et al. 2006). In 
Mexico, at least seven regulations and export licenses 
have to be in place for RCEs to export chicle gum 
(Forero & Redclift 2006). In the southern Indian state 
of Karnataka, the triennial auction system for NTFPs 
operated by the Forest Department rewards external 
concessionaires rather than the permanent local forest-
dependent peoples (Shaankar et al. 2000). 
In their analysis of African firms’ perceptions of the 
regulatory framework in which they operate, Gelb 
et al. (2007) found that perceptions varied accord-
ing to countries’ level of income. Among those at the 
lowest end of the income spectrum, the most severe 
constraints were those dealing with the ability to plan 
work and produce (macroeconomic stability, elec-
tric power, and finance). At the next higher income 
level, constraints emerged related to the quality of 
governance and the capability of the state to provide 
important services, specifically corruption, taxa-
tion, and security. At the highest level (in this case, 
South Africa), the most pressing regulations are those 
related to labor and the availability of skilled labor, 
which become more binding as economic activity 
becomes more sophisticated and the capacity of gov-
ernment to enforce regulations strengthens. Gelb and 
colleagues conclude that for firms in the middle level, 
the outlook is most difficult, as changes will require 
long-term efforts to deal with weak governance and 
low state capacity. Among the lowest income coun-
tries easing infrastructure constraints, such as electric 
power, may have an especially large payoff in busi-
ness opportunities.
The ILO has invested considerable efforts in improv-
ing the political–legal framework in Southern 
countries; however, with limited evidence of success 
(ILO 2005). On one hand, it is difficult to determine 
the extent to which a policy change (and not other fac-
tors) has resulted in better firm performance and in 
the reduction of poverty. On the other hand, change 
itself is difficult to achieve. It often requires a combi-
nation of training, adequate salaries for lower official, 
higher penalties, political will at the higher levels, and 
the development of a strong anti-corruption culture. 
It also requires that RCEs know their obligations and 
rights and can appeal to other government bodies or 
social and business organizations for assistance. 
Infrastructure
Infrastructure access improves the likelihood of RCE 
success by reducing production and transaction costs, 
increasing access to members (labor) and reducing 
the costs of accessing product and factor markets. In 
addition, improvements in communication and road 
services imply gains by reducing distance to agri-
cultural markets (Fay & Morrison 2005). However, 
current levels of infrastructure investments in devel-
oping regions are low, at roughly 2 to 4% of GDP 
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(World Bank 2005). Sub-Saharan Africa lags signifi-
cantly behind all other regions in access levels for 
all infrastructure services (Table 2.1). In addition to 
access, quality and reliability of infrastructure are crit-
ical issues in many countries. For example, in Nigeria, 
only 19 of 79 power plants work, and daily electric-
ity output has plunged 60 percent from its peak, with 
blackouts costing the economy $1 billion a year (Wines 
2007). The one bright spot in sub-Saharan Africa is 
the advance in wireless communication technologies, 
which were introduced in the late 1990s (Allen 2003). 
Property rights
Another often-debated issue related to the political–
legal environment for RCEs concerns property rights 
and access to the natural resource base. Small land-
holdings throughout the South are often held under 
systems of customary tenure rather than under formal 
land titles. In this context, it is important to distin-
guish between two types of customary rights: 1) those 
recognized by the state in the form of usufruct rights, 
and 2) customary rights that are not recognized by the 
state and potentially conflict with state-imposed land 
tenure. 
There is much debate as regards the impact of custom-
ary tenure on rural poverty and the tensions that arise 
when the state seeks to impose its rules on formal land 
tenure in areas where customary land rights prevail. 
This is especially true in remote areas often neglected 
by the state due to poor access and/or low resource 
endowment. Advocates of customary tenure systems 
pursue a differentiated argumentation (Cross 2002). 
They argue, for example, that land ownership per se 
is not the main issue; rather it is access to social capi-
tal related to customary entitlements. In their view, a 
network of social relationships and the corresponding 
set of institutions (rules of the game) provide a solid 
basis for accessing natural resources—with or without 
legally valid land titles. In these situations, the state 
can concede usufruct rights which are akin to owner-
ship in that they cannot arbitrarily be removed, and 
they allow for loaning, renting and pledging. There 
is growing consensus that security of land tenure 
does not always imply legal land titles, as customary 
rights when built on solid social capital and reinforced 
through the concession of usufruct rights by the state 
can provide a similarly firm basis. Land degradation 
under customary tenure may thus be due to a lack 
of knowledge on sustainable agricultural production 
and inputs rather than the lack of land titles (United 
Nations 2003). Similarily, Randrianarisoa and Minten 
(2001) and Deininger et al. (2006) found little effect of 
tenure on increasing agricultural productivity or con-
tributing significantly toward poverty reduction. 
The most common counter argument is that 
land-bound effective, long-term and sustainable 
development is incompatible with customary rights 
regimes. Land titles for smallholders have been shown 
to increase investment in land, inhibit environmen-
tally unsustainable practices, augment land values, 
permit a shift in the balance of crop mix in favor of 
cash crops, promote better adapted technologies of 
production, allow inheritance from parents to chil-
dren directly, and reduce conflict. They provide a basis 
for reallocating land to more efficient users (through 
land markets) and, if accompanied by a low-cost and 
formal means of verifying land ownership status, 
improve credit access (de Soto 2000). Recent evi-
dence in Nicaragua suggests that smallholders’ ability 
to response to market opportunities may be limited by 
insecure tenure status; in particular, relatively high-
value tree crops (e.g., coffee, citrus, bananas) are less 
likely to be grown on rented than on owner-cultivated 
plots (Bandiera 2007). During both the colonial and 
Table 2.1 Infrastructure indicators, by region
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
East Asia and 
Pacific
South Asia Latin
America 
Electricity (% population access to grid) 24 88 43 89
Water (% population with access to 
improved sanitation)
58 78 84 89
Roads (% rural population living within 2 km 
of all-season road)
34 95 65 54
Teledensity (fixed line/mobile subscribers 
per 1,000 people)
62 357 61 416
Source: World Bank (2005) 
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post-colonial periods in Africa, most development 
professionals (certainly in the earlier years), colonial 
governors, land commissions, and missionaries tended 
to favor these viewpoints, with opposition coming, at 
various times, from national-level producer associa-
tions and nationalist politicians (Cross 2002). 
External support services 
Access to the right combination of externally sourced 
services at the right time is critical for RCE develop-
ment. This point is highlighted by numerous studies, 
including Tendler (1988) and Bebbington et al. (1996) 
in Bolivia, Chirwa et al. (2005) in Malawi, and Nittler 
and Tschinkel (2005) in Guatemala. The discussion 
below addresses approaches for facilitating RCE 
access to the financial, technical, and business devel-
opment services. 
Financial services 
Since the 1980s, development practitioners have 
focused on how to increase the poor’s access to 
financial services. Historically, access by the poor to 
commercial services has been limited due to weak 
competition in the banking sector and the high risks 
and transaction costs (real or perceived) associated 
with lending to micro, small, and medium enterprises. 
Directed and subsidized credit programs have done 
little to achieve increased access by the poor to finan-
cial services (Gonzalez-Vega 2003). More recently, 
emphasis has been placed on sustainable microfi-
nance institutions (MFIs), which aim to reach poor 
households based on sound financial procedures, 
which include cost-recovering rates and manage-
ment autonomy (FAO 2005). However, the success 
of MFIs in reaching households, often urban-based, 
has yet to spill over into increased access to financial 
services for established RCEs, whose service needs 
are more related to liquidity and risk management. 
In their analysis of MFI in Nicaragua, Bastiaensen 
& Marchetti (2007:148) conclude that as MFI focus 
their objectives on poverty alleviation, they cease to 
contribute to the strengthening of RCEs: “Much less 
attention is therefore dedicated to longer-term invest-
ment credit and access to risk capital. It is this type 
of capital, however, that is largely absent from cur-
rent micro-credit supply and that could allow poor 
capital-constrained entrepreneurs to engage in more 
sustainable changes in their livelihood strategies.” 
Bastiaensen & Marchetti argue for subsidies to reduce 
the transactions costs, either directly to rural clients 
(through a voucher system) or to subsidies directed at 
clients. In addition, RCEs may benefit by strengthen-
ing their ability to mobilize and manage internal funds 
from members and donor agencies. 
Subsidies for RCE development
Subsidies are a specific form of financial services, 
which are at least as important as credit for RCE 
development. Three types of subsidies can be distin-
guished: 1) strategic subsidies that cover investments 
in infrastructure and other RCE development needs; 
2) long-term subsidies that cover operational and 
investment needs; and 3) short-term to midterm sub-
sidies as a specific form of start-up capital. Strategic 
subsidies can be critical for overcoming low resource 
endowments of RCEs, especially when directed 
toward investments in infrastructure (e.g., buildings; 
machinery for processing), commercial services (mar-
ket studies), and revolving credit funds. The case for 
long-term subsidies is based on the idea that RCEs 
can be important providers of public goods to small-
holders and communities (LeVay 1983). According to 
Rondot and Collion (2001, 9), “Member dues usually 
bring in little, and profits from the RCE’s economic 
activities are limited due to increased market compe-
tition. Outside funding from aid agencies is a major 
portion of a RCE’s financial base, raising fundamental 
questions of this situation and its ambiguous nature.” 
Potential negative impacts alluded to by Rondot and 
Collion include: over-ambitious expansion of RCE 
activities, and subversion of RCE objectives, whereby 
RCEs focus more on obtaining subsidies from donors 
than on providing services to their members. This 
could even happen in case of short-term to midterm 
subsidies, though these typically seek to provide the 
start-up capital needed to push RCEs toward financial 
self-sufficiency.  
Though literature provides little evidence about the 
effectiveness of short-term to midterm vis-à-vis long-
term subsidies, the issue is not without debate. On one 
side, Rondot and Collion (2001) call for long-term 
subsidies for RCE operations from both national and 
international sources. The middle position is reflected 
by Chirwa et al. (2005), who recognize the need for 
subsidies but recommend that they be time-bound 
and based on specific, measurable objectives. On the 
other side, Couture et al. (2002, 82) argue that “tech-
nical, material or moral support (including know-how 
transfer) is generally preferred to direct financial 
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assistance, because of the risks involved in creating 
dependence on outside funding.” Bebbington et al. 
(1996: 202-203) provide an example of the impor-
tance of strategic subsidies for RCE development, as 
well as the difficulties of reducing subsidies over time: 
“[the RCE] has reached a point where it could begin 
to assume a far greater role in financing its activities. 
…However, [it] is so accustomed to receiving grant 
support that it does not look to commercial capital 
markets or other enterprises for investments or joint 
venture.…Aside from simple dependence, this rela-
tionship is a disincentive to [the RCE] to rely on using 
sources other than its own for reinvesting in the busi-
ness, developing human capital, building management 
capacity, etc. This situation is aggravated by the fact 
that donors back winners.” A key issue that has not 
been addressed is whether financial transfers chan-
neled through traders, processors, or other agents 
to smallholders or communities would have a larger 
impact on rural poverty.
Technical and business development services 
Traditionally, technology transfer approaches were 
pursued by government and civil society for upgrad-
ing the capacities of smallholders. These approaches 
typically focused on a narrow portfolio of technical 
issues that were provided to select groups of ben-
eficiaries identified within a given project framework. 
Services were provided free of charge for the duration 
of the project, with little consideration given to sus-
tainability. In the 1990s, a consensus emerged among 
donors that such traditional approaches were limited 
in their impact and coverage and that the develop-
ment of markets for these services would improve 
access to more effective services over the long term 
(Field et al. 2000). In addition, there was increased 
recognition that RCEs required a range of services 
to help them operate efficiently and grow their busi-
nesses with the broader purpose of contributing to 
economic growth, employment generation, and pov-
erty alleviation (World Bank 2001). Specifically, they 
include enhanced technical services (technical advi-
sory and training for quality control, processing, and 
pest/disease management) and business development 
services (BDS), such as market facilitation, technical, 
advisory, and training services for business organiza-
tion and administration, and access to information. 
Inspired by the apparent success of MFIs in reach-
ing the poor through market-based service delivery, 
debates emerged in the 1990s regarding market-based 
approaches for the delivery of technical and business 
development services. 
As presented in the World Bank’s Guiding Principles 
for Donor Interventions (2001), donors advocated 
moving away from services offered free or heavily 
subsidized by state organizations—primarily conven-
tional training and technical assistance—toward the 
development of markets for services, whereby small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) emerge as clients with 
willingness and ability to pay for services. In this con-
text, donor investments were required on the demand 
side (increasing the understanding of service needs 
and ability to pay) and the supply side (strengthening 
the capacities of service providers to respond effec-
tively to the demands and needs of RCEs). However, 
the development of service markets in the rural sector 
has proven especially challenging given 1) limited will-
ingness and ability to pay for services by smallholders 
and RCEs, especially for those with which are they 
are unfamiliar, 2) lack of critical mass of demand for 
sustaining commercial delivery, and 3) relatively high 
risk associated with developing new products and 
exploring new markets. In general, the market devel-
opment paradigm’s failure to address how to build 
service markets in the context of persistent poverty 
and weak institutional frameworks means the donors 
and governments will continue to play a major role in 
the RCE development for a wide range of services, 
including those related to business organization and 
development (Philip 2003). 
In recent years, the market development approach 
has been downplayed, and the more pragmatic mar-
ket-based approach (MBA) has emerged. The MBA 
placed less importance on distinguishing between 
public or private providers and the need for providers 
to fully recover their costs. Rather, MBA stress that 
providers deliver services in a more sustainable and 
market-oriented way, which often includes greater 
incorporation of the private sector. There have 
been a various isolated pilot MBA projects aimed at 
facilitating the link between smallholders and higher-
value national and international markets (e.g., Field 
& Knopp 2003). Although frequently effective in 
creating immediate benefits for participants, few of 
these pilot projects have been scaled up or been able 
to demonstrate sustainability (Christoplos 2008). Nor 
has there been much discussion on how relevant, but 
often fragmented, experiences can improve the design 
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of government and donor policies. Projects still con-
sist of heavily subsidized efforts to link the products 
and services of selected smallholders and RCEs to 
growing markets. In some cases, they have retained a 
mainly technical orientation (e.g., training and infra-
structure development for production and primary 
processing), while adding a market linkage compo-
nent, which may consist of little more that elaboration 
of a business plan and ‘linkage’ with a single buyer. 
Many of these projects have no explicit rationale for 
how they will promote competitive market strategies 
beyond the specific targeted beneficiaries or even 
beyond the time frame of the project. 
Clearly, there are opportunities to promote RCE 
development through effective technical and busi-
ness development services, but related approaches 
will require moving from isolated projects to sustain-
able reform in the services and market relationship 
relevant to the RCEs and their members. There 
have been growing calls to look beyond short-term 
interventions and to take a more systems-oriented 
approach, seeking to identify more ambitious and 
comprehensive interventions that will deliver benefits 
throughout a given sector (Dawson 2003). Christoplos 
(2008) identifies several key elements of a market sys-
tems approach to service design:
• Sector-wide orientation: Government and donor-
funded services are skewed toward smallholders 
alone as the default target groups for public invest-
ment in poverty alleviation. If services are to have 
a significant impact on the livelihoods of the rural 
poor, they must include other private sector actors 
such as buyers and processors. 
• Upgrading skills and capacities of service providers: 
Service providers must upgrade their own capaci-
ties and skills if they are to achieve (sustain) high 
impact services. This, in turn, requires the devel-
opment of methodological and technical support 
programs for service providers which go beyond 
one-off training events.  
• Mitigating the risk of market orientation: Access 
to useful information for assessing the trade-offs 
related to market participation will help the poor 
to make informed decisions about what risks to 
take. Information and decision tools are required 
for better understanding of how different markets 
operate; transparency in prices, regulations and 
standards, and assessment of economic potentials 
and the potential risks.  
• Promoting trust and transparency: This can be 
achieved by providing information on buyers and 
sellers, holding RCEs and their partners account-
able for their contractual obligations, facilitating 
arbitration mechanisms, and promoting multi-
stakeholder platforms to discuss the interests of 
different actors. 
Embedded services
In some cases, services provided by downstream 
buyers and processors in the context of existing com-
mercial relationships (embedded services) can be 
equally, if not more, important than those provided 
by government agencies and NGOs (Hitchins et al. 
2004). Embedded services may include product design 
advice, technical advice on production, storage, and 
quality control; market information; strategy formula-
tion; loan guarantees; loans and grants; and short-term 
credit. Embedded service delivery works partly 
because it can be financed within the cash flow and 
margins of existing commercial relationships and take 
advantage of previous investments in infrastructure 
and relationship building. For buyers and processors, 
incentives for investments may include enhanced rep-
utation vis-à-vis competitors, stronger relationships 
with suppliers, and enhanced product quality. There 
has been little systematic research carried out of the 
availability of these services across sectors or regions 
or regarding their impacts on RCE development. For 
example, the willingness of buyers and processors to 
invest in the provision of embedded services is likely 
to depend on the related benefits and costs (including 
risks), which in turn depend on RCE resource endow-
ments and market orientation, among other factors. 
Thus, it is possible that only the most advanced RCEs 
have access to embedded services such as credit and 
joint marketing efforts.    
Generalist versus specialist service providers 
At the most basic level, two types of service providers 
can be identified depending on the range of services 
offered: generalists, who offer an array of techni-
cal, business development, and financial services 
for promoting rural development in general (con-
servation, health, poverty reduction, etc.), including 
RCE development, and specialists, who focus on a 
particular type of service (technical, business devel-
opment, or financial). As noted by Penrose-Buckley 
(2007), generalists may also have certain advantages 
over specialists, especially in the early stages of RCE 
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development. They often have greater legitimacy 
with local populations, with extensive understand-
ing of local socio-economic issues and the needs and 
priorities of local communities. They often support 
a range of development projects that address devel-
opment problems from different angles, including, 
local governance, and gender relations, and are 
well-placed to address wider issues related to the 
political–legal environment. On the other hand, they 
hardly ever offer the full service package needed 
by most RCEs in their start-up and consolidation 
phases. Generalists often lack sufficient experience 
to develop the administrative, organizational, and 
marketing capacities of RCEs effectively beyond 
the initial stages of development. Moreover, they 
may have reservations about promoting RCEs to 
the extent that RCE development implies trade-
offs with other objectives, such as environmental 
conservation. 
Specialists, on the other hand, tend to offer a nar-
row range of advanced skills in supporting RCEs. 
Because of their strong focus on developing econom-
ically viable businesses, they may focus their support 
on those smallholders most able to meet market 
demands. In efforts to meet project objectives and 
market demands, they may place less emphasis on 
building effective democratic institutions for RCE 
development. The choice between generalist and 
specialist agencies will depend on donor objectives 
and the stage of development among the RCEs 
targeted for support and, depending on the area 
of intervention, on their very availability: gener-
alist organizations may play a more critical role in 
the initial development stages of RCEs, while more 
advanced development beyond the initial stage is 
likely to require regular access to specialized techni-
cal, business and financial services. In this context, 
though, specialized BDS for the rural sector are 
often not readily available and, hence, turn out to be 
the Achilles’ heel in service delivery to RCEs.
Integrated service delivery
Few RCEs have ready access to the mix of technical, 
business development, and financial services by pub-
lic and private agents required for their development, 
due in part, to the fragmented nature of service deliv-
ery. Given that any one service provider is unlikely to 
have the competencies to provide the array of services 
required for RCE development effectively, synergies 
may be derived from coordination of service delivery 
among different providers. For example the financial 
service providers may face reduced risk for their loans 
if accompanied by BDS that increase administration 
and marketing capacities; BDS, in turn, may benefit 
from increased quality and productivity provided by 
technical services. 
Based on evidence from 30 case studies, Sievers 
& Vandenberg (2007) identify success factors for 
BDS-financial service linkages for urban and rural 
microenterprises. They claim that while the number 
of impact studies available is small, evidence suggests 
that combined delivery results in significantly higher 
income for clients, indicating that BDS and credit 
costs may be recovered through client fees. A well-
structured linkage must be voluntary (the enterprise 
is free to take both or only one service) and the two 
types of services must be managed separately (either 
within the same provider or between two providers). 
Separate management ensures that costs of and rev-
enues from each service can be properly monitored. 
When the linkage is voluntary, the provision of ser-
vices will be driven by demand; that is, RCEs will only 
agree to pay for services that meet their demands and 
help to raise their profitability. In turn, demand-driven 
services can increase the sustainability of MFI and 
BDS providers by generating income (fees, interest) 
but also by securing client loyalty (repeat business) 
and by increasing the client base. 
Summary 
Issues and debates related to RCEs have focused 
mainly on organizational forms and structures, enter-
prise governance, market access issues, and the role 
of the political–legal framework in shaping oppor-
tunities for long-term development (see Table 2.2). 
There is general consensus that cooperatives and 
other forms of smallholder and community business 
organizations are more likely to develop into viable 
businesses when they emerge from local develop-
ment processes, thus promoting a sense of ownership 
and asset building, in particular human, social, physi-
cal, and, as a result of the former, financial capital. 
However, there is a poor understanding of the dura-
tion and potential pitfalls of such processes and the 
long-term commitments required for securing RCE 
viability. Given the general lack of awareness of how 
lengthy and demanding these processes tend to be, it 
does not come as a surprise that there has been little 
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Table 2.2  Summary of major issues and debates in RCE literature 
Issues and debates in RCE literature 
Business 
organization 
and 
development 
• RCEs are believed to produce a number of social and economic benefits at community 
and household level, without compromising the natural resource base. However, 
relatively little is known about the challenges facing RCEs in balancing goals of income 
generation, social equity, and resource conservation. Surprisingly little is known about 
how long it takes before RCEs are fully viable and self-sufficient in terms of funding. 
• Bottom-up processes for RCE development can provide a solid base for RCE 
development, but often at the expense of short-term impacts. Externally driven 
processes are more likely to deliver impacts in the short termbut suffer from weak 
governance, poor sense of ownership, and limited sustainability. An unresolved issue is 
how to design better internally driven approaches for achieving viable RCE development 
in reduced time.
• Legal form determines critical aspects of RCE development, including ownership, 
governance and management structures, liability, tax regimes, distribution of profits/
dividends, and capital accumulation. It is well-documented that cooperatives face 
limitations to capitalize, and in the past they have been subject to high levels of 
government interference. Associations tend to be more flexible in set up and operation, 
but face even greater challenges to capitalize. It remains unclear to what extent specific 
legal forms promote or hamper the long-term development of RCEs, and whether 
conversion from one form into another may be a viable alternative when reaching a 
certain development stage. 
• Scale matters, although there is little evidence under which conditions approaches to 
microenterprise development may be superior to SME development and vice versa.
• Multitiered RCE structures can increase efficiency through economies of scale, labor 
division, and professionalization of management at higher tiers. However, effective 
governance of, and coordination within, tiered structures require considerable 
investments in communication and consensus building, which must be compensated 
through increased benefits.
Governance • The development of RCEs appears to be fostered by the formalization, enforcement 
and monitoring of rules and procedures for decision making, benefit sharing, and 
investments. Competence and mutual understanding is required among managers, 
boards of directors, and members, but low investments in communication often hamper 
trust and consensus building. 
• Little consensus exists on whether more or less member inclusion in governance is 
conducive to long-term RCE development. Greater inclusion enhances a sense of 
ownership and helps meet the social objectives of the organization, while less inclusion 
may allow for more managerial efficiency and continuity in decision making. 
• Effective RCE governance requires clearly defined rights and responsibilities for 
members, directors, and managers. However, where educational levels and business 
experience are limited, it is unclear how best to develop such capacities. Are RCEs with 
internally sourced managers more viable than those with externally-sourced managers, or 
vice versa? Is any one model superior to another at different points in time, for example 
in the start-up versus consolidation phases? Or is there no clear-cut picture?
• In many cases, RCEs are governed by boards of directors with limited skill sets for 
business administration. Moreover, mandatory rotation of board members often leads to 
irregular learning curves that hamper overall RCE development. There is little evidence on 
how to address these shortcomings without jeopardizing broad member participation.
Asset building • While building of financial and physical capital has been documented for a number of 
RCEs, there is a poor understanding of opportunities for building human, social, and 
natural capital through RCE development, and the interrelationships between these 
assets.
• It remains unclear to what extent minimum asset endowments are prerequisites for 
successful RCE development. It may well be the case that without minimum levels of 
human, social, and natural capital RCE development efforts are doomed to fail.
Continued on next page
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Table 2.2—Continued
Issues and debates in RCE literature 
Gender • Women may be members of RCEs, but they have traditionally been excluded from RCE 
governance and management. Women-only enterprises have been promoted in response 
to the cultural and institutional barriers to their participation in mixed cooperatives. 
However, these have tended to be small in scale and with limited growth prospects. 
• There are very few examples in the literature of women leading RCEs and related 
development processes. It remains an open question whether cultural context or lack of 
compatibility between household and business roles are the major factors impeding a 
stronger role of women on the boards of directors or at management level. The issue of 
gender in RCE governance has yet to be addressed seriously.
Political–legal 
environment 
• Governments can play a major role in promoting RCEs by removing barriers to, and 
providing incentives for, their development. However, evidence suggests that RCEs 
contend with a myriad of regulations related to start-up, taxes, and export/import 
procedures, etc. This situation is complicated by weak enforcement of laws and related 
rules and regulations. Market liberalization is relatively recent in most of Africa, where the 
possibility that government support translates into interference remains a threat to RCE 
development. 
• Current levels of infrastructure investments in developing regions are low. Sub-Saharan 
Africa lags significantly behind all other regions in access levels for all infrastructure and 
basic services. In addition to access, quality and reliability of infrastructure are critical 
issues in many countries. 
• Small landholdings in the tropics are often held under systems of customary tenure. 
Debate regarding the impact of customary tenure on rural poverty is inconclusive. 
To what extent is secure access to natural resources a prerequisite for viable RCE 
development?
External 
support 
services
• Effective technical, business development, and financial services are key for successful 
RCE development. In practice, however, they tend to be insufficiently articulated and 
focused to meet the needs of RCEs during the development process. There is no 
evidence for integrated service provision by any one provider, be it an NGO, government 
agency or project. BDS are considered to be the Achilles’ heel in the provision of services 
to RCEs.
• Over the past years, the success of microfinance institutions in reaching poor individuals 
has yet to translate into increased access to financial services for RCEs. The current 
micro-finance focus on poverty reduction has failed to contribute to the strengthening of 
RCEs, which tend to require longer-term finance and access to risk capital.
• The provision of technical and business development services continues to depend 
heavily on projects, most of which have no explicit business development strategy with a 
view on the long run and increased RCE self-sufficiency. Exit strategies are complicated 
by smallholders’ and RCEs’ limited willingness and ability to pay for services. 
• Services provided by buyers and processors in the context of existing commercial 
relationships (embedded services) can be as important as those provided by 
governments and NGOs. However, the willingness of buyers and processors to invest in 
these services depends on the related benefits and costs, which in turn, depend on RCE 
asset endowments, among other factors.  
• Public–private partnerships with regard to RCE development and related service delivery 
are a promising option, but not yet fully explored. 
• The need for more specialized services increases as RCEs mature beyond the start-up 
phase. More generalist providers (e.g., rural development NGOs) have advantages in 
the early stages of RCE development: e.g., greater legitimacy with local populations and 
better understanding of local socioeconomic issues. However, they often lack sufficient 
experience to develop the complex administrative, organizational, and marketing issues 
for growth and development beyond an initial stage effectively. 
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debate, let alone in-depth analysis, as how to create 
viable shortcuts to RCE development.
Despite these shortcomings in understanding the 
complexity of RCE development processes and the 
lack of strategies that allow them to turn into viable 
businesses in shorter periods of time, progress has 
been made in several aspects. For example, recent 
discussions highlight that effective governance is 
vital to the overall success of RCEs, especially in 
more demanding market environments. At the same 
time it is acknowledged that effective governance is 
difficult to achieve due to the multiple interests of 
stakeholders (e.g., new members versus old mem-
bers, management versus members), limited business 
experience by board of directors and members, and 
the high costs of coordination and communication 
between them. As a result, RCE governance struc-
tures tend to be weak, often resulting in a low sense 
of ownership among members and overall poor 
business performance. There is broad consensus 
that political–legal frameworks are not conducive to 
RCE development. On the other hand, there is little 
discussion or evidence of the capacity of govern-
ments and service providers to meet better the needs 
of RCEs, their members, or their business partners 
along the value chain. Discussions related to RCEs 
have yet to address fully several important aspects 
related to the design of more effective RCE devel-
opment strategies. For example, few studies have 
estimated the impact of RCEs on poverty reduc-
tion, environmental conservation, and community 
development. Systematic analysis of the minimum 
asset endowments (natural, physical, social, human, 
financial) required for RCE development has yet to 
be carried out. Of particular importance is the need 
to gain more insight into opportunities for improv-
ing technical, business development, and financial 
services for RCEs and, equally important, of better 
articulating them.

37
Case study selection
Primary data collection was carried out in 12 coun-
tries in Latin America and the Caribbean (Bolivia, 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Mexico), 
North America (United States), Asia and the Pacific 
(India, Vietnam, and Papua New Guinea), and Africa 
(Ghana, the Gambia, Malawi, and Uganda). The 
United States was included because of existing expe-
riences with tribal enterprise development by Native 
Americans and the country’s strategic importance to 
the Ford Foundation. 
Country selection aimed to ensure a broad coverage 
of different experiences in RCE development, based 
on the following criteria: socioeconomic performance 
(e.g., variation in HDI and GNI per capita) and 
political, legal, and regulatory frameworks, including 
state intervention in RCE development, institutional 
arrangements for production, processing, and com-
mercialization by small- and medium-scale producers 
and RCEs. Table 3.1 presents, for each of the selected 
countries, indicators of socioeconomic performance 
and salient features of the political–legal framework. In 
terms of economic performance, the majority is at the 
lower, middle, or low income level. Exceptions include 
Mexico, Dominican Republic, and Guatemala as upper 
middle income countries and the United States as high 
income. On average, the Human Development Index5 
(HDI) for the selected countries rises and falls with 
income. One exception is Guatemala, which has an 
HDI rank below its income rank, due in part to large 
discrepancies in income distribution. Another excep-
tion is Vietnam, which remains quite poor but has a 
much higher HDI ranking than many countries with 
higher per capita incomes. Selected counties from sub-
Saharan Africa have a low HDI index. Since 1990 it has 
stagnated, partly because of economic reversal but prin-
cipally because of the catastrophic effect of HIV/AIDS 
on life expectancy (UNDP 2006). The agricultural sec-
tor, including forestry and fishery, is most important in 
the selected African countries, with contributions to 
GDP varying between 33% and 35%. Agriculture is 
also important for the economies of Guatemala, India, 
Papua New Guinea, and Vietnam (GDP contributions 
from 22% to 26%). In Bolivia and the Dominican 
Republic, agriculture is relatively less important, with 
contributions to GDP of 11% and 15%, respectively. 
In the United States and Mexico, the agricultural sector 
plays a small role in the overall economy, with contri-
butions to GDP of 2% and 4%, respectively. 
Emphasis was also given in the country selection pro-
cess to incorporating a diverse range of political and 
legal frameworks for RCE development. In the case of 
the United States, Mexico, and Bolivia, these include 
formal land grants to indigenous and/or peasant com-
munities by central governments, along with the right to 
commercialize forest and other products. In the Petén 
region of Guatemala, rather than land grants, commu-
nities have been granted the right to obtain renewable 
25-year concessions for the harvesting and commercial-
ization of forest resources. Papua New Guinea presents a 
contrasting situation, where rural communities hold for-
mally recognized customary rights to natural resources 
and where state agencies play a key role in RCE opera-
tions (marketing and processing). Among the selected 
Latin American and Caribbean countries, donors and 
NGOs have played a leading role in promoting RCE 
development, in particular in the Dominican Republic, 
Bolivia, and Guatemala, while in the case of several of 
the selected Asian and African countries, government 
agencies and quasi-governmental marketing boards 
have been critical for RCE development, for example 
in Ghana, India, and Malawi. 
Twenty-six RCE case studies were carried out, with 
one to three case studies per country. RCEs were 
selected, together with local data collection partners, 
with the aim of ensuring broad variation regarding: 
• Stage of development: distinguishing between 
incipient or start-up (focus on production and 
organization), consolidation (focus on increased 
value adding), and mature (focus on increased 
management and administrative skills, diversified 
market contacts, and formalized business rela-
tions, as well as increased efficiency)
3 Methodological 
approach 
5  The human development index (HDI) is a composite measure of three dimensions of human development: living a long and healthy life (measured 
by life expectancy), being educated (measured by adult literacy and enrolment at the primary, secondary, and tertiary level), and having a decent 
standard of living (measured by purchasing power parity, PPP, income).
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• Organizational structures: single versus two tier; 
management models (internal versus externally 
sourced managers); access to resources (common 
versus private property)
• Product and market orientation: national versus 
international markets; agricultural and forest 
products or services (e.g., ecotourism).
Data collection methods
Data at the RCE level were collected based on a 
questionnaire that consisted of the following eight 
sections: 
1) General information: RCE legal form; certification 
benefits and costs; production trends; access to nat-
ural resources; enterprise goals; asset endowments 
(human, social, natural, physical, and financial 
capital); services provided to members
2) Internal structure and governance: membership 
levels, organizational structures, management 
models, coordination; internal conflicts, rules and 
regulations, incentive structures, women in RCE 
operations and decision making
3) Political–legal framework: laws, rules, and regu-
lations related to small and medium enterprise 
development, natural resource management, land 
tenure, incentives, tax regimes; political–legal and 
regulatory barriers to RCE development
4) Economics and technology: investments, savings, 
and dividends; sources of capital; marketing strat-
egy; use of technology, including Internet; sources 
of competitive advantage; internal and external 
limitations for development
5) Chain integration: relations with buyers; access to 
information; friction with buyers; buyer-provided 
services
6) Outcome and benefits: employment generation; 
impact of RCE on skills and knowledge of mem-
bers; income generation by members through 
RCE participation; RCE investments in commu-
nity development   
7) Service needs and finance: technical, business 
development and financial services utilized; fund-
ing and cost-recovery mechanisms for service 
delivery; limitation of service providers; unmet 
service needs
8) Future projections: growth potential; benefit cap-
turing and delivery.
Questionnaire design included both open-ended 
and closed questions; the former type was preferred 
for capturing in-depth appraisal from the RCE 
perspective, while the latter was considered critical 
for achieving comparable results across the sample. 
In general, we aimed to obtain as much quantitative 
data as possible and as much qualitative informa-
tion as needed. Quantitative information focused on 
production, processing, sales, economic impact, and 
investments. In many cases however, such data were 
not readily available in view of limitations in account-
ing and record keeping at the RCE level. Within each 
RCE, one to four stakeholders were interviewed, 
depending on the size and organizational complexity of 
the enterprise and the availability of RCE stakehold-
ers. These were interviewed on-site over the course 
of eight months (November 2007–June 2008). The 
respondents were mainly managers, including general 
managers as well as production and sales managers. 
Each questionnaire was reviewed by authors at least 
twice for completeness and accuracy. In nearly all the 
cases, we requested that our partners conduct follow-
up interviews on-site or by telephone to respond to 
our comments and questions. Questionnaire data were 
triangulated by authors through direct questioning of 
the different organizations (RCEs, service providers, 
other enterprises) and analysis of secondary informa-
tion, particularly that available on the Internet. 
Although the sample cannot be considered represen-
tative of the national or international population of 
RCEs, we considered it crucial to draw on existing con-
tacts, experiences, and knowledge of local partners and 
authors since information on the population of RCEs 
at the national or international level is generally scarce 
and difficult to obtain. Moreover, a representative 
sample is not required for the objectives of this report, 
which aims at evaluating the overall successes and limi-
tations of RCEs in increasingly globalized marketplaces 
and their ability to generate tangible benefits for their 
members and surrounding communities, including the 
social and environmental goods and services. 
Potential limitations associated with this methodol-
ogy include:
• Lack of useful information on the political–legal 
framework: Detailed and timely information on the 
laws and regulations in selected countries impact-
ing RCE development is scarce. 
• Potential bias: Survey data may be biased by lim-
ited number of RCE interviewees in each RCE 
case study (mainly limited to managers). Data 
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triangulation through services providers, buyers, 
and secondary information is employed to improve 
objectivity. 
• Incomplete data and high costs for data collection: In 
some cases, RCEs do not maintain written records, 
thus limiting availability of information on pro-
duction, costs, and prices. In other cases, RCE 
managers are reluctant to address “sensitive” 
issues such as conflicts among members or with 
buyers and service providers. 
These limitations notwithstanding, the methodologi-
cal approach provided useful primary information at 
a relatively low cost. It has the merit of determining 
relative capacities of RCEs, i.e., how the capacity in 
one RCE relates to that of another. It is also capable 
of highlighting aspects of comparative advantage 
that are useful for the development of RCEs. The 
approach is also relatively efficient in summarizing a 
large body of information relevant to RCEs and the 
institutional context in which they operate. 
Table 3.1  Characteristics of selected countries for RCE case studies 
Country Per capita GNI at 
PPP (US$)
Human devel-
opment index 
(HDI)
Agriculture as 
% of GDP
Salient features of political-legal frame-
work related to RCE development
Latin America and Caribbean
Bolivia 2,450 .69 15 Tenure rights for indigenous communities; 
strong donor and NGO presence for 
nontraditional agriculture & community 
forestry
Dominican 
Republic 
6,210 .75 11 Long-standing government and donor 
commitment to organic agriculture
Guatemala 4,060 .67 22 Community forestry concessions (Petén) 
and government/donor support for 
specialty coffee production 
Mexico 8,950 .82 4 Ejido common property regimes, extensive 
support for community forest enterprises 
North America
United States 37,500 .95 2 Native American tribal enterprises 
(common property) in agricultural, forest 
and tourism sectors 
Asia and the Pacific
India 2,880 .61 23 Long-standing government support 
to social forestry, including forest 
management and sale of NTFPs 
Papua New 
Guinea
2,240 .52 26 97% of land held by small producers with 
legally recognized customary rights
Vietnam 2,490 .71 23 Dynamic transition economy with strong 
role of government in rural economic affairs
Africa
Gambia 1,820 .48 n/d Strong government involvement in 
community forestry 
Ghana 2,190 .53 35 Strong government involvement in 
marketing cocoa beans
Malawi 600 .40 38 Strong government involvement in RCE 
organization 
Uganda 1,440 .50 33 Strong government involvement in RCE 
organization 
Sources: World Bank (2005), UNDP (2006), CIA World Factbook (2006)
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Salient features of the case studies 
The sampled RCEs capture considerable variation in 
terms of legal form, market orientation, and level of 
processing (position in the value chain) (Table 4.1). 
Salient features of the sample include: 
• Legal form: Cooperatives and associations are 
the dominant form. Interestingly, several RCEs 
operating in relatively demanding international 
market environments are organized as associa-
tions (e.g., BANELINO, Chichan Há), despite 
the limitations of capitalization. A few RCEs are 
organized as corporations (e.g., Menominee Tribal 
Enterprises, FORESCOM, Smallholder Tea Com-
pany), while others have no legal form at all (e.g., 
SMART, Tsyunhehkwa). Complicating matters is 
the fact that some RCEs are legally organized as 
cooperatives but in fact are without community 
ownership. For example, the CCGS Coopera-
tive is wholly owned and managed by the Coffee 
Industry Cooperation (a government agency in 
Papua New Guinea) as part of its Coffee Credit 
Guarantee Scheme for facilitating credit to small-
holder coffee producers. In India, both LAMPS 
and VGKK are controlled by external agents, the 
former by a departmental government and the lat-
ter by an NGO. 
• Market orientation: For roughly 50% of the sam-
ple, at least half of the total income is derived 
from international markets, often niche markets 
(organic, fair trade, certified wood). The majority 
of the internationally focused RCEs are found in 
Latin America. Two RCEs in Africa have obtained 
fair trade certification (Kuapa Kokoo and Kasin-
thula Cane). Organic certification was not reported 
from RCEs in Africa or Asia—even in cases where 
organic production systems have been (partially) 
adopted (e.g., Nama ACE and Rahama). The 
result of this is that RCEs in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, in general, have developed a more 
international orientation than their counterparts 
in Asia and Africa, due to the strong role of inter-
national NGOs in RCE organization and reduced 
presence of state in the rural sector.
• Level of processing: Most internationally oriented 
RCEs produce semifinished products (e.g., cocoa 
butter and powder, green coffee, chicle gum, dried 
tea, and dimensioned sawn wood). They usu-
ally focus on only one product: Nama ACE—hot 
pepper; Smallholder Tea Company—dried tea; 
BANELINO—banana; and Consorcio Chiclero—
chicle gum. Several have managed to overcome 
the regulatory and logistic hurdles for fresh fruit 
export (e.g., BANELINO—banana; Thanh Son—
litchi). A few RCEs stand out in terms of level of 
processing (e.g., El Ceibo—cocoa butter, cocoa 
powder, chocolate) and diversification of supply 
(e.g., Menominee—dimensioned sawnwood, uncut 
logs, pulp, shavings, chips, tree bark). Most of the 
RCEs oriented toward national markets special-
ize in undifferentiated products with low levels of 
processing, but with a more diversified product 
offer (e.g., LAMPS—various NTFPs; Buzaama 
ACE—coffee, rice, sunflower oil).
Externally versus internally driven 
organizations
To examine the role of different actors in the creation 
and development of RCEs, we divide the sample into 
two parts. Table 4.2 presents RCEs with more than 
10 years of experience and Table 4.3 presents those 
with fewer than 10 years’ experience. Among RCEs 
with more than 10 years’ experience, the vast major-
ity can trace their origins to extensive government 
involvement in RCE development. This includes all 
of the forest-based RCEs. Box 4.1 highlights the case 
of Menominee Tribal Enterprises, which has evolved 
over the past 100 years, with extensive interaction 
with the U.S. government for access to national 
resources, financing of infrastructure, and subsidies 
for sustainable forest management. The origin of the 
forest-based RCE in Mexico, Noh-Bec, shares many 
features of the Menominee case. Both Menominee 
and Noh-Bec have evolved into major commercial 
operations. Menominee harvests some 14 million 
board feet of sawn timber annually, while Noh-Bec 
is the single largest exporter of mahogany in Mexico. 
In other cases, government involvement has been 
critical for start-up; however, the development path-
way has tended to focus more on goals other than 
RCE development, for example, conservation in the 
4 Insights from case 
studies 
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case of LAMPS (India) and cultural preservation in 
the case of Tsyunhehkwa (United States).
NGOs, in partnership with local community leaders, 
played a critical role in the organization of several of 
the RCEs, including El Ceibo (Bolivia) and Kuapa 
Kokoo (Ghana). In the case of El Ceibo, extensive, 
long-term technical assistance and well-planned sub-
sidies, combined with some luck, made possible the 
development of local capacity and market and prod-
uct diversification (see Box 4.2). In the case of Kuapa 
Kokoo, cocoa is highly significant both culturally and 
economically, external support was available at the 
right time for growth and expansion, and social capi-
tal was high prior to RCE development (see Box 4.3). 
The case of La Voz in Guatemala stands out for the 
critical role played by an international buyer in the 
upgrading of production and marketing skills. With 
export-provided assistance, La Voz became the first 
exporter of organic coffee in Guatemala. 
Most sampled RCEs were established less than 10 years 
ago (Table 4.3). These relatively-young RCEs tend to 
be characterized by 1) strong orientation toward the 
international market in general and niche markets in 
particular, 2) strong NGO support, and 3) increased 
presence of the private sector, including large enter-
prises and buyers. Among those with an international 
orientation, NGOs have played a prominent role in 
their organization. Examples include CONACADO 
and FORESCOM from Latin America and Thanh Son 
from Vietnam. FORESCOM is the result of decades 
of investments in securing commercial rights to the 
resource base, upgrading business and technical skills 
for forest management and wood processing, and 
project-provided marketing services. CONOCADO 
has been a major beneficiary of international develop-
ment agencies (e.g., USAID, DFID), which has been 
critical for CONOCADO’s successful expansion of 
its membership base and export volumes, adaptation 
of improved production technologies (certification), 
post-harvest (e.g., fermentation) practices, and access 
to new markets in Europe. 
Surprising is the continued high level of involvement 
by government agencies in the creation of RCEs in 
some countries, for example India and Papua New 
Guinea. Similarly, in Mexico, the government has 
Box 4.1  Origins of Menominee Tribal Enterprises in the United States
The Menominee Reservation’s current boundaries were set in 1854 by a treaty with the U.S. government. The 
reservation consists of about 220,000 acres of forest. However, it took more than 50 years for the Menominee 
to obtain full rights to manage their land. In 1856, a small sawmill was established to meet the needs of the 
community. The sawmill began processing pine for sale outside the reservation in 1871, mostly from dead and 
down timber. Over the next 15 years, approximately 100 million board feet of logs were cut for sale. In 1890, 
the Menominee received permission from the U.S. government to cut green timber at an annual rate of 20 M 
board feet. This was the first attempt to calculate an annual allowable cut in the United States. Over the next 
17 years, 290 M board feet of timber were cut and sold. 
In 1905, a windstorm blew down roughly 40 million board feet of timber. This prompted the U.S. government 
to provide funds for the construction of a modern sawmill to process the down and damaged timber. The new 
sawmill allowed the Menominee to process their timber efficiently. Over the next 50 years, more than one 
billion board feet were processed at the mill. The related profits, coupled with a successful lawsuit against the 
federal government for forest mismanagement, resulted in more than $10 million dollars in the Menominee 
Trust Fund by 1954. The Menominee were able to construct a hospital and a clinic and establish a law 
enforcement and judicial system. Since its inception, the forest-based RCE has been the backbone of the 
tribal economy. The enterprise directly generates hundreds of thousands of dollars in salaries and benefits to 
its employees and gives predictable work to the logging contractors and their employees. No other business 
surpassed the forestry enterprise’s impact on the tribal economy until a casino operation was inaugurated in 
1987. It is the oldest tribally owned and managed commercial forest operation in the United States.
Source: Huff & Pecore (1995)
(Continued on page 46)
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Box 4.2  Origins of El Ceibo, Bolivia: Role of long-term donor and NGO partnerships
Since its creation in 1977, El Ceibo has evolved into a complex and multifunctional business organization including 
processing, market development, and technology. El Ceibo’s early work revolved around marketing of cocoa for 
domestic and export markets. However, problems with cocoa quality led the government to withdraw El Ceibo’s 
export licence in the late 1970s, but El Ceibo continued marketing in Bolivia, which was aided by the 400% 
increase in cocoa prices from 1976 to 1980. In 1980, El Ceibo expanded its activities with a large grant from the 
Inter-American Foundation. Purchasing a truck and boosting its operating capital by $100,000 allowed El Ceibo 
to increase its local purchases and compete more effectively with local traders. In the early 1980s, El Ceibo 
expanded its activities beyond marketing. Production of chocolate began in 1984, initially for the national market 
and subsequently international. In 1982, a technology generation, adaptation, and transfer program (Coopeagro) 
was established in response to pest and disease problems and weak public-sector support. 
By 1985, El Ceibo had improved the quality of its cocoa enough that the government returned its export licence. 
Since then, the export market has driven El Ceibo’s operations. El Ceibo’s links to donors, and its German volunteers, 
helped access fair trade and organic product markets in Europe and develop a network of contacts, a range of 
products, and a system for organic cocoa production. By 1989, El Ceibo was Bolivia’s seventh most important 
exporter of nontraditional products. In 1993, El Ceibo exported US$518,000 worth of cocoa products (beans, 
powder, and butter). To manage the range of activities, El Ceibo has had to develop technical, administrative, 
and commercial management capacity. In part, this has been supported by donor–funded advanced training 
programs. Another critical contribution has been the continued presence of technical and economic advisors from 
the German Development Service (DED), who have played important roles in developing El Ceibo’s management 
systems and human capital. El Ceibo’s activities have thus evolved to link its marketing operations with both 
product transformation and technology generation to support that marketing. 
Source: Bebbington, et al. 1996
Box 4.3  Origins of Kuapa Kokoo, Ghana: Importance of local leadership 
When the government of Ghana partially liberalized cocoa markets in 1992, several community leaders  saw an 
opportunity to organize to sell their cocoa to the Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC), the state-owned company 
that is the single exporter of Ghana cocoa. No official support was offered to would-be licensees, as it was believed 
that this would constrain competition and the emergence of a new private sector in cocoa trading. Considerable 
obstacles had to be overcome in order to comply and obtain a licence to trade, for example:
• Operate in at least three cocoa growing regions from the outset 
• Provide collateral and financing for operations (i.e.,CMC provided no advances for future deliveries) 
• Set up fully equipped buying centers: scales, sacks, tarpaulins, and grates to store cocoa professionally 
• Pass inspection by the Quality Control Division of Ghana Cocoa Board (CCB).
By mid-1993, when regulations were to be implemented in the upcoming season, smallholders attempting to start a 
new, collectively organized company had been effectively thwarted. While they were looked on favorably by some 
in CCB, they lacked capital and credibility. At this point, community leaders linked up with two development NGOs, 
SNV and Twin Trading. Each offereded support the local efforts to get a new RCE up and running. After a short 
and intense mobilization—consisting of awareness-raising and village–level discussion about the historic change 
in the trading regime and the idea of starting a new RCE—there was an upsurge of interest in joining the initiative. 
About 2,000 smallholders from 22 villages volunteered to organize their facilities to satisfy the authorities and 
committed to deliver at least 100 MT of cocoa beans per village. The REC was formed, named Kuapa Kokoo Ltd. 
with a handful of local leaders representing three regions and with financial backing from a loan guarantee by Twin 
Trading. Kuapa Kokoo presented a business plan to the CBC to obtain a licence to trade, which was approved.
Source: Tiffen et al. 2004
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Table 4.2  Origins of selected RCEs with 10-plus years of existence
RCE Date of 
foundation
Current 
membership
Description
Menominee 
(U.S.)
1908 8,500 See Box 4.1 
Buzaama ACE 
(Uganda)
1951 350 For most of its existence, Buzaama ACE operated under the 
control of various government ministries. However, since the 
late 1980s, following market liberalization reforms, Buzaama 
ACE has been forced to compete with private-sector 
operators. Advances to date have been supported mainly by 
members, with limited support from government.
El Ceibo 
(Bolivia)
1977 700 See Box 4.2
La Voz 
(Guatemala)
1979 140 La Voz progressed from selling conventional coffee to local 
intermediaries to selling certified organic and fair trade coffee 
directly to U.S. buyers. Long-term assistance from buyers 
was critical, providing technical assistance, certification, 
marketing, and loan guarantees. Government agencies and 
NGOs also provided assistance in co-op organization. 
LAMPS (India) 1982 966 Start-up facilitated by Cooperative Dept through District 
Cooperative Bank to promote tribal development, particularly 
to increase economic benefits from the collection of NTFPs. 
NTFPs purchased from the local communities and auctioned 
by the LAMPS to the highest bidder for processing and 
marketing. NGOs and various projects played an important 
role in capacity building related to forest management. 
Noh-Bec 
(Mexico)
1983 216 The ejido Noh-Bec was founded in 1934 and for most of 
its existence was dedicated to chicle extraction. In 1983, 
the forest concession granted to the state-directed forest 
enterprise MIQROO terminated, thus opening the door for 
community forest management (CFM). Government agencies 
and donors (GTZ) played a critical role in establishing 
the overall political–legal framework, as well as providing 
technical assistance for establishing Noh-Bec.
Tsyunhehkwa 
(U.S.)
1993  4,000 Tsyunhehkwa is a project sponsored by the Oneida Indian 
Nation, with three components: agricultural production, 
cannery plant for processing, and retail operations. It 
provides training in food production and processing and 
organizes community events around white corn production. 
Kuapa Kokoo 
(Ghana) 
1993 45,000 See Box 4.3
VGKK-Honey 
(India)
1995 869 Since 1988, the local NGO VGKK took over operations of a 
failing LAMPS cooperative, creating VGKK-Honey. Support 
has been received from various agencies: Biodiversity 
Conservation Network and Ford Foundation. 
Tumani Tenda 
(Gambia)
1997 203 Village-owned and village-operated camp for providing 
development income for the village, including medical 
and educational facilities, which were not being met 
through income from agriculture. Various government 
agencies provided critical support related to business and 
architectural planning, materials, marketing, and forest 
management.
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played a major role in the organization and capital-
ization of Consorcio Chiclero, donating infrastructure 
and providing major grants and soft loans. On the 
other hand, much less state support has been made 
available for RCE creation in less-traditional sectors, 
such as ecotourism: X-Yaat, an ecotourism venture 
not too distant from Cancún has received only mar-
ginal support from NGOs and international tour 
agencies. In contrast, Tumani Tenda’s ecotourism 
operations in Gambia have been heavily supported by 
government agencies. In Uganda, the organizational 
structure and membership of Buzaama ACE and 
Nama ACE are determined by legal and organiza-
tional frameworks administered through government 
agencies. Kasinthula Cane and the Smallholder Tea 
Company in Malawi were pushed by the government 
following the privatization of the sugar industry and 
tea industries, respectively.
Table 4.3  Origins of selected RCEs with less than 10 years of existence
RCE Date of 
foundation
Current 
membership
Description 
Chichan Há 
(Mexico)
1998 134 Chichan Há emerged as a result of changes in Mexican common 
property law that allowed the division of ejido territories among 
groups of ejido members. It is the largest (137 members) of five 
work groups of the Ejido Caoba and operates on an independent 
basis from the other work groups in the extraction and 
commercialization of timber. 
CONACADO 
(Dominican 
Republic)
1989 8,200 Formed in response to the low international cocoa prices of the 
late 1980s with considerable technical and financial assistance 
provided by the government and international development 
agencies, growing to become the world’s largest single exporter 
of organic cacao beans.
Kasinthula 
Cane (Malawi) 
1999 282 Kasinthula Cane was initiated by the government in 1996 to 
address poverty in southern Malawi and the need for increased 
sugar output by the local sugar processor (Illovo). The government 
facilitated negotiations with Illovo and transferred irrigation 
scheme land and infrastructure to a trust.
BANELINO 
(Dominican 
Republic)
2000 275 With extensive government-backed technical and financial 
assistance, BANELINO began organic production in 1998 
following destruction by Hurricane Georges. It is one of only eight 
banana enterprises worldwide to be certified fair trade. 
Kesla Poultry 
(India)
2001 442 Kesla Poultry organizes production of fresh poultry products 
among tribal women to sell in local poultry markets. Support 
by NGOs motivated women to take up poultry and facilitated 
grants and technical support. Government has provided critical 
assistance for infrastructure.
FEDEPMA 
(Guatemala)
2002 92 FEDEPMA is a second-tier association of NGOs addressing 
economic and social issues of indigenous communities. Among 
its activities is the promotion of smallholder coffee, for which it 
provides technical assistance, training and credit. 
Smallholder 
Tea Company 
(Malawi) 
2002 1,000 See Box 4.4
SMART
(PNG)
2002 29 SMART is a project of the Cocoa Coconut Institute, which emerged 
from a merger between the Cocoa and Coconut Research Institute 
and Cocoa and Coconut Extension Agency and is responsible for 
all cocoa and coconut R&D in PNG. 
Cooperatives 
CCGS 
(PNG)
2003 1440 Cooperatives CCGS is a project of the Coffee Industry 
Corporation, which is a “privatized” version of the former coffee 
marketing board. 
Continued on next page
(Continued from page 43)
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RCE Date of 
foundation
Current 
membership
Description 
FORESCOM 
(Guatemala)
2003 11 
(community 
concessions)
FORESCOM provides technical services (resource manager 
function, nursery production, road construction), marketing 
services, and group certification. It was organized as part of the 
exit strategy of a large-scale USAID project on community forest 
management. 
Nama ACE 
(Uganda)
2003 712 Similar to Buzaama ACE in structure but with an international 
market focus, Nama ACE has experienced rapid growth in 
membership and exports since 2003, due in part to government 
incorporation of additional first-tier RCEs.
X-Yaat 
(Mexico) 
2003 7 Grassroots initiative that offers sustainable tours of El Señor 
community and its surrounding environment and environmental 
education to local youth and the tourism industry. Support was 
provided by donors for financing infrastructure. 
Consorcio 
Chiclero 
(Mexico)
2005 1,500 Consorcio Chiclero was formed from the merger of two 
government organizations: Chicle Pilot Plan (organizational 
assistance and pensions schemes for chicle extractors) and 
Union of Chicle Cooperatives (marketing and political activism), to 
enhance positioning in international markets.
Rahama 
(Ghana)
2005 20 Rahama is informal, with major difficulties in capitalizing and 
increasing value addition. Extension support for production offered 
by Ministry of Food and Agriculture is the only source of external 
support. 
Membership among the sampled RCEs varies widely 
depending on sector (tourism versus agriculture versus 
forest), age (performance), market orientation, and 
role of external agents in RCE organization. Among 
the agriculture RCEs, the three cocoa-based RCEs 
are among the largest: Kuapa Kokoo with 45,000 
members, CONACADO with 8,200 members, and El 
Ceibo with 700 members (plus another 1,500 nonmem-
ber suppliers). Such high membership levels reflect 1) 
that cocoa production takes place in relatively remote 
areas with few other commercial on-farm production 
possibilities and 2) large investments by international 
donors in cocoa expansion. Several other RCEs had 
membership levels between 200 and 700 members: for 
example: BANELINO (275), Kasinthula Cane (283), 
Kesla Poultry (442). Among the forest-based RCEs, 
membership level is determined by community popu-
lation, which varies widely across the sample: from a 
low end of 216 in the case of Noh-Bec to an upper end 
of 8,500 in the case of Menominee Tribal Enterprises. 
With the exception of Tumani Tenda—which has open 
community membership—membership levels among 
timber-producing RCEs vary little over time, as mem-
bership rights are only acquired by inheritance. 
Figure 4.1 examines the relationship between RCE 
age and membership levels.  Generally, the youngest 
RCEs are those with lower membership levels (e.g., 
Rahama, X-Yaat, SMART), while the more mature 
RCEs have larger membership levels (El Ceibo, 
Kuapa Kokoo, CONACADO). Where there are 
notable exceptions (large membership growth over 
short period of time), such as Consorcio Chiclero, 
Cooperative CCGS, and Nama ACE, this is the 
direct result of government involvement in RCE 
organization. In the case of Consorcio Chiclero, 
it is important to note that the RCE was born out 
of the merger of two formerly independent RCEs, 
thus a large membership base already existed. In the 
case of Cooperative CCGS and Nama ACE, such 
high membership levels are likely to be the result 
of government promotion of RCE development. 
RCEs organized in the mid-1990s to early 2000s 
(e.g., Kasinthula Cane, Kesla Poultry, Smallholder 
Tea Company, CAIC) have achieved relatively high 
membership levels required for processing and inter-
national marketing. 
Objectives and service offer  
Here we examine the relative importance of various 
objectives, such as profit, higher income, and capi-
talization, as compared to social and environmental 
objectives. Table 4.4 presents a ranking of RCE objec-
tives as reported by RCE leaders.
Table 4.3—Continued
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Box 4.4  Origins of Smallholder Tea Company, Malawi: Uphill struggle from the start
The predecessor to the Smallholder Tea Company (STC), the Smallholder Tea Authority (STA) was formed 
shortly after Malawi’s independence. By 1990, 2,400 ha had been planted by 4,900 smallholders, who were 
required to register and work with the parastatal STA. The STA effectively supported smallholders with free 
seedlings for plantation establishment, free extension, tea and maize inputs on credit, and regular on-farm 
collection of harvest tea with first payment within 10 days. However, the pressure to continue expansion meant 
that the STA was never financially strong. During the 1990s, increased political interference in the board, 
diversion of transport to politicians’ use, increasingly late payment, farmer demands for higher prices, declining 
STA staff, and collapse of the input credit system led to severe financial difficulties for the STA, a collapse in 
field and factory operations, and alienation of smallholders who responded by selling to local estates. These 
local estates welcomed high-quality smallholder tea and better utilization of factory capacity and began to offer 
interlocked input credit and extension advice, some also offering health, education, and social services. 
After 2002, the STA was dissolved and the STC was established, as well as its governing body, the Smallholder 
Tea Growers Trust (STGT) formed with three growers, two managers,  a lawyer, and an accountant. 
Management and debt were slimmed down and restructured with new appointments, with a strong mandate 
to minimize operation costs, produce quality tea, pay farmers on time, and operate within the cash flow of 
the company. Since the reform a large number of farmers have returned to STC and are receiving much 
better services, although some blocks have formed their own association and continue to sell to estates and 
indeed have started operating their own tea factory. The case illustrates the difficulties in establishing RCEs, 
the resilience and determination of smallholders in the face of a long decline in service to tea production, 
difficulties from political interference and the importance of lean but effective management and services. 
Source: Chirwa et al. 2005, Tiffen et al. 2004
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Figure 4.1  Relationship between RCE age and membership level (n=20)
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• Higher income: In most cases, income generation 
for members is the primary goal. Only in the case 
of LAMPS and the two U.S.-based RCEs was 
income not ranked first. In the case of Menominee 
trial enterprises, community development through 
employment generation and income for tribal 
government are main objectives, followed by sus-
tainable forest management—a requirement for 
maintaining tribal reservation status. Interestingly, 
income generation for members was not a major 
objective: annual dividends per community mem-
ber vary per year depending on profits available 
and community development needs but usually do 
not exceed US$ 300. The primary focus of LAMPS 
is sustainable resource management and increasing 
member income by forcing local intermediaries of 
NTFPs to negotiate directly with LAMPS (admin-
istered by state-appointed officials). 
• Community development: As expected, commu-
nity development is a major goal for most RCEs 
based on common property management, such as 
CAIC, FORESCOM, Chichan Há, and Consorcio 
Chiclero. It is also ranked highly by these RCEs 
engaged in certified fair trade. However, in some 
cases (e.g., BANELINO) tensions have emerged 
between RCE administration and RCE members 
over the use of fair trade “premia” for community 
development, with members arguing for higher 
returns when prices are low rather than investments 
in community development.
• Capitalization: Capitalization ranks second only 
in limited cases (e.g., Kesla Poultry, Nama ACE, 
FORESCOM), all of which are relatively incipi-
ent and oriented toward higher-value markets. The 
overall lack of importance placed on capitalization 
suggests: 1) institutional limitations of RCE to capi-
talize, trade-offs with members’ demand for higher 
returns, and 3) limited strategic planning skills of 
RCEs and their service providers. 
• Environment and conservation: Environmental 
and biodiversity conservation ranked highly as 
an objective when RCEs were orientated toward 
Table 4.4  Ranking of RCE objectives 
RCE Profit and 
higher 
income
Community 
development 
Capitalization Environment/ 
conservation
Political  
advocacy and 
cultural identity
El Ceibo 1 3 4 2 5
CAIC 1 5 4 3 2
BANELINO 1 2 4 3 5
CONACADO 1 2 4 3 5
La Voz 1 3 5 2 4
FEDEPMA 1 2 4 3 5
FORESCOM 1 5 3 2 4
Chichan Há 1 4 2 3 5
Consorcio Chiclero 1 4 3 2 5
Noh-Bec 1 4 3 2 5
X-Yaat 1 5 3 4 2
Menominee 5 1 3 2 4
Tsyunhehkwa 4 2 5 3 1
Tumani Tenda 3 2 4 1 5
Kuapa Kokoo 1 2 4 5 4
Rahama 1 4 2 3 5
Kasinthula Cane 1 2 3 4 5
Smallholder Tea 1 4 2 5 3
Buzaama ACE 1 3 2 4 5
Nama ACE 1 3 2 4 5
Kesla Poultry 1 3 2 5 4
LAMPS 2 3 3 2 5
VGKK–Honey 2 1 4 3 5
Cooperatives CCGS 1 2 4 3 5
SMART 1 3 2 4 5
Thanh Son 1 4 3 5 2
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international markets for organic products, for 
example: El Ceibo, FEDEMPA, BANALINO, 
and La Voz. On the other hand, it can be assumed 
that several noncertified RCEs have a relatively 
low environmental impact due to their limited asset 
endowments: for example, Buzaama ACE sells 
organic fruits although it has no certification and no 
explicit orientation toward conservation—its mem-
bers simply do not have access to chemical inputs. 
In the case of forest-based RCEs, conservation was 
more highly prioritized—in several cases environ-
mental conservation is a precondition for access to 
forest resources as established by the state: Noh-
Bec, Chichan Há, Tumani Tenda, FORESCOM, 
LAMPS, and Menomonee Tribal Enterprises. 
• Political advocacy and cultural identity: In most 
cases political advocacy was not a major focus of 
the sampled RCEs. In the case of FORESCOM, 
however, decisions were taken to separate com-
mercial aspects of community forest management 
(FORESCOM) from the more social aspects, 
under the auspices of the social organization 
ACOFOP (Asociación de Comunidades Forestales 
de Petén). Tsyunhehkwa—a project of the Oneida 
Tribe in the United States—stands out for its focus 
on cultural preservation, especially the preserva-
tion of traditional varieties of white corn and the 
traditions related to food preserving and agricul-
tural harvesting.
To meet these objectives, most sampled RCEs 
offer some form of technical assistance and train-
ing, related mainly to production technologies 
and disease/pest management (Table 4.5). Social 
services include funeral payments for members 
(e.g., CONACADO, Noh-Bec, Smallholder Tea 
Company) and financial contributions to community 
development, including infrastructure development 
(e.g., Menominee, La Voz, Kuapa Kokoo). In the 
case of timber-based RCEs, such as Noh-Bec and 
Table 4.5  Services offered by RCE to their members
RCE Technical assis-
tance and training 
Credit Storage and 
transport
Certification Social 
services
Resource 
management
El Ceibo X X X X X
CAIC X X X X
BANELINO X X X X
CONACADO X X X X X
La Voz X X X X
FEDEPMA X X X
FORESCOM X X X
Chichan Há X X X
Consorcio Chiclero X X X X X
Noh-Bec X X
X-Yaat 
Menominee X X
Tsyunhehkwa X X
Tumani Tenda X X X X
Kuapa Kokoo X X X X
Rahama X
Kasinthula Cane X X X X X
Smallholder Tea X X X
Buzaama ACE X X
Nama ACE X X X
Kesla Poultry X X X X X
LAMPS X X X
VGKK-Honey X X
Cooperatives 
CCGS 
X X X
SMART X X
Thanh Son X X
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Menominee, services provided for members are usu-
ally limited to common-pool resource management. 
RCEs play a critical role in making certification 
accessible to smallholders and communities through 
group certification programs. RCEs that offer the 
lowest level of services include: LAMPS, Rahama, 
Buzaama ACE, and X-Yaat.  
Nearly all the agriculture- and NTFP-based RCEs 
offer finance to their members. In most cases, funding 
for RCE credit programs is provided by NGOs, gov-
ernment programs, or private banks (in limited cases), 
and the cost of credit varies widely, from 5% APR for 
Kasinthula Cane to 15% APR for La Voz. In no case 
were credit programs funded from RCE earnings. In 
general the offer of credit to smallholders can be critical 
for building a sense of ownership and expectations of 
independence among RCE members. It is difficult for 
rural people with little education to solicit loans directly 
from banks and large lending institutions because they 
do not have the proper guarantees, do not have an 
existing credit history, do not understand the exten-
sive paperwork that is required, and often are ashamed 
of their inadequate language and social skills. Credit 
must be managed carefully by both the RCEs and the 
borrowing members, or such programs can severely 
weaken long-term RCE development prospects and in 
some cases, lead to failure (see Box 4.7 for example).
Asset endowments 
This section examines the asset endowments among the 
selected RCEs, focusing on the following five capital 
forms: natural, physical, financial, social, and human. 
Natural capital 
The richness of the natural resource endowments 
of the RCEs varied. Several forest-based RCEs are 
among those with the highest natural capital endow-
ments. In the case of Menominee Tribal Enterprises, 
natural capital includes 120,000 ha of forest with five 
main commercial species. Noh-Bec operates on 18,000 
ha of tropical forest and has the largest concentration 
of mahogany in Mexico. However, several others of 
the sampled RCEs (e.g., Noh-Bec, Chichan Há, and 
FORESCOM) are highly dependent on the sale of a 
limited number of high-value timber products (mahog-
any and tropical cedar), whose long-term availability 
may be in decline (SmartWood 2005). LAMPS and 
VGKK–Honey are two forest-based RCEs that face 
serious constraints in terms of access to the natural 
resource base. In both cases, all aspects of forest man-
agement and commercialization are controlled by the 
state forestry department. Without radical changes 
in policy, these RCEs are not likely to develop much 
beyond their current stage. In a few cases, viable 
forest-based RCEs have emerged as traders and pro-
cessors, with limited backward linkages to members 
and low levels of natural capital. These RCEs, which 
include, CAIC, Consorcio Chiclero, FORESCOM, 
LAMPS), demonstrate the potential for viable RCE 
development independent from direct access to natu-
ral resource base. FORESCOM competes directly with 
local intermediaries for the purchase of raw materials 
from independently owned and operated community 
forest concessions. NTFP-based RCEs, such as CAIC, 
Consorcio Chiclero, LAMPS, maintain relatively loose 
affiliations with their members and maintain low barri-
ers to RCE membership.  
Where collective access to the resource base prevails, 
a range of access agreements exists: substantive own-
ership rights (e.g., ejidos in Mexico, tribal nations in 
United States, ancestral lands in PNG), to usufruct 
rights (CFMA agreements in Gambia, community 
concessions in Guatemala), to customary rights (NTFP 
collection in northern Bolivia). Menominee Tribal 
Enterprises has practised sustainable forest manage-
ment on its land since the mid-19th century when it 
was granted tribal nation status by the U.S. Congress. 
With the exception of Menominee Tribal Enterprises, 
community ownership or usufruct rights within the 
sample has been obtained only within the past 20 
years. In Mexico, agrarian law provides communities 
(ejidos) with secure land tenure, including the right to 
harvest and sell trees. In Guatemala, successful lobby-
ing of NGOs supported by development projects and 
donor agencies led to the granting of community for-
est concessions. Access to the resource base implies 
usufruct rights for 25 years (renewal possible) under 
the condition that the management units become cer-
tified under the scheme of the Forest Stewardship 
Council within three years after being granted the 
concession (Carrera et al. 2006). In Gambia, access to 
forest resources has provided a base for RCE devel-
opment, but much institutional reform remains to be 
done if RCEs are to have a significant impact on pov-
erty reduction over the long term (see Box 4.5). 
With few exceptions, access to the resource base among 
agriculture-based RCEs is through customary rights 
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held by individual RCE members or households, rather 
than through land titles. For example, only 20% and 
10% of members of BANELINO and CONACADO, 
respectively, have land titles. In the case of RCEs in 
Guatemala, all members have land titles that were 
awarded as part of the Peace Accords of 1996; how-
ever, these titles have yet to be formally lodged with 
the government, as this would imply additional costs 
in legal and administrative fees, suggesting that overall 
risks perceived by RCE members are relatively low. 
One exception is Kasinthula Cane, where the resource 
base has been granted to the RCE and held in trust 
by a government-established organization (Kasinthula 
Cane Trust). The 760-ha area has been divided into 
280 parcels among RCE members (members’ average 
holding is 2.7 ha). In most cases where resource access 
is individually owned, only a small percentage of mem-
bers have legally registered land titles, usually between 
10% and 30%. Another exception is Cooperatives 
CCGS (Papua New Guinea) where members have col-
lective customary access to their resource base. 
In several cases, high endowments of natural capi-
tal among agriculture-based RCEs have played a 
key role in their development. For example, both 
RCEs in the Dominican Republic (CONACADO 
and BANELINO) benefit from favorable growing 
conditions for organic production relative to 
other countries. Unlike most of Central and South 
America, crop diseases such as black Sigatoka 
(banana) and Moniliasis (cocoa) have yet to take 
hold in the Dominican Republic—resulting in 
lower production costs and higher productivity in 
organic production for members of CONACADO 
and BANELINO. Other agriculture-based RCEs 
with relatively high levels of natural capital include 
Kasinthula Cane and Kuapa Kokoo for example, 
with 760 and 90,000 ha total area under production, 
respectively. In the case of FEDEPMA and La Voz, 
total area is relatively small (between 68 ha and 144 
ha, respectively), but production takes places on 
highly suitable land (e.g., coffee on high-altitude, 
volcanic soils, near a major tourism center). At the 
RCE member level, natural capital tends to be lim-
ited, however, with the average farm size between 
0.5 and 3.5 ha per member (e.g., CONACADO, 
BANELINO, La Voz, FEDEPMA, Kasinthula 
Cane). 
Physical capital 
Among internationally oriented RCEs, the sample 
shows that major investments in physical capital have 
been achieved in a relatively short period of time. 
Examples include BANELINO (banana packing 
Box 4.5  Community access to forest resources in Gambia: Recent achievements 
and future challenges 
Community Forestry in the Gambia grew out of the realization that the Forestry Department alone was unable 
to protect the forest resources effectively. In 1987, the department drafted a proposal for the introduction 
of community forestry. The legal framework emerged in the early 1990s and conditioned resource access 
to a community’s successful completion of three phases: 1) a preparatory phase during which the forest 
management plan is prepared; 2) a preliminary phase during which the communities demonstrate their 
capacity in forest management; 3) and a consolidation phase during which the communities gain further forest 
management skills, resulting in a Community Forest Management Agreement (CFMA). The CFMA grants 
usufruct rights for three years. Forest management plans have to be approved by the Divisional Forest Officer. 
Communities, through their forest committees, are required to open a bank account into which all revenues 
from the forest management activities are received. These funds can be used by the community to finance 
development activities at the community level. In addition, they must pay out a certain proportion (~40%) 
for reinvestment in their forest. While exempted from all licence and permit fees, they are also required to 
pay 15% of their collections into the National Forestry Fund as a contribution toward the development of the 
forestry sector. In this context, CFMA is designed more for promoting community forest management than for 
long-term viable RCE development. That is to say, the requirement that proceeds from forest management be 
reinvested in community development and used to subsidize the government’s forest programs provides few 
incentives for RCE development of a more commercial nature. 
Source: Bojang & Reeb (1998)
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shed, storage facilities, banana transport infrastruc-
ture, vehicles, fertilizer production facility, and 
equipped offices) and Tumani Tenda (five guest 
cabins, restaurant, conference hall, and on-site com-
munity infrastructure). In addition, relatively large 
endowments of physical capital exist among the newly 
established, forest-based RCEs, such as Chichan Há, 
FORESCOM, and Consorcio Chiclero. Several RCEs 
have made significant investments in physical capital 
worth several hundred thousand U.S. dollars (e.g., 
Kuapa Kokoo, CAIC, FORESCOM, BANELINO, 
Noh-Bec) and up to several million U.S.dollars (e.g., 
El Ceibo, Menominee Tribal Enterprises). In many 
cases, related investments were realized through exter-
nal donor funding and/or credits, and most RCEs are 
not well-equipped with state-of-the-art technology or 
facilities. Typically, equipment and machinery were 
purchased secondhand, lowering initial investments 
but resulting in higher maintenance and operating 
costs. In most cases, regular maintenance has been 
deferred due to unavailability of spare parts, limited 
willingness of RCEs to invest, and limited technical 
capacities of RCE staff or external support service. 
For example, both Chichan Há and Noh-Bec report 
major inefficiencies in milling operations due to lack 
of maintenance. Kesla Poultry has a relatively high 
level of physical capital endowment, which includes 
four retail and wholesale outlets in urban areas, 
each equipped with small-scale poultry processing 
equipment (e.g., scales, freezer, defeathering device, 
scalding tank, and killing cone). In addition, each 
RCE member has invested in on-farm poultry rearing 
infrastructure. These investments were highly subsi-
dized by government agencies and NGOs.
A low endowment of RCE-owned physical capital 
is common among agriculture-based RCEs oriented 
toward domestic markets with little or no support from 
government agencies or NGOs. Examples include: 
VGKK–Honey and LAMPS in India, Buzaama ACE 
and Nama ACE in Uganda, and Rahama in Ghana. 
In these cases physical capital consisted of little more 
than an administrative office, basic storage facili-
ties, and rudimentary post-harvest and/or processing 
machinery and equipment.
Among the sample organizations, access to “public” 
infrastructure varied widely, but in general it represents 
a constraint to RCE development. Less than 20% of 
the sampled RCEs have year-round road access, 24/7 
electricity, and secure telephone and Internet connec-
tion. For the majority of the RCEs, one or several of 
these factors constrain RCE operations. Impassable 
roads during parts of the year cause delays in delivery 
of raw materials and finished products (e.g., CAIC). 
Regular and irregular power cuts and limited capacity 
to generate their own electricity increase production 
costs (e.g., Nama ACE, Buzaama ACE), while limited 
number of telephone lines (only one to two lines at RCE 
level and highly limited number of lines among RCE 
members) and low speed and intermittent Internet 
connection increase transaction costs and undermine 
coordination and internal and external communica-
tion. In limited cases in Africa, basic infrastructure 
(electricity, telephone) is not available (e.g., Rahama), 
which seriously limits development potential. In addi-
tion, Internet access is not available in the majority of 
the RCEs sampled in Africa and Asia (e.g., LAMPS, 
Nama ACE, Cooperatives CCGS). Even when a tele-
phone connection is available at the RCE level, in many 
cases, most members do not have telephone access, thus 
increasing the cost of internal RCE communication. 
Financial assets 
Most sampled RCEs are highly undercapitalized irre-
spective of their size and scale of operations. However, 
the extent to which the lack of financial resources 
restricts RCE development varies: 
• Critical, barely able to cover operational costs: 
Nama ACE, Buzaama ACE, and Rahama, with 
financing based on annual membership fees that 
are less than US$ 5 per year. While this may 
simplify administrative procedures, it does not 
provide for the development of a full range of 
RCE services nor for long-term capitalization. 
These organizations face an especially difficult 
task to capitalize, as they will be unable to develop 
new services or improve existing ones without 
additional capital, while members will be unlikely 
to support increased capitalization without new 
and better services. 
• Severe, but able to cover operating costs, but 
dependent on outside assistance for investments: 
BANELINO, CAIC, CONOCADO, La Voz, 
FEDEMPA, and X-Yaat from Latin America; 
Tumani Tenda and Kasinthula Cane from Africa, 
and VGKK–Honey LAMPS, Cooperatives CCGS 
and SMART from Asia and the Pacific. These 
finance their activities via deductions in payments, 
with payments by RCE members proportional to 
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their usage of RCE marketing services. In some 
cases government agencies subsidize operations 
(e.g., Cooperatives CCGS, SMART) 
• Sufficient for covering operating costs and 
stimulation of long-term growth: Only in the case 
of Menominee Tribal Enterprises and El Ceibo 
were significant financial assets reported. In the 
case of Menominee, this is largely due to a long 
track record of sound business administration, 
large volumes of timber sales, and high levels of 
social capital within the tribal nation that allows 
for long-term investment in RCE operations. 
Access to financial services is highly variable. For 
RCEs with long-term relationships with buyers, 
relatively stable production volumes, and niche mar-
ket orientation, formal credit from international 
not-for-profit lending organizations (e.g., Shared 
Interest, EcoLogic Finance, Oikocredit) is a viable 
option. In the case of several RCEs oriented toward 
niche markets, grants were made available from 
NGOs, government agencies and foundations, for 
example: X-Yaat (Expedia), Tumani Tenda (presi-
dent of Gambia), and Kuapa Kokoo (Twin Trading, 
Body Shop International). Nearly all the financial 
services received by Noh-Bec, Consorcio Chiclero, 
and Chichan Há for infrastructure development and 
processing facilities were provided by government-
backed projects at highly subsidized or zero interest 
rates. The U.S. government provides Menominee 
Tribal Enterprise with annual subsidies of US$ 1.5 
million for forest management and periodic grants 
for expansion and maintenance of the processing 
facility. In the case of Kesla Poultry, government 
and NGOs have facilitated investments in infrastruc-
ture totaling US$ 2 million in recent years. The use 
of credit and donations ranged from investments in 
facilities and processing technologies (e.g., El Ceibo, 
FORESCOM, Kuapa Kokoo) to near insolvency 
(e.g., Kasinthula Cane). 
A few RCEs have achieved significant levels of 
working capital (e.g., Consorcio Chiclero, CAIC, 
FORESCOM), mainly acquired through loans. 
Among major externally financed investments 
by RCEs in recent years are US$ 1.5 million in 
infrastructure by BANELINO, US$ 1 million in 
construction projects by El Ceibo, and US$ 150,000 
in purchase of land and irrigation equipment by 
Kasinthula Cane.
Several RCEs report very limited access to credit for 
financing growth or offering short-term credit services 
to members (e.g., Rahama, Nama ACE, Cooperatives 
CCGS). In such cases, members must rely on informal 
lending options that typically imply very high interest 
rates. Access to crop insurance was not reported by 
any of the selected RCEs.
Social capital 
A proximate indicator of social capital formation 
between members and RCE administration is change 
in membership levels. Several RCEs exhibited strong 
membership growth over the past five years, reaching 
as much as 200% for BANELINO. All of these RCEs 
are positioned in higher value markets, have profes-
sional business administration, and receive high levels 
of support from donors and governments:
• CONACADO: 15% increase in membership over 
the past five years
• Consorcio Chiclero: 30% growth in membership 
between 2004 and 2006
• Kuapa Kokoo: Marked increase in membership 
levels over the past five years (~80%)
• La Voz: Slight increase in membership level over 
the past five years (<5%) 
• Thanh Son: Membership increased ~100% since 
2002 
In the case of Buzaama ACE and Nama ACE, over-
all membership levels have increased moderately over 
the past five years. However this is due to government 
assignment of additional first-tier groups to RCEs, 
rather than voluntary decisions by smallholders based 
on costs and benefits of RCE membership. In other 
cases, membership levels have remained unchanged 
or declined. In the case of El Ceibo and several forest-
based RCEs (Menominee, Noh Bec, Chichan Há) high 
barriers to membership restrict growth. Cases where 
declining membership was observed include:
• FEDEPMA: Moderate decline in membership lev-
els over the past five years (~20%), partially due 
to inability to generate price premiums for organic 
coffee 
• SMART: Membership declined nearly 5x 
between 2002–2006, due to lack of export activ-
ity (2005–2006) and establishment of a competing 
processing plant.
Among RCEs with the lowest levels of social capi-
tal are LAMPS, VGKK–Honey, Buzaama ACE, 
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Rahama, SMART, and X-Yaat, which in addition 
to declining membership, report friction regarding 
internal operations. These RCEs are administered 
by volunteer or government-paid staff with little or 
no member involvement and are characterized by 
restricted access to services.
An indicator of bridging social capital is the quality 
of relations with downstream buyers and processors. 
Several RCEs have been successful in establishing long-
term trust relationships with a small number of buyers. 
This has led to secure market outlets, also in times of 
high market volatility, and access to embedded services 
(e.g., financing, loan guarantees, and technology trans-
fer). Examples include: CONACADO with 10-plus 
year relationships with four international buyers, La 
Voz with a 10-plus year relationship with U.S.-based 
coffee importer, and Consorcio Chiclero with several 5-
plus year relationships with importers in Japan, Europe 
and the United States. While some friction has been 
reported, mostly related to prices, quality, and commu-
nication, the long duration of these relationships implies 
mutual benefits for RCEs and their business partners. 
Several RCEs have also forged long-term relations 
with government agencies and NGOs, for example, 
Cooperatives CCGS (Coffee Institute), Kesla Poultry 
(PRADAN), CAIC (SNV), and El Ceibo (DED). 
Such partnerships have been instrumental in assist-
ing RCEs in overcoming the problems faced in the 
initial stages of RCE development related to capital 
accumulation and strategic orientation. In general, 
our sample suggests that innovation in production or 
marketing, at least in the early states of RCE develop-
ment, comes from NGOs and buyers, for example, La 
Voz (first cooperative in Guatemala certified organic 
with help from a U.S.-based buyer) and Kesla Poultry 
(seller of fresh broilers to various retail locations). 
Kuapa Kokoo presents a unique example of social 
capital formation between RCEs, NGOs, and buyers 
(see Box 4.6). 
Human capital 
Human capital endowments are assessed at two 
levels: board of directors (BoD) and management. 
In general, there is a shortage of formally trained 
personnel from within RCEs. BoD members and 
managers often acquire their skills through “learn-
ing by doing” processes, based on trial and error. In 
some cases mandatory rotation of BoD members and 
at times, managers, every two to four years implies 
irregular or zigzag learning curves, hampering RCE 
Box 4.6  Kuapa Kokoo and the Divine Chocolate Company
The decision to launch a Fair Trade chocolate company in the UK was made at the Kuapa Kokoo general assembly 
meetings in 1997. With the help of the NGO Twin Trading and Body Shop International, Divine Chocolate Ltd. 
(formerly The Day Chocolate Company) was launched in 1998. The company tackled the difficult task of financing 
a company without handing over ownership to those who had capital. Through the intervention of DFID, who 
provided a loan guarantee, it was possible to issue one-third of the shares of Divine Chocolate to Kuapa Kokoo. 
The other investors were Twin Trading (53%) and Body Shop International (14%). 
All of the cocoa in Divine Chocolate comes from Kuapa Kokoo and is purchased on fair trade terms. Divine 
bought 1,200 tons of cocoa from Kuapa Kokoo in 2006. However, 98% of Kuapa Kokoo’s production is sold at 
commodity prices to the state-run marketing board in Ghana. Kuapa Kokoo invests a fair trade premium into 
schools, clean drinking water, mobile medical clinics, and women’s entrepreneurship projects for the significant 
percentage of women cocoa farmers who are Kuapa Kokoo members (60% of the national executive board 
of Kuapa Kokoo are women). As owners of Divine, the farmers have two seats on the Divine corporate 
board, a share in the profits, and a seat at the table of global trade. Divine’s sales were $18m in 2006, and 
recently Divine launched a U.S. affiliate that is 33% owned by Kuapa Kokoo. In 2006 Body Shop International 
transferred its entire interest in Divine Chocolate to Kuapa Kokoo, making the cooperative the single largest 
shareholder. Today the balance is held by Twin Trading (43%) and Oikocredit (12%). 
In 2007, the U.K.-based Divine Chocolate Company paid out is first dividend to Kuapa Kokoo (US$ 93,000).
Sources: Tiffen et al. 2004, The Economist (2007)
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performance and strategic orientation. Despite these 
limitations, there is evidence that over the course 
of time, RCE BoD members and managers become 
progressively capable of administering RCE opera-
tions and thus less dependent on outside support in 
terms of funding and business administration. For 
example, Menominee Tribal Enterprises and El 
Ceibo stand out as having acquired relatively high 
levels of human capital among elected board mem-
bers and administrative staff. In some cases, high 
levels of human capital exist for business admin-
istration based on externally sourced managers or 
extensive support from NGOs. For example, Kesla 
Poultry and FORESCOM, both with fewer than 10 
years’ existence, have good business administration 
capacity but depend heavily on NGO and project 
support to maintain professional staff. Without 
such external support, both of these RCEs would be 
highly vulnerable to changes in market conditions 
and general management challenges (Table 4.6). 
However, in other cases, human capital endowments 
from internal or external sources have yet to develop 
fully (Table 4.7). For example, strong public-sec-
tor involvement in the operations of Cooperative 
CCGS and SMART (both in Papua New Guinea), 
have not led to strategic positioning of RCE in the 
coffee or coconut oil markets, respectively. In the 
case of LAMPS and VGKK–Honey in India, com-
munity members have only a marginal role in RCE 
administration, which is carried out by government 
or NGO representatives. Competition among NTFP 
Table 4.6  RCEs with relatively high levels of human capital
RCE Human capital (business administration and special skills)
BANELINO 
(Dominican 
Republic)
- General manager with 10 years’ experience (MS degree) + five-member staff 
- Selection of personal based only on professional qualifications
- 70% of producers able to comply with organic and EurepGap certification 
- Management of certification schemes: organic (2000) + fair trade (1996)
El Ceibo (Bolivia) - Until recently, managers (general, production, sales) from community, but no professional 
background; rotation system (on a four-year basis) 
- Long-term sales manager and production manager in the processing plant with autodidactic 
skills acquired over many years
FORESCOM 
(Guatemala)
- Professional manager, with marketing staff provided by international NGO
- Experienced technical staff for forest management and timber marketing
- 3-plus years experience in production and processing of complex timber operations
Consorcio 
Chiclero (Mexico)
- Advanced communication and coordination skills for maintaining business contacts in Japan 
forged over many years of trial and error
- Builds on lessons from previous government-led chicle sector initiatives, efforts made to provide 
transparency and demand-oriented services 
Kesla Poultry 
(India)
- NGO managed and operated with highly trained technical and marketing staff 
- Staffing costs are covered from RCE revenues 
Tsyunhehkwa 
(United States)
- 10-plus years experience in the production of organic agriculture and meat products 
- Professional manager plus three area supervisors (agriculture, canary, retail)
- Research capacity for organic production and product development
CAIC (Bolivia) - Full-time, (semi-) professional, nonmember staff for business administration and accounting, 
legal assessment, general medicine, and chemical engineering
CONACADO 
(Dominican 
Republic)
- General manager with 12 years’ experience (BS degree) plus three-member staff
- 100% of producers comply with organic certification requirements
- International certification schemes: organic (1992) and fair trade (1995)
Noh-Bec (Mexico) - No professional manager—key decisions taken by BoD and general assembly
- Highly experienced technical staff for forest management and timber marketing
- 15-plus years experience in production and processing of timber operations
- FSC certified since 1994, on-site specialist in wood kiln drying
Kuapa Kokoo 
(Ghana)
- Paid staff of nearly 200, including managers, depot keepers, drivers, security personnel, 
accountants, and messengers
- Management of fair trade certification schemes (1995)
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traders is restricted by government decree (traders 
must buy through RCE, rather than through com-
munity members).
Comparative analysis of asset endowments 
Figure 4.2 compares asset endowments across agricul-
ture and NTFP-based RCEs in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. In general, financial assets are low across 
all six RCEs, followed by physical capital. El Ceibo, 
Consorcio Chiclero, CONACADO and BANELINO 
stand out in terms of overall asset endowments. These 
are followed by CAIC and La Voz. Low asset endow-
ments of FEDEPMA partially reflect its difficulty in 
marketing members’ organic coffee. (FEDEPMA is 
managed by an NGO dedicated to community devel-
opment and political advocacy.) 
Figure 4.2  Asset endowments of selected agricul-
ture and NTFP-based RCEs from Latin America
Table 4.7  RCEs with intermediate/low levels of human capital 
RCE Human capital (business administration and special skills)
FEDEPMA 
(Guatemala)
- NGO managed and operated highly trained in organic production techniques
- Management of certification schemes: organic (2002), C.A.F.E. practices (2005)
La Voz 
(Guatemala)
- No professional management or technical staff
- 25-plus years of training in organic production techniques—first cooperative in Guatemala to 
obtain organic certification)
- Sophisticated understanding of quality issues from long-term exposure to tourists
Chichan Há 
(Mexico)
- 15-plus years’ experience in production and processing of complex timber operations
- Management of FSC certification scheme since 1991
- Limited business administration and marketing ability, with high staff turnover
Kasinthula Cane 
(Malawi)
- Professional management and technical staff (external) 
- Six years’ experience in organizing production of sugarcane and coordinating its processing 
and marketing with the national sugar processor 
X-Yaat (Mexico) - Volunteer, part-time manager with four years’ experience, takes operational and strategic 
decisions, coordinates with clients, and organizes RCE members 
Tumani Tenda 
(Gambia)
- Manager with eight years’ experience (community member)
- Range of capacities for support operations (tourist guides, accounting, food service)
- Knowledge of community forest management certification schemes
- First-place winner of National Environment Competition (1997)
LAMPS (NTFPs–
India)
- No professional business manager, with operating decisions taken by Forestry Department 
official and secretary (charged with commercialization) 
- Limited interest shown by managers in RCE development as business operation
Thanh Son 
(Vietnam)
- Volunteer manager from community, elected every two years
- Members with basic technical skills for production and post-harvest management
- Limited capacities for business administration and marketing
Cooperatives 
CCGS (Papua 
New Guinea)
- Business administration provided by Coffee Industry Cooperation
- Producers with basic skill in coffee production and primary transformation
- Highly limited understating of international markets or certification systems
SMART 
(Papua New 
Guinea)
- Business administration provided by Cocoa and Coconut Research Institute, with little 
participation by RCE members
- Limited understanding of international markets or certification systems by RCE members
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In the case of forest-based RCEs in Mexico, 
Guatemala and the United States, overall asset 
endowments are higher than those for agriculture 
and NTFP-based RCEs from the region (Figure 
4.3). Endowments are highest across the five asset 
types for Menominee Tribal Enterprises and Noh-
Bec. Relative to Menominee, Noh-Bec is markedly 
weaker in human capital due to lack of professional 
management. Their limited growth in financial and 
social capital reflects the tensions inherent in com-
mon-property based resource management between 
RCE capitalization and community development 
and dividend payments. Both Chichan Há and 
FORESCOM have achieved moderate endowments 
in the relatively short period of time since their 
creation—eight and seven years respectively. The 
future development of the ecotourism RCE X-Yaat 
will require significant investments in all five asset 
types. 
Asset endowments among the selected African RCEs 
(all agriculture based) vary widely but in general 
reflect low financial and physical asset endowments 
(Figure 4.4). Kuapa Kokoo and Kasinthula Cane 
stand out in terms of overall asset endowments 
(although Kasinthula Cane is has critically low 
financial stock due to high debt burden). Emerging 
RCEs include Tumani Tenda and Nama ACE, both 
of which have achieved considerable capitalization 
in a relatively short period of time—nine and four 
years respectively. However, it should be noted that 
Tumani Tenda has very low financial asset endow-
ments, depending mainly on donations for growth 
and development. Its future development may 
depend on a more business approach to ecotour-
ism and increased internally funded capitalization. 
Those RCEs with relatively low asset endowments 
are Buzaama ACE and Rahama. 
Among the sampled RCEs of Asia and the Pacific, 
Kesla Poultry stands out in overall asset accumula-
tion (Figure 4.5). Its endowment of natural capital 
is low, but small-scale poultry rearing only requires 
small amounts of land. Kesla’s human asset endow-
ments are high, but this largely reflects strong 
involvement of an experienced local NGO in RCE 
operations (Pradan). Future development of Kesla 
will require increased local capacity for RCE admin-
istration and strategic decision making. Overall, as 
compared to sampled RCEs from Africa and Latin 
America and the Caribbean, those from Asia and the 
Pacific have lower endowments of financial, physical 
and social capitals. This is especially pronounced in 
the case of LAMPS and VGKK–Honey, where RCE 
administration is carried out by government- and 
NGO-appointed representatives, with little commu-
nity participation or buy-in from downstream chain 
actors (buyers are required to buy from LAMPS 
rather then deal directly with NTFP extractors or 
local communities). In the case of RCEs from Papua 
New Guinea (Cooperative CCGS and SMART), 
social capital endowments are higher than those 
for India due to more market-based approaches 
followed by RCE leaders (representatives of govern-
ment-backed industry associations). Endowments of 
natural and human capitals are comparable to those 
of the sampled African RCEs. 
Figure 4.4  Asset endowments of selected RCEs 
from Africa
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Figure 4.5  Asset endowments of selected RCEs 
from Asia and Pacific
Organization and management structure
Twenty out of the 26 sampled RCEs are legally consti-
tuted as cooperative or producer associations. When 
asked about the advantages of these legal forms, all 
responded that it the cooperative form was well-suited 
to their needs, highlighting the advantages related to 
tax exemption, ease of establishment, and member-
ownership with internal decision control. Only in 
one case are there plans to change legal form: given 
restrictions on capital accumulation under its current 
legal form (association), FEDEPMA is in the process 
of forming a wholly owned corporation to deal with 
processing and marketing of its members’ organic cof-
fee. Other advantages that were mentioned include 
access to state services and appropriateness for local 
conditions (i.e., participatory decision-making pro-
cesses). Only El Ceibo (Bolivia) reported paying taxes 
on income, albeit at a lower rate that other business 
forms (16% rather than 20%). However, both RCEs 
from the Dominican Republic (BANELINO and 
CONACADO) expressed reservations regarding 
their current legal form (producer association) due to 
a recent proposal to tax net income regardless of legal 
form. 
In three cases, RCEs are organized as incorpo-
rated companies: Menominee Tribal Enterprise, 
FORESCOM, and Kasinthula Cane. In terms of 
advantages, it was noted that the incorporated com-
pany legal form offered flexibility in financial and 
management operations, leading to more profes-
sional management and technical staff and overall 
better relations with buyers. While payment of taxes 
on net income was required in all cases, this was 
not mentioned as a major disadvantage. Rather, the 
major disadvantages identified were 1) increased dif-
ficulty in receiving donations from the government 
and international donors and 2) lack of understanding 
among members as to the operations of the corpo-
ration, leading to perceptions that professional staff 
received unfair access to benefits over members. In 
three cases, no legal form at all was detected, as the 
RCEs have yet to emerge from underneath project or 
NGO structures. These results suggest that none of 
the current options of legal forms (cooperative, asso-
ciation, incorporated company) adequately addresses 
the realities and needs of RCEs at certain critical 
stages of their development. No hybrid forms of coop-
eratives or associations were detected in the sample.
Table 4.8 highlights key features of the organizational 
structure of the sampled RCEs. Several of the RCEs 
are governed entirely by the board of directors or 
general assembly, with no professional managers for 
RCE operations, namely Noh-Bec, Rahama, Tumani 
Tenda, and Chichan Há. On the upside, this gover-
nance structure legitimizes major RCE decisions 
over resource management and benefit distribution. 
Evidence suggests that they have been able to guide 
RCE operations through relatively complex resource 
management, production, and marketing operations. 
On the downside, development of clear strategic per-
spectives is often hampered and operational decision 
making processes are especially complex and slow. In 
the case of Noh-Bec, for example, potential buyers 
of certified mahogany must present their propos-
als directly to the general assembly, which are then 
decided upon by consensus voting. In some cases 
(Chichan Há and Noh-Bec), board members are sub-
ject to frequent rotation or turnover (every one to 
three years), thus requiring continuous investments in 
the development of business administration and mar-
keting skills among board members. 
In other cases, long-term support in RCE administra-
tion has been provided in the form of direct control by 
NGO or government staff (e.g., FORESCOM, Kesla 
Poultry, FEDEPMA, LAMPS, Cooperatives CCGS, 
SMART). While this may ensure minimum capacities 
and skills in the early stages of RCE development, it is 
prone to be unsustainable unless a clear strategy exists 
for local skills’ development and phasing out. In cases 
of NGO support, there is the issue of termination of 
funding, which may leave RCE managers without 
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sufficiently developed administration skills and thus 
highly vulnerable to changes in market conditions or 
buyer relationships. In general, the development of 
phasing out strategies through local skill development 
is a long-term process, which is not thoroughly com-
patible with project structures and funding (incentive) 
structures. Staff of NGOs or government agencies 
may perceive few incentives to build local capacities. 
For example, VGKK–Honey (India) relies on RCE 
earnings to support community development projects. 
Curiously, government appointed managers, such 
as those found among the RCEs in Uganda, Papua 
New Guinea, and India, neither create a sense of local 
ownership nor effectively tackle the complex tasks of 
RCE administration. 
In general, agriculture-based RCEs present relatively 
low barriers to the entry of potential new members. 
These may include approval from the board of direc-
tors, and payment of an entrance fee. In cases of 
organic certified RCEs, members must be willing to 
convert to organic production systems—including 
three-year transition period during which produc-
tion cannot be sold as organic. For example, in the 
case of La Voz, potential members must comply with 
strict production requirements of organic coffee and 
a US$ 40 entrance fee charged to new members. 
New members must also be approved by the board 
of directors and must convert 25% of their coffee to 
certified organic coffee. In the case of some fair-trade 
certified RCEs, increased membership is not a prior-
ity given overall limited size of fair trade markets for 
certain products (e.g., BANELINO, La Voz). 
The case of El Ceibo illustrates the challenges faced 
by cooperatives once a significant level of capitaliza-
tion has been achieved: to prevent “free riding” of new 
members, El Ceibo charges new first-tier cooperatives 
US$ 20,000–28,000, reflecting the value of previous 
investments in building and chocolate processing 
equipment, among other things. However, this policy 
has been criticized by nonmember cooperatives that 
sell to El Ceibo but do not receive dividend payments, 
as they are not former members. In the case of forest-
Table 4.8  Characteristics of RCE organizational structures
RCE Management staffing 
arrangement 
Degree of formalization of 
rules and regulations 
Barriers to 
membership 
El Ceibo Contracted (internal) Medium High
CAIC Contracted (external) Medium Low
BANELINO Contracted (external) Medium Medium
CONACADO Contracted (external) Medium Medium
La Voz Contracted (external) Medium Medium
FEDEPMA Contracted l (external) Medium Medium
FORESCOM Contracted (external) + NGO Medium High
Chichan Há Volunteer (board of directors) Medium High
Consorcio Chiclero Contracted (external) High Low
Noh-Bec Volunteer (general assembly) Medium High
X-Yaat Volunteer manager (internal) Low Low
Menominee Contracted (external) High High
Tsyunhehkwa Project provided Medium High
Tumani Tenda Volunteer (board of directors) Medium High
Kuapa Kokoo Board of directors Medium Low
Rahama Volunteer manager (internal) Low Low
Kasinthula Cane Contracted (external) Medium High
Smallholder Tea Contracted (external) Medium Low
Buzaama ACE Government provided Low Low
Nama ACE Government provided Low Low
Kesla Poultry NGO provided Medium Medium
LAMPS Contracted (external) Medium Low
VGKK-Honey NGO provided Medium Low
Cooperatives CCGS Government provided Medium Low
SMART Government provided Low Low
Thanh Son Project provided Low Low
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based RCEs, membership requirements are generally 
low for those RCEs focused on NTFP processing and 
commercialization. However, for timber-based RCEs, 
such as Noh-Bec, Menominee Tribal Enterprises, 
membership expansion is strictly limited. In the 
case of Menominee, members must be at least 25% 
Menominee blood. Noh-Bec membership is limited to 
216, with new members incorporated only upon death 
or emigration of an existing member. 
In most cases, RCE operation is highly informal, with 
no established rules or regulations beyond distribu-
tion of income, for example: X-Yaat and Buzaama 
ACE. More than 50% of the sampled RCEs buy from 
first-tier RCEs and/or sell to buyers and processors 
without written contracts. In other cases, RCEs have 
formalized rules and regulations for critical areas of 
RCE administration, namely financial reporting and 
credit. However, rules regarding communication, 
decision taking, roles and responsibility have yet 
to be defined or enforced. Examples of RCEs with 
relatively advanced governance structures include: 
Menominee Tribal Enterprises and Tsyunkehkwa 
in the United States, BANELINO in Dominican 
Republic, and Kesla Poultry in India (see Table 4.9).
Adding value to primary production 
The ability of RCEs to add increased value to their 
primary production by engaging in higher levels of 
downstream production and marketing functions 
(e.g. processing, manufacturing, transporting, mar-
keting, and/or retailing), varies throughout the 
sample, depending mainly on such factors as asset 
endowments; access to technical, business, and finan-
cial services; and cost structures related to processing 
(economies of scale). Below we highlight features of 
the sample as related to production and marketing 
functions (see Table 4.10 for classification): 
•	 Kasinthula Cane stands out in its specialization in 
raw material production. This is mostly due to the 
especially large barriers to achieving minimum 
efficient scale in sugar production, rather than 
lack of asset endowments or access to services. A 
long-term agreement exists with a multinational 
scale sugar processor in Malawi for processing 
and marketing of sugar (fair trade certified). 
•	 Nearly 70% of the sample has the capacity to add 
value to primary production through first-stage 
processing and direct marketing. These include 
La Voz, SMART, Smallholder Tea Company, 
and Consorcio Chiclero for the export market and 
VGKK–Honey, Tsyunhehkwa, and Menominee 
Tribal Enterprises, for the national market. In 
all cases, these RCEs have relatively high human 
capital endowments and have been supported 
extensively by government agencies and NGOs 
for the purchase of processing machinery and 
equipment, capacity building, and technical assis-
tance. 
•	 Forest-based RCEs are among the most advanced 
in terms of processing capacity. Investments in 
milling by communities, government agencies, 
and NGOs are often considered important for 
generating on-site employment and overcoming 
unfair power relations between highly remote 
communities and local processors and trad-
ers. In addition to processing, these RCEs must 
coordinate intensely with government and com-
munity leaders for the management of their forest 
resources. 
•	 Outsourcing of processing activities is rare among 
the sampled RCEs. CONACADO and Coop-
eratives CCGS are two exceptions: the former 
outsourcing the production of cocoa power and 
chocolate liquor and the latter outsourcing the pro-
cessing of green coffee for export. Such alliances 
can allow RCEs to focus on their core activities, 
thus reducing risk and management burden, while 
still offering value added products. 
•	 Five RCEs have fully integrated their opera-
tions, carrying out all operations related to 
production, processing, and marketing. RCEs 
dedicated to ecotourism (X-Yaat and Tumani 
Tenda) have constructed infrastructure and 
developed market contacts to identify potential 
clients. El Ceibo and Kesla Poultry have devel-
oped complex production and marketing systems 
focused on national markets, with extensive, 
long-term technical and marketing services by 
NGOs. The NGO-management of Kesla Poultry 
organizes production inputs for members, pro-
vides technical assistance and veterinary services 
for production, facilitates transport, and oper-
ates retail outlets for the sale of fresh poultry 
products directly to consumers. El Ceibo orga-
nizes cocoa production of organic cocoa among 
approximately 2,000 smallholder producers (700 
of which are registered members), processes the 
cocoa into finished products (chocolate), which 
is distributed throughout Bolivia.
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Relations with buyers 
The majority of sampled RCEs—regardless of age or 
level of asset endowment—maintain direct relations 
with local processors and/or international buyers, 
in some cases with extensive support from NGOs 
(e.g., FORESCOM, Kesla Poultry). Exceptions 
include Kasinthula Cane, which processes and sells 
sugar cane through a multinational sugar proces-
sor; BANELINO, which sells fresh bananas through 
local exporters to the EU; and Rahama and Buzaama 
ACE, which sell fresh produce to local intermediar-
ies. Where RCEs sell directly to international buyers, 
the number of buyers is usually limited to a handful, 
reflecting high transaction costs of establishing mar-
ket contacts, lack of information about alternative 
buyers/markets, and small volumes of raw material. 
In several cases, RCEs have cultivated long lasting 
buyer relationships, for example: El Ceibo (15-plus 
years with buyer in Germany), La Voz (10-plus years 
with buyer in United States), and Noh Bec (10-plus 
years with exporter in Guatemala). 
Relations between RCEs and their downstream part-
ners can be an important source of support for their 
long-term growth and development (Table 4.11). 
In the case of La Voz (Guatemala) for example, 
Table 4.9  Features of selected RCEs with advanced governance structures 
RCE Salient features of governance structure 
El Ceibo (Bolivia) - General assembly meets at least once a year 
- Board of directors (BoD) elected from every two years (one re-election possible)
- General manager oversees sales and production managers
- Mainly RCE members who run the cooperative on a rotational basis; trend toward more 
professionalization and long-term assignment of key functions
BANELINO 
(Dominican 
Republic)
- Professional full-time administrator plus four professional admin. staff
- BoD plays key role in decision making, with supervision of Oversight Committee 
- Formal rules or regulations exist covering key areas of business operations, including 
financial reporting, investments, and credit 
- Communication with members carried out at annual general assembly meetings and 
informally through visits by technicians, no monitoring or info systems in place, strategic 
vision shared by admin, BoD, and members
Kesla Poultry 
(India)
- Governing Board of elected members with president, vice president and executive officers, 
five-year terms, CEO manages day-to-day affairs, six member professional administrative 
staff, 11 full-time coordinators 
- Democratic governance is specified in statutes which also prescribe policies on financial 
management and reporting (however, professional managers make most decisions); 
information on performance via monthly “cluster” meetings
Kuapa Kokoo 
(Ghana)
- No professional manager, paid operational staff of nearly 200, including field-level managers, 
depot keepers, drivers, security, accountants, and messengers
- BoD composed of RCE members and representatives of foreign partners; manages RCE and 
oversees activities of various administrative committees 
- Internal regulations govern financial management, communication, investments, and credit, 
among others 
- Communication with first-tier organization via internal mail (2x/week), no monitoring system 
in place, arbitration committee handles internal conflicts 
Menominee 
(United States)
- Formal rules for key aspects of business operations, including federal government approved 
constitution (strictly enforced) 
- General Manager plus seven-member management staff; professional management required 
by constitution, only general manager reports to BoD 
- Democratically elected BoD (tribal members only, usually retired or active RCE members), 
one-to-three-year terms, for formulating policy and overseeing operations (not directly 
involved in operations) plus three committees to advise BoD 
- Annual general assembly meetings for reporting business performance (no decision making 
or policy function)
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buyer-provided services were critical for obtaining 
organic certification and exporting to the United 
States (Box 4.7). However, in cases where RCEs 
supply more conventional products (e.g., coconut 
oil or fresh fruits), buyer-provided services remain 
important but are generally less intensive in nature, 
usually not extending beyond information sharing 
(e.g., SMART, Cooperatives CCGS, Thanh Son). 
Among RCEs focused on national markets, most 
maintain relations with a variety of buyers. These 
relations usually involve little cooperation or coor-
dination beyond that required for commercialization 
(e.g., Buzaama ACE, Rahama, and LAMPS). This 
type of relationship offers limited opportunities for 
increased value adding by RCEs or access to buyer-
provided services. On the other hand, it requires less 
investment in coordination (reduction or elimination 
of language and cultural barriers). 
RCEs and their buyers face bottlenecks of varying degrees 
of severity for deepening their relations, for example:
• BANELINO: Insufficient communication regard-
ing fluctuations in price and rejection of fruit for 
quality control problems; EurepGap certification 
provides insufficient remuneration given invest-
ments required
• CONACADO: Limited opportunities for increased 
value adding, for example export of semiprocessed 
and processed cocoa products
• Consorcio Chiclero: Difficult price negotiation 
process, whereby buyers base price negotiations 
on cost of artificial gum base, buyers resistant to 
increased transformation (elaboration of gum 
base) for fear of losing quality 
• Nama ACE: Inconsistent and untimely communi-
cation from buyers regarding market trends and 
value adding opportunities
• Cooperatives CCGS: Lack of incentives for quality 
enhancement; difficulties in supplying consistently 
high quality coffee, insufficient volume, limited 
communication skills
• SMART: Inability to meet minimum quality 
requirements for export (FFA level >.2%), low 
production volumes, ineffective communication 
(remoteness)
• X-Yaat: RCE unable to meet demands of local 
tour operators: regular communication, low cost, 
large capacity, hygienic food service.
Table 4.10  Production and marketing activities by sampled RCEs 
Production and marketing activities RCEs
Raw input suppliers 
RCEs organize production and sales of raw materials 
to downstream chain actors (wholesalers, processors, 
retailers), processing limited to post-harvest treatments 
and packaging.
Kasinthula Cane
Marketers of semi-finished products
RCEs have specialized in marketing of semifinished 
products. Upstream activities, such as primary 
production, post-harvest management and processing 
are carried out by members (either smallholders or first-
tier RCEs). 
Buzaama ACE, Cooperatives CCGS, FEDEPMA, 
FORESCOM, LAMPS, Nama ACE, Rahama, 
Thanh Son
Processors and marketers of semi-finished products
RCEs carry out first-stage processing (drying, extracting, 
packaging, cleaning, grading, etc.) and marketing of 
semifinished products, primary production is carried out by 
members.
BANELINO, CAIC, El Ceibo (international 
market), CONACADO, Consorcio Chiclero, La 
Voz, Kuapa Kokoo, SMART, Smallholder Tea 
Company, VGKK–Honey
Producers, processors and marketers of semifinished 
products
RCEs organize the production and possessing, and 
marketing of semifinished products. RCE has direct 
access to natural resource base. 
Chichan Há, Menominee Tribal Enterprises, 
Noh-Bec 
Fully integrated operations 
RCES carry out full range of activities required to bring 
product/service to final consumer, including raw material 
production, processing, and direct marketing to consumer
El Ceibo (national market), Tsyunhehkwa, 
Tumani Tenda, X-Yaat, Kesla Poultry
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Internal limitations for expansion 
Among most RCEs, a major limitation is low produc-
tivity at the farm (member) level, due largely to lack 
of improved genetic material, low use of fertilizers 
and irrigation, inappropriate pest and disease man-
agement technologies, and overall limited knowledge 
of good agricultural practices (Table 4.12). Several 
RCEs reported inability of producers to expand 
acreage or intensify production systems despite 
highly secure market outlets with relatively favorable 
prices (e.g., BANELINO and Consorcio Chiclero). 
An overarching challenge for RCEs is quality con-
trol from the farm to the RCE. None of the sampled 
RCEs provides incentives for increased investment 
in quality control to its members. Likewise, there 
is typically little grading at RCE level, even in the 
cases where semifinished or finished products are 
sold. Among the forest-based RCEs, technical skills 
Table 4.11  Relations between RCE and downstream buyers and processors
RCE Features of relations between RCE and downstream buyers and processors
BANELINO 
(Dominican 
Republic)
- Exporter provides guarantee for credit and purchasing quotas and prices are negotiated directly 
with exporter and may vary according to market conditions
- Buyer-required EurepGap implementation, costly to implement, has not yielded expected benefits 
in terms of price premiums 
Buzaama ACE 
(Uganda)
- Sells to various buyers in local market, no strategic alliances formed 
- Friction reported by buyers regarding lack of product
- No contracts—price determined at market with product on hand 
CONACADO 
(Dominican 
Republic)
- Formal, high-trust commercial relationships maintained with four buyers over 10 years 
- Buyers provide guarantee for bank loans and occasionally technical assistance in production and 
processing; no other embedded services reported 
- Relations suffer from weak coordination regarding quality control and sanctions
Chichan Há 
(Mexico)
- Four-year relation with national buyer of tropical wood
- Buyers provide advance payment credit (50%) for timber (critical for operations)
- Friction reported by RCE regarding high prices and limited quality control
- No price premium obtained for certification in national marketplace
Consorcio 
Chiclero (Mexico)
- Relations for between four and six years with nine Asian buyers, mainly in Japan, and with major 
buyers in U.S.(Wild Things & Glee Gum) and Europe (Gepa & Gum Base) 
- Friction reported by buyers related to lack of volume and inconsistent quality
FEDEPMA 
(Guatemala)
- Links with three coffee exporters, relations maintained from one to four years
- Buyer-provided services include: replanting after hurricane, implementation of C.A.F.E. practices 
certification, credit 
- Buyers demand considerably more product than RCE is able to supply 
Kasinthula Cane 
(Malawi)
- Exclusive long-term (6+ years) relation with sugar processor (Illovo) who provides services related 
to processing, marketing, loan facilitation, production inputs, and technical assistance (Illovo 
charges 40% of sugar price for services)
- Access to critical production and marketing services (transport, input, engineering)
Kuapa Kokoo 
(Ghana)
- 97% of cocoa sold through government marketing board at pre-established prices 
- One-third share in the Day Chocolate Company (U.K.-based fair-trade chocolate marketer)—first 
dividend payment in 2006
- Fair trade certification considered valuable in RCE promotion but has not translated into 
significant income increases for members (3% cocoa sold as fair trade)
Noh-Bec (Mexico) - Alliances with timber buyers in U.S. and Europe, including substantial price premiums for certified 
mahogany
- 10+ year relation with Guatemala-based timber exporter 
- Weak communication and over dependence by RCE on buyer-provided credit 
Menominee 
(United States)
- Strong communication and coordination between RCE and buyers for timber sale (based on 
wood availability) and post-sale follow up (response within 48 hours)
- Buyer services are not required or offered 
Rahama (Ghana) - Over past four years RCE has maintained relations with four Ghana-based exporters; relations are 
low-investment for exporters, with no embedded services reported other than sharing of market 
information
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for timber or nontimber forest management are rela-
tively well-developed, but occasional quality issues 
arise related to processing (milling and drying) and 
classification. 
In several cases, RCEs have limited abilities to sat-
isfy fully their members’ demand for services. This is 
especially true in the agricultural sectors, where local 
intermediaries and processors may compete head on 
with RCEs for their members’ products. Though local 
intermediaries tend to pay prices somewhat below 
those of the RCE, members selling outside the RCE to 
local intermediaries is a prominent phenomenon in sev-
eral of the sampled RCEs (e.g., Rahama, FEDEPMA, 
La Voz, Noh-Bec, FORESCOM, Nama ACE). This 
negatively impacts RCEs by increasing costs (reduced 
economies of scale), increasing risk with buyers (non-
compliance with volume requirements), and reducing 
income for growth and development. Side selling may 
result from limited marketing capacities of RCEs and 
inability to obtain higher prices (reliance on limited 
buyer portfolio, limited bargaining power), offer of 
payment by competitors upon delivery of raw material, 
or competitors’ offer of affordable credit to cover 
planning and harvest costs. Limited financial plan-
ning and monitoring, and difficulty in accessing credit 
on favorable terms limits RCEs’ capacity to provide 
financial services to their members, such as advance 
payments, which are critical in both the agricultural 
and forest sector. In addition, payment modalities are 
such that an RCE member may receive full payment 
several weeks, if not months, following delivery of the 
raw material to the RCE. 
External service offer 
More than 50% of the sample has received financial 
services at least once over the past three years from 
either local private or state banks or international 
not-for-profit providers (Table 4.13). In many cases, 
long-term loans have been provided without collat-
eral, based on loan guarantees provided by RCEs 
buyers. These loans have been critical for upgrading 
Box 4.7 Challenges for long-term RCE–buyer relations: Case of La Voz 
A variety of different individuals and development agencies influence and support La Voz’s participation in 
international organic and fair trade coffee markets. Perhaps the most important actor is the U.S.-based coffee 
importer and roaster Elan Organic Coffee. Since 1991, Elan has provided a number of “embedded” services 
that were critical to the development of La Voz, including: 
• guaranteed organic/fair trade coffee floor price 
• technical and financial support for transition from conventional to organic agriculture
• increased brand recognition through buyer co-financed trips to three trade fairs 
• co-signage of loans allowing RCE to obtain better terms than those offered locally 
• facilitation of partnerships between RCE and roasters to improve farm processing
• co-invested in seed capital for micro-loan bank for women RCE members
• paid off debt of $285,000
In 1991, with technical and financial support from Elan Organic Coffee, La Voz became the first certified 
organic coffee cooperative in Guatemala. This allowed La Voz to quit selling to local intermediaries in favor of 
direct export to the United States at significantly high prices. In the mid-1990s, La Voz entered into a 10-year 
contractual agreement with Elan. During the late 1990s and early 2000s when prices for conventional coffee 
were at historic lows, La Voz members received certified organic and fair trade coffee prices that averaged 
more than 100% higher than those for conventional coffee. During this period, there existed a strong sense of 
satisfaction over agreement with their buyer, and overall satisfaction with RCE operations was high. However, 
in early 2005, conventional coffee prices began to rise, putting increased pressure on La Voz to offer higher 
prices to its members. As a consequence, side selling become a problem as La Voz members sought out 
more attractive selling options outside the RCE with local buyers of conventional coffee. In addition, by selling 
to local intermediaries, members could avoid (postpone) repayment of RCE-extended credit, which would 
normally have been deducted upon delivery of coffee cherries to the RCE. 
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infrastructure in such cases as La Voz (construction of 
wet coffee processing mill), El Ceibo (construction of 
multistory office building, part of which is rented out), 
and Kasinthula Cane (installation of irrigation equip-
ment). In addition, short-term loans have been critical 
for financing harvest and input purchases—reflecting 
the limitations they face to capitalize internally and 
to offer self-financed credit to their members. In a 
few cases, international buyers have been willing to 
provide these loans. In the case of BANELINO, 
banana exporters provide credit for planting and 
purchase of production inputs, while importers have 
facilitated loans for infrastructure development. 
Agriculture-based RCEs that reported limited access 
to financial services exhibited low levels of business 
consolidation and operated in unfavorable politi-
cal and market environments (e.g., Buzaama ACE, 
Rahama, LAMPS, Cooperatives CCGS). 
Table 4.12  Limitations to RCE growth and development 
RCE Other limitations/comments
El Ceibo Premium for organic and fair trade certified cacao (about 10%) not always perceived as high 
enough (though price premium is as high as 30% when dividends are accounted for); better 
information flow claimed by members, particularly regarding sales and price formation; El Ceibo 
also buys organic cacao from nonmembers who became organized under the umbrella of CIAAB; 
nonmembers not eligible for payment of dividends
CAIC Side selling is a pronounced problem; price premium and payment modalities perceived as 
insufficient and inappropriate, respectively; certainly lots suffer from high levels of aflatoxin; 
sometimes problems with timely delivery or meeting volume requirements
BANELINO Low willingness to invest in productivity-enhancing measures; lack of leadership/business vision, 
and weak communication 
CONACADO Low prices (high administration costs); lack of information flows on prices and market trends; lack 
of clarity on decisions regarding credit and project activities
FEDEPMA Delivery of less than 50% of estimated harvest; weak business vision and communication; 
members unsatisfied with price for coffee (RCE unable to offer organic price premium)
FORESCOM No formal agreements for sale of raw material by community concessions to FORESCOM; 
members reluctant to hand over processing activities to FORESCOM for most valuable species 
due to importance for community employment generation
Chichan Há Difficulties in coordinating sawmill operation among five working groups in ejido restricts ability 
of RCE to respond on time to buyer’s demand, lack of investment in ejido-owned sawmill; late 
delivery; limited quality control (poorly calibrated boards) 
Consorcio 
Chiclero
Despite significant increases in member income, members unwilling to increase production; 
limited communication on relations with buyers and market trends
Noh-Bec Subgroups of ejido members sell timber to intermediaries, in some cases up to two years in 
advance, slow/complicated decision process (sales agreements negotiated by the general 
assembly); internal disputes of decision making and control; lack of operating capital by RCE 
(must provide credit); occasional lack of volume 
X-Yaat Low participation among RCE members; limited coordination with local tour providers; limited 
capacity for managing large groups; food service does not meet hygiene standards 
Menominee Push to reduce RCE investments and increase payments to members and to tribal government; 
variation in wood supply due to climate (e.g., tornados) and sustainable management operations 
(limited availably); occasional minor conflicts over lumber grading
Tsyunhehkwa Limited ability to expand corn production (main product line) due to lack of land area and shortage 
of volunteer labor for harvest, drying, and shelling operations; RCE focused on community 
outreach; however, tribal government may require more commercial focus 
Kuapa Kokoo Limitation in quality control due to poor agronomic practices; members concerned over delayed 
payments (payments not effected until importers pay)
Kasinthula Cane Reduced benefits due to debt burden; use of funds by RCE committees to please influential RCE 
members; limited communication in business administration
Smallholder Tea 
Company
Lack of supply from growers, sporadic access to packaging material, limited quality control, some 
smallholder farmers, especially large scale, educated, and powerful ones, started forming their 
own associations (overall low sense of governorship among some smallholders who consider that 
they were forced into membership with the RCE)
Continued on next page
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In the case of most forest-based RCEs, government 
agencies rather than private banks or NGOs have been 
the key source of long-term loans. RCEs such as Noh-
Bec, Consorcio Chiclero, FORESCOM, and Chichan 
Há all received relatively large grants or government-
backed loans (US$ 200,000–US$ 400,000) for the 
purchase of forest extraction and milling equipment 
over the past three years. Menominee receives annual 
payments from the U.S. government (US$ 1.5 mil-
lion) to help cover the costs of forest management and 
implement fire prevention measures. Overall, RCEs 
in Mexico and Guatemala reported a high degree of 
reluctance on the part of private banks to provide ser-
vices. This may stem from a perception that RCEs lack 
business consolidation (volunteer administration with 
complex decision-making processes) and have limited 
operating capital. National and international timber 
buyers provide critical short-term financial services 
for timber extraction. Menominee Tribal Enterprises 
was the only timber-based RCE not to report strong 
demand for financial services, largely due to its over-
all current high level of capitalization. 
All sampled RCEs reported at least some access to 
technical services, although the coverage and level 
of specialization of these services varied widely. 
In several cases, government agencies were the 
sole providers of technical services (e.g., LAMPS, 
Rahama, Buzaama). In these cases, services were 
focused on production and post-harvest management 
of traditional products, with relatively little atten-
tion on increased value adding through processing. 
Government-provided extension services were most 
common in Africa and India, although in the case of 
Africa, several RCEs reported reduced and increas-
ingly sporadic coverage of extension services. Access 
to buyer-provided technical services was generally 
limited to a few RCEs participating in niche markets 
(organic coffee, organic chicle, certified timber, fair 
trade cocoa). In the case of CONACADO, CAIC, 
and Consorcio Chiclero, buyers have been especially 
important for upgrading their quality control pro-
cesses. In cases where specialized technical services are 
required (e.g., organic banana and cocoa production), 
RCEs provided these services directly to their mem-
bers (e.g., El Ceibo, BANELINO, FORESCOM), 
usually with support from NGOs. 
While technical and financial services for RCE devel-
opment are more or less readily available, business 
development services (BDS) were in especially short 
supply. Where RCEs participated in local and national 
markets, BDS are simply unavailable. In cases such as 
Buzaama ACE (Uganda), Rahama (Ghana), LAMPS 
and VKGG–Honey (India), access to BDS had not 
been reported over the past three years. When asked 
what BDS they perceive as important to RCE devel-
opment and would demand if available, most of these 
RCEs had no response—indicating an extreme lack 
of familiarity with BDS. In other cases, buyers have 
RCE Other limitations/comments
Buzaama ACE Default on their membership contribution by members; RCE provides insufficient services, e.g., 
credit, poor quality control; irregular information flows; low prices
Nama ACE Inconsistent product quality among members, inability to meet demand volumes, insufficient 
infrastructure for processing; RCE with limitations to meet members’ price expectations; high cost 
of credit through RCE
LAMPS Member dissatisfaction with delayed payments and low prices, poor services to members, 
decisions taken without reference to members; lack of information; tribal-led management 
committee unable to exercise role
VGKK–Honey Members have limited participation in RCE administration, limited processing for products other 
than honey, weak communication regarding business performance; limited distribution of bonuses 
to members; reluctance of NGO to hand over RCE operations to community
Cooperatives 
CCGS
Average quality of coffee is downgraded because some members deliver low quality; RCE not 
able to offer payment upon delivery of raw product (delay of three to four months); lack of clear 
and thorough understanding of pricing formula, including step by step calculation from FOB to 
parchment equivalent accounting for all costs; lack of decision-making power
SMART Inconsistent quality control (sprouted nuts) and low production volumes (excess processing 
capacity); no dividends are offered; overall low price paid for raw material
Thanh Son Inconsistent quality control, low productivity; limited information sharing and member participation, 
limited high-value market outlets, e.g., supermarkets (low prices)
Table 4.12—Continued
(Continued on page 70)
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provided BDS related to information on market con-
ditions and logistical assistance with exportation (e.g., 
BANELINO, Consorcio Chiclero, FORESCOM). 
Across the sample, BDS were often limited to one-off 
training events on business planning, administration, 
and cooperativism. There was limited use of spe-
cialized BDS related to marketing and information 
services, business monitoring and performance evalua-
tion, financial management, or business leadership. 
In several cases, long-term accompaniment by gov-
ernment agencies and NGOs has been critical to the 
development of technical and business capacities of 
sampled RCEs, among them El Ceibo (DED, Caritas), 
CAIC (SNV), El Ceibo (SED), Kesla Poultry (Pradan), 
FORESCOM (USAID/Rainforest Alliance), and 
Thanh Son (GTZ). Such support has been critical 
for linking with buyers, improving quality, obtaining 
certification, and developing effective administration 
and export procedures. The typical situation among 
the sampled RCEs is one where there is one service 
provider that provides a service free of charge as long 
as funding is available. Most sample RCEs have been 
unable or unwilling to invest their own resources in 
obtaining specialized technical or business develop-
ment services. This implies that service delivery is often 
according to service needs identified outside rather 
than inside the RCEs. Even in cases where RCEs are 
called upon to identify their service needs, they tend 
to request services with which they are familiar and/or 
from which they expect short-term impact. As a result, 
more long-term needs related to RCE development 
tend to be neglected, in particular planning, product 
development, and strategic marketing. 
Political–legal environment 
While the overall political–legal environment for RCE 
development varies greatly according to country and 
sector, evidence here suggests that much work remains 
to establish political–legal frameworks that are condu-
cive to RCE development. In the case of access to forest 
for NTFP collection in India, there is a clear bias toward 
conservation over RCE development. This is exempli-
fied in the recent decision to ban all NTFP collection 
for commercial purposes (see Table 4.14). In 2006, the 
Wildlife Protection Amendment Act (2002) banned 
local tribes from gathering NTFPs for commercial 
purposes from parks and sanctuaries. Prior to the ban, 
tribes had usufruct rights to collect NTFP and sell them 
to LAMPS, which in turn would auction them to the 
highest bidder. Recognizing the importance of NTFPs 
for local livelihoods, in 2007 the Forest Department 
petitioned the State Wildlife Board to allow limited 
commercial collection of NTFPs by tribal members. 
The issue was referred recently to the central govern-
ment for a decision (Acharya 2007). Conflicts between 
conservation and RCE development are not limited to 
India. In Guatemala, communities can extract timber 
from their concessions only if their management prac-
tices are certified by the Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC), despite having invested years in building human 
capital for sustainable forest management. In Gambia, 
communities must invest at least 40% of any forest-
related income back into forest management (Box 4.5). 
In Bolivia, ambiguity exists regarding who has access to 
harvest NTFPs: according to the Agrarian Reform Law, 
forest communities have usufruct rights to the land and 
all materials that fall onto it (e.g., Brazil nuts); however, 
under the Forest Law, rights are given only to individu-
als and businesses with a government-issued concession, 
which have an approved resource management plan and 
pay taxes in the given area that they manage. 
The sample also highlights several laws and regulations 
related to the production and marketing of agricultural 
and forest products and RCE development, which have 
constrained the growth and development of RCEs. In 
the case of Menominee Tribal Enterprises in the United 
States, early success in sustainable forest management 
and RCE development prompted the U.S. government 
to suspend the tribe’s status as a legally autonomous 
region, thus subjecting it to taxes and laws and regula-
tions of the states of Wisconsin and sending the RCE and 
the tribe into an economic tailspin for a period of more 
than 10 years (Box 4.1). In several cases, RCEs have lit-
tle influence on the offer of services from state agencies. 
In the case of Mexico for example, RCEs reported bias 
in the state forest agency toward technical approaches 
(and related lack of services for business development 
and marketing). In the case of Ghana, the state remains 
the sole buyer of cocoa, and while Kuapa Kokoo has 
experienced rapid growth in membership, it has been on 
the base of nonprice incentives, such as access to credit 
and its reputation for honesty in weighing cocoa (see 
Box 4.8). While the impacts of partial liberalization of 
the Ghanaian cocoa sector have yet to be thoroughly 
understood, a case can be made that Kuapa Kokoo 
stands to gain little by not being able to market its mem-
ber’s cocoa to international buyers directly. Among the 
more positive elements of the political–legal framework 
(Continued from page 67)
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for RCE development are 1) exoneration from taxes 
on income and input purchases and 2) financial assis-
tance in the development of infrastructure. 
Impacts on poverty reduction and 
community development 
RCEs generate impact on their members through 
increased income (e.g., higher price relative to local 
intermediaries and payment of dividends), and on 
the community level in which they operate (e.g., 
increased employment and provision of public goods 
such as infrastructure and social services), although 
overall impact varies widely (see Annex for detailed 
information on impacts of RCE on members and 
their communities). In terms of direct benefits to 
members, several samples RCEs have made a sig-
nificant impact on household incomes. In the case 
of RCEs that participate in markets for certified 
organic and fair trade products, premiums can be 
significant: 
•	 BANELINO members who produce organic 
and conventional banana averaged 10% and 5% 
respectively, above prices paid for conventional 
banana by local exporters. 
Table 4.14  Features of political–legal framework for RCE development, as reported by selected 
sampled RCEs
RCE Positive Negative 
BANELINO 
(fresh banana— 
Dominican Republic)
- Preferential access to European 
markets for fresh banana, including 
related programs for export promotion 
(access to finance) 
- Various projects for development of 
irrigation technologies and improved 
genetic material 
- Risk of payment of taxes on income (despite 
constitution as association) 
- Strong labor laws and rigid application, 
especially compared with other banana 
producing countries
- Legal system not accessible, lack of high- 
quality imported production equipment
Buzaama ACE 
(coffee, rice—
Uganda)
- Process of land titling (with access to 
loans) from Ministry of Lands, Water 
and Mineral Development
- Exception from taxes
- Government interference in organization 
- High risk: RCE required to pay members upon 
delivery of their produce before RCE has 
secured a buyer or negotiated its price 
Chichan Há and 
Noh-Bec 
(tropical timber— 
Mexico)
- With creation of CONAFOR, for first 
time, there are funds available for the 
community forest sector
- State support for infrastructure 
development (INSOL)
- Facilitated access to commercial 
financial services (FIRA); however, 
RCE still does not meet conditions
- Externally driven service offer from state forest 
agency, with limited attention given to issues of 
RCE development 
- Technical support for forest management 
only for forest owners with 5,000 ha (excludes 
Chichan Há)
- High costs of credit, lack of long-term loans for 
RCEs
- High costs for bureaucratic processes (e.g., 
US$ 2,200 for approval of environmental impact 
assessment and travel to Mexico City for obtaining 
a CITES permit, ~1,300 km from RCEs)
Consorcio Chiclero
 (chicle gum—
Mexico)
- State support for forest management, 
including forest inventory, road 
construction, reforestation, and 
training 
- Exempt from export taxes and sales 
tax on purchase of machinery
- Lack of flexibility in government support 
programs—decisions taken in Mexico City with 
limited consultation within the chicle sector
- Overall regulation of chicle sector, require 
professional assessment
LAMPS 
(NTFPs —India)
- Loans and working capital provided by 
the state 
- Right to harvest forest resource in 
wildlife sanctuary
- Since 2004, Ministry of Environment and Forests 
and State Forest Department have banned 
NTFP collection in wildlife sanctuaries, directly 
impacting LAMPS 
Rahama 
(chile peppers, 
garden eggs—
Ghana)
- None identified - Lack of infrastructure for transport and 
communications
- Lack of local banking/financial services 
- Withdrawal of subsidies for purchase of inputs 
(fertilizers) in the late 1980s
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•	 El Ceibo, CONACADO and Kuapa Kokoo mem-
bers receive roughly 10% to 20% price premium 
for certified cocoa beans above local prices for 
conventional cocoa.
•	 Members of La Voz averaged 15% to 20% price 
premium above prices for conventional coffee 
paid by local traders and processors, translating 
into roughly US$ 500 of additional annual income 
per member household. 
•	 Consorcio Chiclero: 100% increase in chicle-
derived income, translating into additional annual 
income of US$ 1,500/ member.
With the exception of Consorcio Chiclero, organic and 
fair trade price premiums are diminished in the light of 
potentially higher production costs (reduced produc-
tivity), costs related to RCE administration, and RCE 
payment modalities that are usually not as agile as those 
of local intermediaries. However, this is compensated 
for by the services provided by RCEs, including techni-
cal assistance and training (provided by the RCE or its 
partner organizations), advance payments and credit, 
certification, and insurance, among others. 
In 2006, the timber-based RCEs Noh-Bec and Chichan 
Há paid out annual dividends to all registered com-
munity members of approximately US$ 2,000 and 
US$ 400 respectively. Higher dividends paid by Noh-
Bec are possible due to relatively high concentration 
of mahogany. In situations where local marketing 
Box 4.8 Impacts of partial liberalization of cocoa markets in Ghana 
Until 1992, Ghana’s cocoa sector was characterized by a marketing system fully controlled by the state-owned 
Cocobod. This system has since been internally deregulated, with a number of local and foreign-owned trading 
companies, known as LBCs, emerging in all growing areas of southern Ghana (Kuapa Kokoo is one of the five 
major LBCs in Ghana). A key feature of the Ghanaian cocoa marketing system is that the Cocobod continues to 
fix the floor price for all domestic purchases of the crop: although all LBCs are legally entitled to buy the crop at a 
price above the one announced by the board, the premium prices are rarely paid and of little value. Competition 
among buying companies comes from the volume of total purchases and is generated mainly through nonprice 
strategies (for example, prompt cash payment and greater, but ad hoc, provision of input subsidies and credit). 
The Produce Buying Company (PBC)—the former state-owned purchasing arm of Cocobod—remains by far 
the largest buyer across all regions.
Fourteen years into partial liberalization of cocoa markets, the debate over which actors in Ghana’s cocoa 
sector have benefited from this system is still ongoing. Vigneri and Santos (2007) analyze the extent to which 
the market environment in Ghana is beneficial to the actors involved. Key lessons from their research include: 
• Prompt payment drives selling choices: Cocoa smallholders have little access to credit or cash resources. 
Allowing farmers to have more places to buy from in each village (regardless of what their final choice 
may be) raises the possibility for smallholders to shop around for the best deal (for example, by selling to 
those LBCs who pay promptly, or by avoiding those they consider less trustworthy—it was common for 
smallholders to report that scales are often adjusted to underweigh their cocoa bags). 
• LBCs tend to cluster in areas of higher concentration of large farmers: LBCs target district areas where 
they can lower operational costs by buying from fewer, but larger, producers to cut down on the number 
of transactions needed to break even. This might have important repercussions on the geographical 
distribution of the benefits from the present partially liberalized marketing arrangement. 
• Remoteness of villages affects farmers’ choices: the greater distance between the farm gate and the main 
daily market area (proxy for measuring the extent of geographical isolation of producers) increased the 
chance of cocoa sales to PBC (which is still obligated to have buying centers in all cocoa-growing areas).
Vigneri and Santos conclude that overall, liberalization has been good for producers on at least three levels: 
providing producers with more choice of buyers; delivering cash payments promptly; and maintaining stability in 
prices throughout the season. The question for policymakers is whether partial liberalization is the way forward, and 
whether producers are getting the right incentives from this arrangement to invest in better production practices.
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conditions are relatively poor, RCEs oriented toward 
the international market have managed to pay signifi-
cant price premiums (up to 50%) by linking directly 
with international buyers. Examples include: 
•	 Nama ACE: members are paid 100% over local 
intermediary prices for hot peppers, inclusive of 
RCE overhead costs.
•	 Cooperatives CCGS: 75% increase in price 
received by members above local roadside inter-
mediaries, translating into average income benefit 
of roughly US$ 280/year. 
In other cases, RCEs provide new opportunities 
(especially for women) for the commercialization of 
products and services that otherwise would not have 
been offered, for example: 
•	 Members of Kesla Poultry earn an additional US$ 
175-250/year through their rearing of poultry in 
their backyards. 
•	 X-Yaat members earn an additional US$ 850/year 
through their participation in cultural and eco-
tourism activities.
For several sampled RCEs, however, prices offered 
to members are not significantly different from 
those offered by local traders or processors. This 
was the case for FEDEPMA, Buzaama ACE, and 
Rahama. These RCEs maintain low administration 
costs and compete with local intermediaries in local 
and national markets. In these cases, incentives for 
RCE affiliation are more related to affordable credit 
and other services (training, transport) than higher 
prices. As a general picture, incomes generated 
through affiliation to an RCE, though being impor-
tant to its members, are only part of the household 
portfolio. In none of the cases sampled did RCE 
members live exclusively on RCE-derived income. 
This reflects the fact that RCEs tend to be special-
ized on a single product (or product group), whereas 
livelihood strategies of its members are fairly diver-
sified. RCEs face a major challenge in the need to 
become proficient in what they are doing and, at the 
same time, diversify their operations to meet better 
the diverse needs of their members.  
With few exceptions, participation of women in RCE 
management and decision making has been very 
limited. In some agricultural and NTFP-based RCEs, 
women play a critical role in harvest and processing 
(on farm or in factory) but are largely excluded from 
RCE decision-making boards. In the case of timber-
based RCEs, women also tend to be excluded from 
production related processes. In many cases, cultural 
factors and women’s domestic tasks, which in turn are 
culturally shaped, largely prevent them from playing a 
more prominent role in RCE-related decision making. 
Other barriers are likely to be women’s role in produc-
tive and reproductive activities that conflict with RCE 
participation. It is striking, however, that even women 
beyond the age of child-rearing responsibilities do 
not readily find their way into RCE decision-making 
boards. Some barriers may be structural: women are 
just excluded, suggesting that strong cultural barriers 
to entry exist. Exceptions regarding prominent roles 
of women in RCEs include the executive directors of 
CONACADO and BANELINO. There is an urgent 
need to identify women who are interested in RCE 
administration and to strengthen their entrepreneur-
ial and leadership skills.
The employment generated by RCEs ranges from 
anything between a handful of employees to several 
hundred staff. In most cases, RCEs employ between 
10 and 20 staff. In cases where processing is a major 
RCE activity significant, employment is generated—
for example: El Ceibo (80 full-time employees), 
CAIC (20 full-time employees, Menominee Tribal 
Enterprises (180 full-time employees), and Noh-Bec 
(116 full-time employees). Seasonal employment is 
also significant in some cases: Kasinthula Cane hires 
up to 500 seasonal workers annually, while CAIC 
hires about 150. In cases where RCE administration 
is volunteer-based and some processing takes 
place, employment generation has been limited, for 
example: LAMPS, La Voz, Cooperatives CCGS, 
Nama ACE, Rahama, Thanh Son, Tumani Tenda, 
and Buzaama ACE. Moreover, in the cases of 
Cooperatives CCGS, LAMPS and VKGG–Honey, 
employment is limited to a handful of government 
and NGO staff, rather than RCE or community 
members. 
RCEs usually generate impact on community devel-
opment beyond their own members, though the 
level of overall impact varies widely. By their very 
nature, forest-based RCEs tend to provide ben-
efits to a larger proportion of community members, 
thereby increasing overall impact on the community. 
For example, Menominee Tribal Enterprises and 
Noh-Bec make major contributions of community 
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infrastructure (e.g., 80% of ejido funding from Noh-
Bec). Agricultural-based RCEs, on the other hand, 
typically represent only a subgroup of a given com-
munity, though certain forms of certification (fair 
trade) and enterprise philosophy make them invest 
part of their proceeds in community development 
(e.g., schools, road construction, wells for drinking 
water). One of the areas where RCEs clearly stand 
out is their capacity for sound natural resource 
management. This is not only true because of the 
high degree of certified enterprises but also because 
the generally low-input agriculture or forestry they 
practice. In addition, outside support provided to 
them has strongly focused on improving the envi-
ronmental performance of RCEs.
Typology of RCEs 
Here we distinguish between the sampled RCEs accord-
ing to their overall level of development based on four 
criteria: level of asset building, consolidation of manage-
ment structure, positioning in markets, and impacts on 
member and community. Based on these criteria, three 
types of RCEs can thus be distinguished (Table 4.15): 
• Type I—Pre-emergent: insufficient asset endowment 
for viable RCE development, organized and admin-
istered with heavy influence from external agents, 
dependence on a small number of service providers 
(if any), considerable fluctuation in membership, 
participation in local, generally low value markets 
and limited impacts on income and employment
• Type II—Emergent: relatively high levels of physical 
and natural capitals but limited human, social, and 
financial capitals; community-based administrators 
with developing administration skills or externally 
sourced business administration, strong membership 
growth, participation in local or high value markets, 
notable increase in prices received by members but 
still limited capitalization
• Type III—Mature: high level of asset endow-
ment including relevant capitalization, high sense 
of ownership among members, relatively stable 
membership numbers, well-developed administra-
tion skills sourced from within the community or 
externally with effective member oversight; par-
ticipation in high-value markets, extensive service 
offer to members.  
Type I—Pre-emergent
Eleven sampled RCEs maintain commercial rela-
tions with local traders for conventional products 
such as rice, coffee or various NTFPs such as honey 
and medicinal plants. Trade is based principally on 
high-volume, low-value products rather than qual-
ity or other differentiating product attributes. These 
enterprises vary in age from a few years to more 
than 50, with on average about 20 years of existence. 
Their longevity can be attributed to their low over-
heads (simplicity of business operations) and ability 
to address specific market failures, such as prod-
uct bulking requirements and high transport costs. 
Nevertheless, these organizations are pre-emergent 
in the sense that they have not acquired sufficient 
capital and other assets to become established 
businesses. 
Most of these RCEs are outcomes of various govern-
ment and NGO interventions aimed at community 
mobilization and rural development. In some cases, 
the enterprises have yet to—or are just beginning 
to—emerge out of state-driven rural development 
programs and lack the ability or capacity for self-gov-
ernance or the pursuit of multiple objectives. These 
RCEs include:
•	 Buzaama ACE (Uganda)
•	 Cooperatives CCGS (Papua New Guinea)
•	 FEDEPMA (Guatemala)
•	 LAMPS (India)
•	 Nama ACE (Uganda)
•	 Rahama Farmers Group (Ghana)
•	 SMART (Papua New Guinea)
•	 Smallholder Tea (Malawi)
•	 Thanh Son (Vietnam) 
•	 X-Yaat (Mexico)
•	 VGKK–Honey (India)
Type II—Emergent
Seven RCEs are relatively young, with on average 
less then 10 years of existence and a strong orienta-
tion toward high-value markets. They have acquired 
the capacity to deliver a range of services, includ-
ing credit, basic processing, group certification, and 
market linkages. Overall membership levels are 
large: for example, Kesla Poultry with 442 members 
and Kasinthula Cane with approximately 275 mem-
bers. In some cases, their membership levels are 
expanding rapidly: for example, since 2002, mem-
bership has increased 100% for Kesla Poultry. Their 
development has been supported extensively by 
external services from buyers, government agencies 
and NGOs. However, these RCEs usually lack the 
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human, social, and/or financial assets to consoli-
date business operations sufficiently and continue 
to be highly dependent on a limited number of ser-
vice providers for critical RCE operations. These 
RCEs include: 
•	 Chichan Há (Mexico)
•	 Consorcio Chiclero (Mexico)
•	 FORESCOM (Guatemala)
•	 Kasinthula Cane (Malawi)
•	 Kesla Poultry (India)
•	 Tumani Tenda (Gambia)
•	 La Voz (Guatemala)
Type III—Mature
The remaining RCEs have developed over the 
course of one up to several decades. They have 
secure access to the natural resource base and have 
developed the capacity to provide effective ser-
vices to their members and to adjust to changes in 
market and political–legal environments. Most are 
orientated toward higher-value markets where com-
petition is based on quality and other attributes. 
In several cases, product lines include both semi-
elaborated and elaborated products. These RCEs 
stand out for their large endowments of human and 
Table 4.15  Typology of RCEs    
Type I: Pre—emergent Type II—Emergent Type III—Mature
Asset building • Human capital limited 
to primary production 
and basic processing 
• Natural capital low 
at member and RCE 
levels
• Infrastructure limited to 
processing equipment 
• No financial stocks, 
restricted access to 
credit
• Side selling common 
among members
• Human capital limited to 
primary production and 
basic processing 
• Externally sourced 
business administration 
and technical services
• Natural capital low at 
member level 
• Basic physical capital for 
processing and transport 
• Access to credit and 
grants through NGOs/
projects
• Secure access to natural 
resource base 
• Managers sourced from 
membership base or externally 
sourced
• Extensive physical capital for 
advanced processing, transport  
• Access to commercial credit 
• High sense of ownership among 
membership base
Governance 
and 
management 
structures 
• RCEs administered by 
members or NGOs  
• Informal governance 
structures, with 
rudimentary decision 
control and monitoring 
structures 
• External professional 
managers dominate 
strategic and operational 
functions or strong 
member participation in 
decision making
• BoD comprised of RCE 
members but with limited 
decision control 
• Professional managers 
employed 
• Formalization of relations within 
RCE and between RCEs and 
other chain actors 
• BoD comprised of RCE 
members—provides oversight 
function
Market 
orientation and 
value chain 
position
• Conventional products, 
sold to various 
local traders or one 
international trader
• Raw material supplier 
with limited value- 
adding potential 
• High-value, certified 
and/or quality products, 
mainly in international or 
national markets 
• Small buyer portfolio (<2)
• Supplier of semifinished 
products
• High-value, certified and/or 
quality products
• Diversified buyer portfolio (5–
10+)
• Supplier of semifinished and 
finished products
• Strong brand reputation 
Impacts at 
member and 
community 
level 
• Price premiums: 
<10% in national 
markets, 20%–40% in 
international markets 
• Price premiums between 
20% and 40% over local 
intermediaries 
• 10–20 administrative and 
technical staff employed
• Access to credit and 
certification services
• Social services provided
• Annual dividends between  
US$200 and $2,000 
• Price premiums 20–40% over 
local intermediaries 
• 10–20 administrative and 
technical staff employed
• 50–250 staff employed in 
processing activities
• Social services provided
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social capitals. With the support of external service pro-
viders, these enterprises have acquired the capacity for 
self-governance. However, they continue to suffer from 
chronic shortages of financial capital, in part, due to 
their legal organizational form. These RCEs include: 
•	 BANELINO (Dominican Republic)
•	 CAIC (Bolivia)
•	 CONACADO (Dominican Republic)
•	 El Ceibo (Bolivia)
•	 Kuapa Kokoo (Ghana)
•	 Menominee Tribal Enterprises (United States) 
•	 Noh-Bec (Mexico)
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The long and winding road to creating 
viable businesses 
Among the key findings of this global RCE review 
is the length of time it takes for these enterprises to 
become viable—if they don’t break up before reach-
ing maturity. It is the rule rather than the exception 
that RCEs reach maturity only after three to five 
decades—despite, or at times because of, intensive, 
albeit often disarticulated, interventions from gov-
ernment agencies, NGOs, development projects, 
and the like. The long duration of this process will 
increasingly become an obstacle for smallholders, 
RCEs, and development agencies, given rapidly glo-
balizing markets for agricultural and forest products 
where these enterprises meet with both new oppor-
tunities and increased competition. It is imperative 
to identify viable shortcuts to RCE development 
based on enabling political and legal frameworks, 
harmonized and aligned development interventions, 
and, most importantly, the delivery of effective and 
well-articulated technical, business development, and 
financial services. In the first section of this chapter, 
we summarize the main findings and lessons learned 
from this global review according to the knowledge 
gaps identified in Table 2.2. In the following section 
we give recommendations to the Ford Foundation 
and the general donor community for future invest-
ments that allow for shortcuts to the development of 
economically viable and self-sustaining RCEs.
What are the major endogenous challenges faced by 
RCEs for achieving increased impacts and long-term 
viability? 
• Limited production volumes and quality control: 
Among the vast majority of agriculture-based 
RCEs, productivity at the farm level was reported 
to be low—in some cases critically low—resulting 
from lack of improved genetic material, low use 
of (organic) fertilizers, inappropriate pest and dis-
ease management, and limited knowledge of good 
agricultural practices. None of the sampled RCEs 
provides economic incentives for quality produc-
tion to its members and in only a few cases were 
sanctions reported for noncompliance. Overall 
product grading is limited at RCE level, even in 
the cases where semifinished or finished products 
are sold. 
• Limited processing capacity: Most sampled RCEs 
have yet to move beyond post-harvest treatments 
or simple first-stage processing required for export. 
Among other things, this reflects lack of techni-
cal capacities and skills, low access to capital for 
investment in processing equipment and machin-
ery, restricted access to services for processing, 
or reduced opportunities in local markets for 
higher-value processed products. It may also be a 
characteristic of a restricted business vision that is 
unable to respond to technological advances and 
emerging business opportunities. For agriculture-
based RCEs oriented to regional and international 
markets, processing of food products, cosmet-
ics, and other forms of value addition involve 
relatively high risks due to high and rigid sanitary 
and quality standards (traceability, cold chain, 
etc.) that are subject to rapid change. For forest-
based RCEs, high costs for processing technology 
related to primary and secondary wood transfor-
mation are often prohibitive since access to credit 
is limited by the fact that most of the forests that 
serve as a common pool resource cannot be used 
as collateral. 
• Barriers to consolidating organizational and 
administrative processes: The majority of sampled 
RCEs have yet to consolidate their governance, 
management and overall organizational structures. 
Relations between second-tier and first-tier RCEs 
and between the latter and their members tend be 
informal, often characterized by weak communi-
cation and coordination procedures for production 
and marketing, with few, if any, systems in place 
for monitoring and evaluation of RCE perfor-
mance. A clear division of responsibilities is often 
lacking between the boards of directors, externally 
sourced or community-based managers or admin-
istrators, and the general assemblies (members), 
leading to cumbersome decision making and 
reduced accountability. Boards of directors and 
management or administrative staff often acquire 
5 Lessons learned and 
recommendations
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their skills through lengthy learning-by-doing pro-
cesses, at times in a fully autodidactic fashion, at 
times supported through more or less isolated 
training and technical assistance interventions. 
In many cases, mandatory rotation of BoD mem-
bers, and at times, managers, creates erratic or 
zigzagged learning curves with a strong likelihood 
of extending the duration of RCE development 
processes toward maturity. In extreme cases, orga-
nizations may pass through a phase of collapse and 
regeneration before settling on a steadier path to 
growth and emergence.
• Undercapitalization: With few exceptions, the 
RCEs sampled here have extremely low levels of 
financial capital stock. This limits, among other 
things, their capacity to provide advance pay-
ments or credit to their members—a constraint 
that often is critical for planting and harvesting/
collection. In some cases, over-reliance on exter-
nal, often high-cost credit has led to near collapse 
of the RCE. In addition, delays in payment by 
buyers, combined with lack of own financial capi-
tal, mean that RCEs tend to pay their members 
fully only several weeks, if not months, following 
the delivery of raw material. Though many local 
intermediaries pay prices somewhat below those 
of the RCE, members selling to local intermediar-
ies outside the RCEs (side selling) because of the 
untimely payment modalities are a phenomenon 
reported by several RCEs. 
• Inherent tensions between social and economic 
objectives: only a few of the RCEs sampled can 
be considered fully fledged businesses with clear 
economic objectives. For a variety of reasons, 
including legal forms, historical legacy, develop-
ment considerations, and the nature of external 
support services, most RCEs pursue a blend of 
social and economic objectives. While in theory 
these are not mutually exclusive, in practice they 
tend to turn out to be conflicting. For example, 
cooperatives and associations often can chose 
between reinvesting their profits into the busi-
ness to capitalize their enterprises and paying 
dividends to their members to spur household 
and community development. The pursuit of 
environmental objectives adds a further layer of 
management complexity, except where natural 
resource management objectives are fundamen-
tal to the business model, such as in ecotourism 
enterprises.
What commonalities and differences exist among RCE 
in terms of asset endowments? 
• Natural capital: Large endowments of natural 
capital among several RCEs have played a major 
role in their development. Their membership base 
provides most RCEs with relatively good access to 
the resource base, even in the absence of legal land 
titles. In addition, RCEs may benefit from site-spe-
cific biophysical or agroecological characteristics 
that confer a basis for competitive advantage. 
For example, the absence of major diseases in the 
Dominican Republic allows for high levels of pro-
ductivity in organic banana and cocoa as compared 
to neighboring countries. In other cases, for exam-
ple specialty coffee production in Guatemala, the 
ability to attract large investments by international 
buyers relates to the high degree of “cup complex-
ity”—a result of production being scattered in 
various microclimates along a volcanic ridge. The 
success of RCE development based on the produc-
tion of certified wood products in Mexico, in turn, 
reflects the RCEs’ exclusive access to large expanses 
of mahogany-rich forest. Alternatively, insecure 
or highly conditional resource access has limited 
RCE development in the Gambia (ecotourism) 
and Guatemala (sawnwood). Interestingly, there 
are cases where limited natural capital does not 
impede RCE development, for example in India 
where the raw material for poultry production is 
purchased from external providers. In general, 
most RCEs are relatively well-endowed with natu-
ral capital, but even in the few cases where they are 
not, this restriction alone is not necessarily a limit-
ing factor for RCE development.
• Physical capital: In many cases, lack of basic 
infrastructure, storage and processing facilities, 
equipment, machinery and tools is a major con-
straint for RCE development. In several cases, 
RCEs possessed little more than an office, basic 
storage facilities, and some post-harvest and/or 
processing machinery and equipment, if any. 
However, some RCEs have been able to make 
significant investments in physical capital worth 
between a few US$ 100,000 (e.g., Bolivian Ama-
zon, Ghana, and Mexico), or up to several million 
in U.S. dollars (e.g., Bolivian highlands, Domini-
can Republic, and USA). In most cases, RCEs 
are not adequately equipped with state-of-the-art 
technology or facilities. Typically, equipment and 
machinery were purchased secondhand, lowering 
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initial investments but causing higher maintenance 
and operating costs. In general terms, we found 
that significant investments in processing facilities 
based on sound funding and marketing strategies 
make the difference between RCEs that are viable 
but relatively stagnant and not fully self-sufficient, 
and those that have reached a stage of maturity 
and strategic positioning in the value chain.
• Financial assets: Most sampled RCEs are highly 
undercapitalized irrespective of their size and scale 
of operations. While this partially reflects the inher-
ent constraints of the legal form of the RCEs that 
may impede capital accumulation (e.g., cooperatives, 
associations), it also reflects inefficient management 
and limited ability/willingness of members to invest 
in their businesses. Funding constraints force RCEs 
to access formal or informal credit, often under 
unfavorable conditions, which in turn reduces the 
net benefits received by members. Where large 
investments have been made by RCEs, donations 
have played a major role (e.g., Mexico and Bolivian 
highlands). Despite a concentration of donor fund-
ing in Africa, the African RCEs in the sample report 
less donations for RCE infrastructure development 
as compared to Latin America. This reflects, among 
other things, certain advances in RCE development 
in Latin America and, possibly, donor strategies in 
Africa focused on basic needs and disaster relief 
rather than business development.  
• Social capital: Several sampled RCEs show espe-
cially high levels of social cohesion and formation 
of social capital (e.g., Bolivian highlands, Mexico, 
United States), as reflected in corporate identity, 
political advocacy, demand for membership, and 
strong commitment to the development of their 
enterprises. These RCEs share such features as: 
individual members with the knowledge and skills 
to exercise their rights and participate in decision-
making processes; formal structure and rules that 
define members’ rights and responsibilities, as well 
as mechanisms for enforcement and sanctions; and 
motivation and trust in control and decision-making 
processes. Where one or more of these features was 
not present, social capital within RCEs is rather lim-
ited (e.g., Ghana, Uganda, Guatemala, Papua New 
Guinea). In these cases, an RCE may be perceived 
by its members as merely another intermediary 
competing for the purchase of raw material. 
• Human capital: Human capital in RCEs has two 
major manifestations: entrepreneurial skills for 
innovation and management skills for business 
administration. We rarely found evidence for the 
combination of both types of skills in a single per-
son at management or director’s level. In several 
cases, human capital has been built for carrying out 
relatively complex production activities (organic, 
fresh fruits, sustainable forest management), pro-
cessing, and marketing in higher-value national 
and international markets. Even when spread out 
over various persons, however, overall innovation 
and management capacity was low in most of the 
RCEs sampled. One of the unsolved questions is 
whether the human capital needed for innova-
tion and management can, and should be, formed 
among RCE members gradually over time. Such 
investments in prevailing management and gov-
ernance structures are at odds with the quick 
turnover at the leadership level which results in 
zigzagged learning curves and enterprise develop-
ment processes of several decades. Alternatively, 
human capital deficiencies could be addressed 
by hiring externally sourced managers, though 
this may imply reduced sense of ownership, less 
democratic governance and a challenge of sus-
tainability. Mixed models, whereby externally 
sourced managers train local staff from within 
the communities on the job for a given period of 
time, are yet to be explored. Support by donors 
along these lines would allow for a decent level 
of managerial skills early in the start-up phase of 
RCEs, while continuously forming local human 
capital and, hence, increased sense of ownership.
•	 In the cases where RCE have opted for externally 
sourced management, experiences have been 
positive if 1) RCE members have the ability and 
structures to monitor performance and influence 
policies, or 2) externally sourced managers effec-
tively involve RCE members in decision making. 
To what extent have bottom-up (community-led) versus 
top-down (NGO, government agency, or buyer-led) 
approaches impacted the overall RCE development 
process?
•	 Evidence here suggests that the upside of bottom-up 
RCE development is increased sense of owner-
ship and empowerment of local leaders, while the 
downside of bottom-up processes is intervention 
periods measured in decades rather than years. 
The development of Menominee has largely been 
the effort of tribal members working with the U.S. 
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government, which over several decades has led to 
the required level of asset endowments. The cacao-
based RCE in Bolivia is a good example of how 
local producers can assume management positions 
and develop managerial skills over time that allow 
them successfully to run a second-tier enterprise 
engaged in processing of semifinished and finished 
cacao products. At the same time, the success has 
to been seen in light of the long-term commitment 
and extensive investments by a multitude of devel-
opment agencies and NGOs.   
•	 The sample included several examples of top-down 
approaches to RCE development based on the 
notion that RCE members did not have the basic 
skills nor the confidence required to participate 
in decision-making processes. In these cases, the 
principal dilemma exists in that top-down develop-
ment can increase RCE performance and therefore 
provide increased benefits for members in shorter 
periods of time, while, in several cases, government 
and NGO appointed managers neither created 
sense of ownership among RCE members nor were 
up to the complex tasks and responsibilities related 
to RCE administration and marketing. 
•	 In general, long-term accompaniment by govern-
ment agencies and NGOs has been critical to the 
emergence of all of the more developed RCEs. With-
out such assistance, these RCEs probably would 
not have been organized nor sufficient human and 
physical capital formed for participating in higher-
value markets. In this respect, external services were 
critical for linking with buyers, improving quality, 
obtaining certification, and developing effective 
administration and export procedures. While nearly 
all the internationally oriented RCEs report hav-
ing received buyer services over the past few years, 
in most cases these services were limited to credit 
guarantees and the exchange of strategic informa-
tion. Only in the case of organic coffee production 
in Guatemala were buyers willing to invest in long-
term RCE development through capacity building 
in production techniques, certification, and mar-
keting. Those RCEs with strictly limited access to 
external services were among the least developed of 
the sample.  
To what extent do economic, social, or environmental 
objectives dominate RCE development? 
•	 The RCEs sampled here highlight the diverse 
range of objectives potentially pursued by RCEs. 
In two cases, the objective of RCE development 
was predominantly focused on natural resource 
conservation, and to a lesser extent community 
development. In both these cases, however, RCE 
objectives were highly influenced by external 
organizations, through RCE administration by the 
state forest department or by the legal require-
ment to reinvest a significant share of RCE income 
in forest management. In other cases, community 
development was a primary goal, though the offer 
of employment and income to a broad group of 
community members tends to compromise cost 
effectiveness of RCEs. In other cases, income gen-
eration has been stressed above all other goals. In 
exceptional cases RCEs appear to have reached 
a certain balance between the three objectives, 
although trade-offs still exist. 
•	 As RCEs mature, there is ample evidence that they 
can provide a range of services to their members in 
addition to product bulking and market linkages. 
Examples include: credit provision, education 
programs, and technical assistance for primary 
production. However, evidence here suggests that 
during the early stages of RCE development, the 
overextension of internal RCE service provision 
is a factor contributing to the long development 
horizon for RCEs. In some cases, outsourcing of 
RCE services would enable RCEs to concentrate 
on their core activities (e.g., quality control, mar-
keting) and improve their overall sustainability. In 
this context, the challenge for development agen-
cies is to facilitate the effective linking of RCE 
members with service providers. 
What legal forms are available for RCE organization 
and to what extent do they promote or hamper their 
long-term development? 
•	 While various options of legal forms exist for RCE 
constitution, most adopt the form of cooperatives 
and associations. However, neither model ade-
quately addresses the realities and needs of RCEs. 
The selection of a legal form often forces RCEs into 
trade-offs related to taxes versus nonprofit status, 
asset building versus capital disbursement, internal 
versus external decision making and control, and 
member versus nonmember participation, among 
other factors. However, in many cases, not even the 
“second-best option” is frequently chosen, due to 
the lack of business vision, legal inexperience, and 
inappropriate advice by NGO and development 
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agencies (e.g., priority for conservation rather than 
business development). The sample shows that tax 
breaks are often the major motive behind the selec-
tion of the legal form of a cooperative or association; 
however, these structures, as currently defined in 
most countries, do not permit the capitalization 
required for strategic positioning in expanding agri-
cultural and forest product markets. As a result, the 
legal form selected by RCEs may impede long-term 
development because of inappropriate governance 
structures and lack of investment options. 
To what extent have RCEs adopted clearly defined 
rights and responsibilities among members, directors 
and managers? 
•	 Several RCEs lack clear constitutions and proper 
management structures. In some cases, decisions 
are taken by the BoD or the general assembly. On 
the upside, a participative structure legitimizes RCE 
decisions. On the downside, development of clear 
strategic perspectives is often hampered. In some 
cases, long-term external support is provided for 
business administration, usually in the form of exter-
nally funded managers or co-administration by NGO 
staff. While this form of administration may ensure 
minimum capacity and skills in the early stages of 
RCE development, it is prone to be unsustainable 
unless a clear strategy exists for local skills develop-
ment and phasing out of external support. In other 
cases, NGO support is cut prematurely due to the 
termination of projects or other funding, often leav-
ing RCE managers without sufficiently developed 
administration skills. In cases where NGO support 
is long-term, it may turn out to be paternalistic, thus 
impeding local skill development. 
•	 Most RCEs maintain informal relations with 
their members: few have written well-defined 
mechanisms for communication downward to 
the members and upward to the managers, other 
than the general assembly. Even in cases where 
rules and regulations for critical areas of RCE 
operations exist, effective implementation and 
enforcement mechanisms may not be in place. 
Notable exceptions include the RCEs sampled in 
the United States, the Dominican Republic, and 
India. Regarding vertical commercial arrange-
ments, more than 50% of the sampled RCEs buy 
from first-tier RCEs and/or sell to buyers and 
processors without written contracts. The for-
malization of institutional arrangements between 
RCEs and members and between RCEs and buyers 
will contribute to reducing transaction costs along 
the value chain and improving the overall business 
performance of RCEs. 
How do women participate in RCE membership, 
management and governance? 
•	 Participation of women in RCE management and 
governance is very limited in this sample, despite 
the fact that in several RCEs women play a criti-
cal role in harvesting and processing. In the case of 
timber-based RCEs, women tend to be excluded 
from all production-related processes. Cultural 
factors largely prevent them from playing a more 
prominent role in management decision making. 
Nonetheless, some exceptions were identified; 
for example, in both RCEs from the Dominican 
Republic women play prominent roles as execu-
tive directors. In general, however, unless there is 
change in attitudes toward women and the division 
of labor within the household, little real change can 
be expected, even if RCEs can point out examples 
of a few female board members. In this context, 
there is an urgent need for RCEs and supporting 
organizations to identify women who are interested 
in RCE administration and to strengthen their 
entrepreneurial, managerial and leadership skills.
Which elements of the political–legal framework stand 
out in terms of their positive or negative impact on 
RCE development? 
•	 Existing policies, laws, rules, and regulations are 
rarely conducive to RCE development. There tends 
to be a set of incomplete, conflicting, and/or overly 
complicated regulations for business operations 
(e.g., complex export procedures, lack of finan-
cial incentive schemes, ill-suited legal forms for 
RCEs). In some cases, direct political interference 
constrains RCE performance, especially in Africa. 
Formal mechanisms are needed for establishing 
regular dialogue between government agencies and 
RCEs to address limitations in the political–legal 
and regulatory frameworks and identify viable 
solutions. An enabling institutional environment 
would also include effective and well-articulated 
technical, business development and financial ser-
vices provided by government agencies, NGOs and 
projects that have aligned and harmonized their 
intervention strategies, including clear entry and 
exit strategies.
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•	 There were also some positive features of the 
political–legal framework that we could identify, 
including: increased access to forest resources, 
special treatment of RCEs in tax codes, and some 
cases of subsidies for infrastructure development. 
Governments and international organizations 
can contribute to improving the political–legal 
framework for RCE development by emphasizing 
business objectives at least as much as conservation 
objectives in the granting of resource access rights, 
adopting specialized legal forms for RCEs that 
provide incentives for capitalization and social and 
environment performance, adopting simple busi-
ness registration and export procedures, promoting 
financial incentive schemes; investing in improved 
information and communication flows (e.g., low-
cost access to Internet and cell phone service in 
rural areas); fostering market-based approaches 
to service delivery through innovative payment 
mechanisms (e.g., vouchers or co-funded measures) 
and upgrading the capacities of service providers to 
identify and respond to the needs of RCEs. 
To what extent does insecure access to natural resources 
constrain RCE development?
•	 Access to the resource base remains a major 
issue for RCE development in the forest sector. 
Among the related RCEs, collective access to the 
resource base prevails, ranging from community-
owned lands (e.g., ejidos in Mexico) to usufruct 
rights (community concessions in Guatemala) or 
customary rights (NTFP collection in the Bolivia 
Amazon). However, ambiguous and overlapping 
regulations, strong biases toward conservation 
rather than income generation, and the shifting 
of management burdens to communities without 
sufficient financial and technical support have 
thwarted the emergence of several RCEs. On the 
other hand, where tenure has been secure and 
natural resources are relatively abundant, such as 
in Mexico, viable RCE development has proven 
possible. 
•	 With regard to agriculture-based RCEs, in most 
cases, only a small percentage of RCE members 
have land titles, usually between 10% and 30%. 
Though land title is a prerequisite for using land as 
collateral for credit and functioning land markets, 
its absence does not imply an imminent threat to 
the flow of natural resources from producers (col-
lectors) to RCEs. Evidence here suggests that 
investments by RCE members in, for example, 
perennial coffee, cocoa, and banana, take place 
even in the absence of legal access to the resource 
base. This implies that RCE members perceive 
related risks as being relatively low due to the 
prevalence of customary rights, lack of land use 
pressure, or indifference by the state. While land 
tenure is not a sine qua non for RCE develop-
ment in the initial stages, over the long term it 
may prove to be significant, since secure tenure 
improves access to capital and the introduction of 
labor-intensive production modes.  
To what extent does lack of infrastructure limit the 
development of RCEs?
•	 Less than 20% of sampled RCEs have year-round 
road access, 24/7 electricity, and secure telephone 
and Internet connection. For the majority of 
RCEs, one or several of these factors constrain 
RCE operations. Impassable roads during parts 
of the year cause delay in delivery of raw mate-
rials and finished products. A number of factors 
increase transaction costs and undermine coordi-
nation and internal and external communication: 
regular and irregular power cuts increase produc-
tion costs, while the limited number of telephone 
lines and low speed and intermittent Internet con-
nection causes higher transaction costs. 
What impact have RCEs had in employment and 
income generation, natural resource management, and 
community development?
•	 Employment generated by RCEs ranges from a 
handful of employees to several hundred staff. In 
most cases, RCEs employ between 10 and 20 full-
time staff. Only in enterprises where processing 
plays a major role are employment rates signifi-
cantly higher. Where processing is not a major 
activity, employment of community members can 
be as low as two to five full-time positions, and in 
some cases, there is no full-time employment for 
community members at all.
•	 Evidence suggests that income generated by 
smallholders and community members through 
RCE affiliation figures prominently among over-
all income sources. Some forest-based RCEs pay 
significant annual dividends of US$ 500–2000 per 
member. This, however, usually implies high bar-
riers to entry, in order to protect current RCE 
members from benefit reductions. Relatively few 
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RCEs oriented toward local markets pay prices 
significantly exceeding those paid by local inter-
mediaries. Even among the RCEs with niche 
market orientation, prices paid to members for 
differentiated products tend to be only 10–15% 
above prices of conventional products. In situ-
ations where local marketing conditions are 
relatively poor, RCEs oriented toward the inter-
national market have managed to pay notable 
price premiums (up to 50%) by linking directly 
with international buyers. In general, incomes 
generated through RCE affiliation are only part 
of the household portfolio. In none of the cases 
sampled, did RCE members live exclusively on 
RCE-derived income. This reflects the fact that 
RCEs tend to be specialized on a single product 
(or product group), whereas livelihood strategies 
of members are diversified. RCEs face a major 
challenge to become proficient in what they are 
doing and, at the same time, diversify their oper-
ations and services to meet the diverse needs of 
their members better.  
•	 One of the areas where RCEs clearly stand out 
is their capacity for sound natural resource man-
agement. This is not only true because of the 
high degree of certified enterprises but also the 
generally low-input agriculture or forestry they 
practice. In addition, outside support provided 
to the RCEs has strongly focused on improving 
their environmental performance. RCEs have 
generated impact on community development 
to varying degrees. Given shared ownership of 
the resources, forest-based RCEs tend to pro-
vide benefits to a large proportion of community 
members, thereby increasing overall impact 
on the community. For example, RCEs in the 
United States and Mexico have made major 
contributions to community infrastructure. 
Agricultural-based RCEs, on the other hand, 
typically represent only a sub-group of a given 
community, though certain forms of certifica-
tion (fair trade) and enterprise philosophy make 
them invest part of their proceeds in community 
development (e.g., schools, road construction, 
wells for drinking water). 
•	 The perception of RCEs among governments 
and civil society as a promoter of broad-based, 
equitable development among smallholders, 
combined with the perception of local traders and 
processors as offering inequitable relations with 
smallholders, has made them a common prescrip-
tion for rural development. As noted throughout 
this review, mature RCEs can play a critical role 
in addressing rural poverty, community develop-
ment and natural resource conservation. However, 
where local leadership, management, experience 
and technical know-how are weak, and the over-
all business environment is less than hospitable, 
RCEs may not be the best option for promoting 
rural development. 
To what extent is the environment for the provision 
of services conducive to long-term RCE growth and 
development? 
•	 RCEs with greater access to credit are those with 
long-term business relationships with buyers, 
relatively stable production volumes, and niche 
market orientation (usually certified). More than 
50% of the sample has received formal financial 
services from either local banks or international 
not-for-profit providers (e.g., Shared Interest). 
Access to credit has been critical for investments 
in facilities and processing technologies. How-
ever, in a couple of cases excess credit has led to 
near insolvency. On the other hand, a few RCEs 
have achieved significant levels of working capi-
tal. The recent trend for specialized lending to 
fair trade certified RCEs (e.g., Ecologic Finance, 
Shared Interest, Verde Ventures), benefits 
RCEs by providing more favorable conditions in 
terms of collateral, interest rates, and repayment 
terms. For the other half of the sample, the lack 
of affordable credit has prohibited growth and 
expansion and the possibility of offering credit 
services to members (who must rely on informal 
lending options that typically imply unfavorable 
interest rates). 
•	 Most RCEs reported a minimum level of access 
to technical services, usually through government 
agencies, government-supported industry associ-
ations, or NGOs. However, with few exceptions, 
these services have focused only on produc-
tion and processing for conventional products 
for local markets or international markets. In 
some cases where specialized services have been 
required (e.g., organic banana and cocoa pro-
duction), RCEs have had to invest in the direct 
provision of technical services for their members, 
requiring extensive technical and financial sup-
port from donors and NGOs. Overall, access to 
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specialized business services for RCE develop-
ment is insufficient. In practice, business services 
are provided by generalist service providers who 
tend not to meet the demand for such services. 
What strategies have been adopted to balance the 
need to build capacity with the need to promote RCE 
independence? 
•	 Results suggest that business services tend to be 
incomplete, insufficiently focused on RCE needs, 
rarely coordinated among different services pro-
viders, and delivered without a clear entry and exit 
strategy. In addition, many of the sampled RCEs 
face difficulties in clearly articulating their demand 
for such services—they tend to demand what they 
know as they lack knowledge of the benefits of alter-
native services and have yet to receive specialized 
business development services. The typical situation 
RCEs face is that where a sole service provider—
typically an NGO or development project—offers 
an often incomplete service package for the dura-
tion of external funding (usually three to four years). 
If there is more than one service provider in a given 
region, these may compete or worse, pursue con-
flicting objectives and approaches. At the same 
time, RCEs do not receive all the services needed, 
as their providers may be specialized in certain ser-
vices without being capable of providing the mix of 
technical, business development and financial ser-
vices RCEs typically need during both the start-up 
and consolidation phases. 
•	 To overcome the technical, institutional, manage-
rial and financial challenges identified here, many 
RCEs fall back on external support from develop-
ment projects, NGOs, and government agencies, for 
which the main criterion is “free-of-charge,” rather 
than “as-per-demand.” Service delivery focuses on 
short-term impact, neglecting strategic planning, 
product development, and marketing. Similarly, 
internal capacities focus on labor-intensive, low-
cost, and low-risk solutions, which may yield the 
desired impact on the short term, but compromise 
the strategic orientation of the enterprise.
What have been the impacts of buyer-provided services 
on RCE development? 
•	 Access to buyer-provided services was generally 
limited to a few RCEs participating in niche mar-
kets (organic coffee and chicle, certified timber, 
fair trade cocoa). In the case of the organic coffee 
cooperative in Guatemala, such services were crit-
ical for 1) acquiring organic production capacities 
and certification, and 2) development of business 
vision. In a case from the Dominican Republic, 
buyers were important for resolving issues related 
to the export and import of cocoa. In most cases, 
however, buyer-provided services were limited in 
nature and scope, usually not extending beyond 
information sharing. 
Potential shortcuts: recommendations  
for donors 
Discussions throughout this review highlight the 
urgent need to create more economically sustainable 
RCEs in shorter periods of time. Such ‘short cuts’ will 
require that RCEs have regular access to a variety 
of effective and well-articulated technical, business 
development and financial services throughout the 
development process. The design and delivery of 
these services require alignment and harmonization 
between government and development agencies, 
NGOs, research and training centers on the one hand, 
and closer collaboration, communication and coor-
dination among RCEs, buyers and processors on the 
other. Precise support mechanisms need to be identi-
fied, including cost recovery schemes and sequencing 
of service delivery according to the stage of enterprise 
development.
In the design of services for RCE development sev-
eral cross-cutting themes should be considered: 
• Gender equity: Effectively dealing with gender 
issues requires systematic approaches to address-
ing realities and needs related to gender-wise 
labor division, decision making and income gen-
eration at household level. This implies dialogue 
between RCE leaders, members, and community 
leaders for awareness raising of gender issues, and 
designing, implementing, and monitoring institu-
tional mechanisms for gender equity. Specific to 
RCE development is the need for increased com-
patibility between business activities and other 
livelihood activities, in particular “traditional” 
female household tasks and responsibilities. Solu-
tions could include structural innovations—such as 
quotas for female participation in RCE leadership 
positions; and facilities and services—such as day 
care; and process innovations—such as scheduling 
meetings at times and in places that are accessible 
to women.
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• Sustainability in service delivery: The lengthy pas-
sage from emergence to maturity means that the 
requirement for long-term support cannot be 
overstated. The untimely withdrawal of support by 
service providers can have dramatic consequences 
for RCE development, as most RCEs have few 
alternative sources of support. Dealing with 
this issue calls for more flexible and creative 
approaches to project funding such that providers 
are not forced to withdraw too early. This requires 
a clear business vision and strategic orientation 
in service delivery, ideally from the very begin-
ning of the RCE development process. Tangible 
goals need to be identified for the short, mid and 
long term that allow RCEs to reinvest part of the 
increased utilities derived from effective services 
in contracting progressively more sophisticated 
services.
• Organizational models: Formulation of novel and 
appropriate legal forms of collective organization 
may help to overcome the perennial problems of 
inadequate governance structures, weak opera-
tional management and undercapitalization. Most 
of the legal forms available for RCE organization 
allow for a blend of social and economic objec-
tives. On the upside, the not-for-profit nature of 
these forms exempts RCEs from taxes and permits 
equitable distribution of benefits among the mem-
bers. On the downside, legal restrictions for profit 
making and capital accumulation usually impose 
a ceiling to RCE growth and performance. Solu-
tions to this dilemma may involve alternative legal 
forms according to the development stage. Not-
for-profit forms such as cooperatives and producer 
associations may be viable in the initial stages of 
enterprise development, whereas the evolution 
from emergent to mature enterprise often requires 
for-profit forms of RCE organization, professional-
ization of management, and external investments. 
For example, investment by the private sector into 
shared equity may provide finance, ensure profes-
sional governance and management, and build in 
accountability mechanisms. Insights can be gained 
from the ‘new generation’ cooperative movement 
to design new-generation RCEs for developing 
economies. This requires political dialogue for 
adjustments in the political–legal frameworks, as 
well as changes in the mindsets of RCE leaders 
and members, would-be investors, and political 
decision makers.
• Trust development: Interventions must adequately 
address trust issues within RCEs (members, first-
tier, second-tier), and between them and other 
chain actors and service providers. This requires 
appropriate communication and coordination 
mechanisms designed for increased transparency 
in actions, dialogue, participatory goal setting, 
and effective monitoring and evaluation. These 
mechanisms need to take into account that trust 
building implies long-term, gradual processes 
that, in order to be viable, should be based on 
realistic and tangible outcomes whose scope and 
scale increase over time.
• Learning and coordination: With the growing 
interest in RCE development by NGOs, gov-
ernment agencies, and the private sector, it is 
essential to improve our understanding of related 
processes and the ways in which we advance them. 
Toward this end, systematic learning is impera-
tive, based on thorough impact assessment of 
RCE development interventions. Learning alli-
ances and other multistakeholder platforms have 
shown potential to stimulate reflection on factors 
of success and failure and to advance concepts, 
methodologies, and tools for RCE development. 
If well-designed and managed, these also help 
avoid competition and undue overlap.
• Triple bottom line: Donors should not assume 
that RCE development is inherently compatible 
with “triple bottom line” performance. With the 
aim to become economically viable businesses, 
the focus on enterprise must be paramount. 
Compatibility of the economic goals of RCE 
development with environmental and social 
objectives is most feasible when sustainable 
production modes are in place or strived for. 
Examples include sustainable forest manage-
ment, organic agriculture, and fair trade certified 
operations. It needs to be borne in mind that 
all these examples refer to niche markets and, 
therefore, do not provide broad-based solu-
tions for rural development. Outside of these 
niches, social and environmental objectives are 
also feasible but there are second-order objec-
tives in RCE development. In situations where 
environmental management and broader com-
munity development are paramount, and where 
niche market orientation is not a viable option, 
approaches other than RCE development may 
be required.
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To improve the overall service environment for RCE 
development, donors may wish to consider the rec-
ommendations in Table 5.1. These are provided for 
the following three stages of RCE development: 
pre-emergent, emergent, and mature. In addition, 
recommendations distinguish between three types of 
support organization: generalist providers, specialist 
providers, and research and training centers. By gener-
alist providers we refer to organizations which provide a 
range of services to rural communities, including health, 
education, and political advocacy. In contrast, specialist 
providers focus on a narrow range of services related to 
strengthening the technical, business, or financial capac-
ities of RCEs and other types of enterprises. Research 
and training centers, in turn, are the nodes where inno-
vations emerge that help both generalists and specialists 
to upgrade their service delivery. A competent gener-
alist is one who recognizes when specialist skills are 
required and how they can be mobilized. A competent 
specialist, on the other hand, recognizes the limits of its 
service delivery and helps mobilizing complementary 
services by other specialists or generalists.
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Table 5.1  Recommendations for donors in supporting services for RCE development, according to type 
of service provider and stage of RCE development
Stage of 
RCE devel-
opment
Generalist service providers Specialist service providers Research and training centers
Pre-
emergent
− Provide advocacy for 
enhanced political–legal 
framework (appropriate legal 
forms, secure land tenure), 
and basic infrastructure 
− Build human and social capital 
for business organization and 
development
− Identify appropriate RCE 
governance structures 
according to local objectives, 
asset endowments, and the 
needs of business partners
− Build capacities for increased 
productivity, raw material 
quality, and value adding
− Promote regular dialogue 
between local processors, 
investors, and governments 
for linking RCEs with national 
and international markets
− Facilitate access to grants and 
soft loans for RCE operations 
and investments in basic 
physical capital
− Identify opportunities for 
enhancing political–legal 
frameworks for RCE 
development and market 
opportunities
− Develop appropriate 
technologies for increased 
productivity, raw material quality, 
storage, and value adding
− Build capacities in RCE 
development of generalists and 
specialists through concepts and 
tools for pre-emergent RCEs
Emergent − Provide advocacy for 
enhanced political–legal 
framework: legal forms, 
incentives, tax polices, 
infrastructure improvements
− Build capacities of women 
in business leadership and 
management
− Promote basic M&E systems, 
transparency, and RCE 
conflict resolution mechanisms
− Facilitate trust building within 
RCEs and between RCEs and 
other chain actors and service 
providers 
− Promote alternative 
governance structures, 
gender equity, and strategic 
orientation
− Build capacities for improved 
production, processing, and 
quality control
− Facilitate improvements 
in strategic and business 
planning, buyer relations, 
marketing, and financial 
management
− Facilitate access to loans and 
co-funding schemes for RCE 
operations and investments in 
processing technologies
− Identify alternative RCE 
governance structures and 
market opportunities
− Develop appropriate 
technologies for production, 
processing, and quality control
− Facilitate learning processes 
among RCEs and service 
providers regarding the design of 
viable financing and risk-benefit 
sharing mechanisms
− Build capacities in RCE 
development of generalists and 
specialists through concepts and 
tools for emergent RCEs
Mature − Provide advocacy for 
enhanced political–legal 
framework: specific incentives 
and tax regimes for capital-
intensive RCEs
− Facilitate strategic planning 
within RCEs (members, first- 
and second-tier) for capital-
intensive RCE development 
− Promote strategic alliances 
between RCEs and other chain 
actors and service providers
− Promote innovations in 
product design, marketing, 
and product diversification
− Build capacities for total 
quality management in 
production, processing, and 
commercialization
− Facilitate access to 
sophisticated  investment and 
risk reducing schemes
− Identify opportunities for 
innovative product design, 
marketing, and product 
diversification
− Develop appropriate 
technologies for total quality 
management
− Identify opportunities for 
innovative investment and risk 
reducing schemes
− Facilitate learning processes 
among RCEs and service 
providers for design of success 
and failure in RCE development 
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RCE Member impacts Community impacts 
El Ceibo 
(Bolivia)
- Price premium for certified cacao (about 
30% or US$400/member/year)
- Access to organic production 
technologies
- Access to RCE provided credit
- Production zone: 80 full-time employees (mainly 
local promoters) plus processing plant: 40 full-time 
and 20 part-time employees
- Leverage of project funds for community 
development 
CAIC (Bolivia) - Market outlet for 450 Brazil nut 
collectors;
- Availability of cheap foodstuffs to 
employees of processing plant, which 
are bought by the cooperative from 
members, to the extent possible
- Part-time employment (4–8 months) for 170 people
- Full-time employment for 20 people
- Strong role of women in processing plant (110 Brazil 
nut shelling posts absorbed by women)
BANELINO 
(Dominican 
Republic)
- 2006 prices for organic and conventional 
banana averaged 10% and 5%, 
respectively, above prices offered by 
local exporters, translating into an 
average of US$ 2,100 increased income 
for RCE members
- Skills development in post-harvest 
management, certification, and organic 
production
- Relatively low-risk investment/market 
environment 
- Access to affordable credit through RCE 
(12% APR)
- Strong female participation in management, 
marketing, and technical assistance (>50% labor)
- Low barriers to RCE membership, with rapidly 
expanding membership levels
- 25% net income reinvested in community 
development (educational infrastructure, health 
services, youth sports) and certification 
- 70% production certified organic (est. 700 ha)
- 50 full-time, year-round positions
- One of only 28 fair trade certified banana providers 
in the world
CONACADO 
(Dominican 
Republic)
- Average annual income received by 
RCE members ~US$ 2,000, with price 
premiums averaging 50% above prices 
offered for conventional cocoa (average 
US$ 1,000/year of additional income/
member)
- Skills development in organic production, 
fermentation, and certification 
- Funeral costs covered for members 
- Low-risk investment/market environment 
- Secure access to interest-free credit 
- Low barriers to RCE membership, with moderately 
expanding membership levels 
- US$ 330,000 invested in churches, home repair, 
bridge construction since 2004
- 100% cocoa production certified organic (est. 
24,000 ha)
- Sound resource management through use of 
diversified cocoa-based agroforestry systems
- 12 full-time, year-round positions 
La Voz 
(Guatemala)
- Average annual income received by RCE 
members: US$ 2,300, price received 
averaging 25% above prices offered 
for conventional coffee, translating into 
average increased income of US$ 525/
year/member
- Relatively low-risk investment/market 
environment 
- Development of skills and capacities for 
production and certification of organic 
coffee
- Low barriers to RCE membership, with slightly 
expanding membership levels 
- Social premiums from fair trade invested in didactic 
materials for 4 local schools and construction of 
library (US$ 1,300) 
- 3 full-time, year-round positions 
- 100% of coffee production is certified as organic, 
produced using traditional techniques and plant 
varieties (est. 144 ha)
Annex: Impacts of RCE development at 
household and community levels
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RCE Member impacts Community impacts 
FEDEPMA 
(Guatemala)
- Average annual income received by RCE 
members ~US$ 230,with price premiums 
nearly 5% to 10% above conventional 
coffee 
- Development of capacities for production 
and certification of organic coffee and 
manufacture of handicrafts
- Low barriers to RCE membership
- Facilitated the donation of US$ 13,000 for the 
upgrading of local school infrastructure (security 
wall, water purifiers, latrines, etc.)
- 6 full-time, seasonal positions (6 months) 
- 100% of coffee production is certified as organic, 
shade canopy is maintained (est. 68 ha)
Chichan Há 
(Mexico)
- Annual dividend ~US$ 150/member 
(expected to increase once recent loans 
for processing equipment are repaid)
- Dividends have increased nearly 100% 
since formation of RCE (work group)
- 40 temporary jobs per year in forest management 
and timber processing
- Financial support for members’ funeral costs, 
schools and sporting events
- 32,500 ha(50% total land area) declared permanent 
forest reserve
Consorcio 
Chiclero 
(Mexico)
- 100% increase in chicle-derived income, 
translating into additional annual income 
of US$ 1,500/member
- Pension benefits for members
- Skills development in quality control and 
international marketing of chicle products
- Relatively low-risk investment/market 
environment 
- Chicle extraction provides seasonal employment 
for up to 1,500 forest dwellers in Yucatan (many of 
which among most vulnerable members of forest 
communities)
- Provides economic incentives for sustainable 
management of 18,000 ha forest 
- RCE critical for preserving 100+ year tradition of 
chicle extraction in Yucatan
Noh-Bec 
(Mexico)
- Annual dividend US$ 2,200/RCE member
- Price of timber in 1982 US$ 800 in 1994, 
increased to US$ 19,000 after ejido took 
control over resource base and RCE was 
established
- Development of skills related to 
sustainable forest management, timber 
extraction and processing, marketing, 
and certification
- 80% of community income comes from RCE, 
providing support for pensions, funeral costs, health 
and social services, and co-financing of potable 
water service and cable TV service
- 70 temp. jobs/year and 116 full-time positions 
- Sustainable management of 18,000 ha dry tropical 
forest, agricultural frontier checked, fire control
X-Yaat (Mexico) - 7 RCE members receive on average US$ 
13/visit (average total US$ 850/year/
member)
- 39 participating community members 
receiving average US$ 7.50/visit (total 
US$ 500/year/member)
- Development of skills related to food 
preparation, group tourism management, 
and business administration
- Low barriers to RCE membership, with 3 out of 7 
members being women who assume 50%–75% 
of activities related to provision of services (food, 
cultural shows) 
- Loan vehicle to ejido members for emergencies 
- Loan computer to ejido primary school
- Preservation of culture through productive activities, 
food, and dancing (average 65 visits per year, 
majority from regional schools)
Menominee 
(United States)
- Full benefits for all employees, including 
health insurance and retirement (n=180)
- Average annual divided US$ 100–
350/household (n=~2,000), exact 
amount varies as determined by Tribal 
Government Council 
- Insurance (workman’s compensation) 
for contract loggers (n=150), benefit not 
provided by most mills
- Development of skills related to 
sustainable forest management, timber 
extraction and processing, marketing
- Sustainable forest operations are critical for 
maintaining reservation status (requirement in 
agreement with federal government) 
- Prior to 1960, all community income was derived 
from RCE, remains important (>50%), casino 
operations developed over past 15 years have 
allowed for more diversified tribal income (~500)
- Critical source of income (~ US$ 1 M/ year) for co-
financing tribal infrastructure and operations (health 
clinic, university, primary and secondary education, 
public transport, youth programs, etc.) 
- Largest employer of household heads in tribe 
- Sustainable forest operations for 150 years on 
100,000-plus haof broad leaf forest (largest 
continuous stand of forest in state of Wisconsin)
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Tsyunhehkwa 
(United States)
- Above average pay for farm and retail 
operations + full benefits, including 
insurance and retirement
- Average ~100 people/year trained in health and 
nutrition issues (including food preservation)
- Donations of food for funeral for tribal members 
- Full time employment for 13 persons, 9 of which are 
tribal members
- Preservation of traditional white corn varieties 
and cultural practices related to corn production, 
harvesting, and post-harvest treatment 
- Organic production on 42 ha of land 
Tumani Tenda 
(Gambia)
- No dividends paid out to RCE members, 
although RCE pays local property taxes 
for all members
- School supplies provided annually for 
community members’ children 
- Access to credit at rates (5% APR)
- Skills developed in business planning 
and administration, marketing, client 
relations, and logistics 
- Skills developed in production of 
products/services related to ecotourism 
camp (e.g., transport, honey)
- Market outlet for community-based micro-
enterprise initiatives (honey, tie and dye, poultry 
rearing, transport, grocery shop, bakery)
- Community vehicle purchased in 2004 
- Infrastructure development (construction of school, 
health care facilities, grocery shop) 
- Preservation of Jolla culture, through productive 
activities, food, and dancing (average 300 visits/
year)
- Poor people’s access to resources, incomes, 
employment, multiplier effects in community, 
community taxation
Kuapa Kokoo 
(Ghana)
- Members receive government 
guaranteed price + extra 1% (due 
low overhead), end-of-year bonus 
(depending on the profit) +US$ 40/bag 
(fair trade premium)
- Including bonus, members receive an 
estimated 20% higher price than prices 
received by intermediaries 
- First divided from ownership of Day 
Chocolate Co. to be paid in 2007 (avg. 
US$ .50/member)
- Strengthened capacities of members in 
cocoa production and diversification of 
skills in oil palm processing and snail 
rearing 
- Access to credit via RCE-owned credit 
coop.
- Increasingly women’s participation in RCE activities: 
50% female participation in production plus 25% in 
marketing
- Provision of day care centers and primary and 
junior secondary schools and water and sanitation 
improvement program 
- 100,000+ people in communities with RCE producer 
groups have received free medical attention and 
prescriptions 
- 90,000 ha of cocoa-based agroforestry systems
- Integrated Crop Pest Management Systems has led 
to doubling of yields
- RCE is strongly representative at the national level 
in Ghana
Rahama 
(Ghana)
- Diversification into niche product lines 
has allowed for possibility of year round 
production and commercialization, 
generating an estimated 20% higher 
member income
- Improved crop production methods 
(irrigation) and diversification of project 
lines
- Women dominate marketing activity, but limited 
involvement in production 
- No community impact as yet, but community 
investments are planned (sanitation projects and 
construction of local farmers’ market) 
- All volunteer operation, no paid employment
- Organic production techniques are low input and 
environmentally friendly (90 ha), currently in process 
of seeking organic certification
Kasinthula 
Cane (Malawi)
- Steady income to members on monthly 
basis est. at 1,500/year + US$ 60/MT of 
fair trade sugar exported is redistributed 
directly to members (roughly US$ 615/
year/member) 
- Low risk investment climate with 25-year 
contract for sugar cane processing 
- Funeral expenses covered for members
- Drilled wells to provide safe drinking water to two 
villages and financed the installation of electricity in 
Chinangwa village 
- Supply local clinic with medication required for the 
treatment of bilharzias
- Members hire ≈500 seasonal employment/year
- Low input production for sugar cane 
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Buzaama ACE 
(Uganda)
- Impacts in members’ income estimated 
to be low, RCE only sells in regional 
market when first-tier organizations 
unable to sell locally
- Increased skills in horticultural 
production and business administration 
- Low barriers to RCE membership 
- 1 full-time, year-round position 
- Use of traditional, low-impact production 
techniques
Nama ACE 
(Uganda)
- Members receive US$ 1.30 (includes 
10% marketing fee charged by RCE) 
for box of hot pepper for export market, 
compared to US$ .58 offered by local 
intermediaries 
- Improved skills in production and post-
harvest management for hot peppers
- Low barriers to RCE membership
- 1 full-time, year-round position 
- Use of traditional, low-impact production 
techniques
Kesla Poultry 
(India)
- Annual average income approximately 
US$ 175-250/year/member 
- Members have reinvested and 
expanded production and bought assets 
(ornaments and bicycles, built new 
houses) and leased agricultural land with 
poultry proceeds 
- Skills development in poultry production 
and commercialization and business 
administration 
- Low barriers to entry, rapidly expanding 
memberships levels, all members are women 
- Gender empowerment: members more assertive 
(increased income and exposure to business world), 
increased cash for medical expenses and home 
construction, reduced out-migration 
- 9 full-time technical and retail staff plus 11 
community-based, part-time staff 
LAMPS (India) - Dividends for members (US$ 6,225 over 
5 years, average US$ 1.50/member/year) 
- Average income from NTFP harvesting 
for ≈900 members estimated at $34/
member 
- Skills development in forest 
management, fire control, NTFP 
collection and processing
- Food products sold at subsidized rates 
for harvesting of NTFPs
- Financial support for education and spiritual 
activities 
- 8 full-time, year-round position
- Increased create awareness and capacities for 
sustainable forest management
- Village Forest Committee has been formed with 
potential to enhance community involvement in 
NTFP management
VGKK (India) - 3 dividend payments: 1997 (US$ 3,440), 
2003 (US$ 3058), and 2005 (4,500) paid 
to LAMPS honey collectors (n=869) 
- Skills developed in honey processing and 
marketing among RCE employees (n=18)
- Financial support for higher education for 15 tribal 
members (US$ 356/student/year)
- RCE contributes financially to NGO activities related 
to primary education, health services, training on 
sustainable forest management
- Temporary (11) and full time (7) employment
Cooperatives 
CCGS (Papua 
New Guinea)
- ≈75% increase in price received by 
members over prices paid by local 
intermediates, translating into average 
income benefit US$ 280/year/member 
- Skills development in best practices for 
coffee production and processing
- Low barriers to RCE membership 
- Low-input coffee production techniques (232 ha)
SMART 
(Papua New 
Guinea)
- Imparted new knowledge and skills 
in processing of coconut products. A 
council ward has installed its own mill, 
operated by community members who 
previously worked at SMART 
- Project formed basis for economic 
development—mutual recognition of 
need for communities to take over 
operations 
- Since 2003, contributed to building of new church 
(US$1,071), loan vehicle for community activities, 
supporting relevant organization in providing 
awareness and distribution of HIV/AIDS information 
- Employment: 11 full-time salaries 
- Low-input coconut production techniques (unknown 
area)
Global review of rural community enterprises
97
RCE Member impacts Community impacts 
Thanh Son 
(Vietnam)
- Increased income of $.13/kg, translating 
into increased annual earning of US$ 
88/member 
- Increased capacities related to 
production and processing (drying) of 
litchi, as well as business administration 
and marketing
- Low barriers to RCE membership 
- Female participation is about 50% in primary 
production, 25%–50% in processing and marketing
- Low-input litchi production techniques (59 ha)
The Tropical Agricultural Research and 
Higher Education Center (CATIE) is a regional 
center dedicated to research and graduate 
education in agriculture and the management, 
conservation and sustainable use of natural 
resources. Its regular members include the 
Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on 
Agriculture (IICA), Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Venezuela. 
CATIE’s core budget is strengthened by 
generous annual contributions from these 
members.
Headquarters, CATIE 7170
Cartago, Turrialba, 30501 
Costa Rica, C. A.
Tel. (506) 2558-2000 • Fax: (506) 2558-2060
www.catie.ac.cr
